本文選題：朝核危機(jī)　切入點(diǎn)：博弈模式　出處：《華東師范大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：朝鮮問(wèn)題無(wú)疑是東亞地區(qū)“冷凍的活火山”,朝核問(wèn)題更是關(guān)乎亞太地區(qū)和平穩(wěn)定的重要問(wèn)題之一。在始于上世紀(jì)90年代初期的第一次朝核危機(jī)和2002年10月爆發(fā)的第二次朝核危機(jī)中,美國(guó)均未能實(shí)現(xiàn)其對(duì)朝政策的理想目標(biāo)——解除朝鮮的核武計(jì)劃,維護(hù)核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制和半島穩(wěn)定。相反,在美朝對(duì)局當(dāng)中,朝鮮卻成功迫使美國(guó)兩次與其達(dá)成了緩和緊張局勢(shì)的協(xié)議——1994年的《美朝核框架協(xié)議》和2007年的《“2·13”共同文件》。美國(guó)和朝鮮之間是經(jīng)歷了怎樣的博弈過(guò)程才達(dá)成了兩份協(xié)議?兩國(guó)是選擇實(shí)施了什么樣的策略才實(shí)現(xiàn)了從對(duì)峙向“合作”的過(guò)渡?兩國(guó)間的博弈模式呈現(xiàn)出什么樣的特點(diǎn)?這是作者所關(guān)注的問(wèn)題。 本文以密歇根大學(xué)政治學(xué)教授羅伯特·艾克斯羅德(Robert Axelrod)關(guān)于合作演進(jìn)的理論為基礎(chǔ),分析了美朝圍繞朝核問(wèn)題進(jìn)行的“重復(fù)囚徒困境”博弈,并對(duì)美朝在博弈期間政策行為的強(qiáng)硬與合作程度進(jìn)行賦值,畫(huà)出雙方政策行為的過(guò)程圖。最后,本文將在這些過(guò)程圖和分析的基礎(chǔ)上總結(jié)美朝博弈的行為特點(diǎn)。本文共分五章,從博弈理論的框架出發(fā),闡述朝核危機(jī)的爆發(fā)、僵持以及化解過(guò)程中的美朝博弈。第一章為博弈論的分析框架和本文的研究?jī)?nèi)容,第二章闡述美朝博弈中各自的策略選擇和利益訴求,第三章和第四章運(yùn)用了政策行為過(guò)程圖的方法分別剖析了兩次朝核危機(jī)中的美朝博弈過(guò)程、各自的行為策略和政策走向,并重點(diǎn)分析了兩份協(xié)議達(dá)成前后美朝間的“利益交換”。第五章分析了美朝在危機(jī)博弈時(shí)的行為特點(diǎn)。 本文采用過(guò)程圖的方法對(duì)美朝博弈過(guò)程分析后發(fā)現(xiàn),美朝在兩次核危機(jī)中所表現(xiàn)出的博弈模式符合“重復(fù)囚徒困境”的特征,而且雙方的對(duì)局過(guò)程也證明了艾斯克羅德教授“合作演進(jìn)”理論的有效性。本文總結(jié)發(fā)現(xiàn),一方面,美國(guó)的對(duì)朝策略行為表現(xiàn)出雙層博弈的特征；另一方面,除第一次朝核危機(jī)爆發(fā)階段之外,此后的朝鮮對(duì)美策略表現(xiàn)出了與美國(guó)對(duì)朝策略很強(qiáng)的同步性,尤其是在朝鮮實(shí)施“以牙還牙”的策略后,美國(guó)才真正認(rèn)識(shí)到朝鮮的態(tài)度立場(chǎng)并回到談判桌前,由此實(shí)現(xiàn)了從對(duì)抗到達(dá)成協(xié)議、緩和危機(jī)的演變。 《“2·13”共同文件》簽署后,朝鮮半島的政治格局和安全形勢(shì)也發(fā)生了巨大的變化,朝核危機(jī)的發(fā)展也面臨著一系列新的環(huán)境和因素。如果美朝仍然延續(xù)過(guò)去的“以牙還牙”的博弈規(guī)則,朝核危機(jī)將很難走出美朝互不信任的困境。
[Abstract]:The Korean issue is undoubtedly a frozen active volcano in East Asia, and the North Korean nuclear issue is one of the most important issues related to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.During the first North Korean nuclear crisis, which began in the early 1990s, and the second North Korean nuclear crisis, which broke out in October 2002, the United States failed to achieve the ideal goal of its policy towards North Korea-the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.To maintain the nuclear non-proliferation regime and stability on the peninsula.On the contrary, North Korea succeeded in forcing the United States twice to reach an agreement with the United States to ease tensions-the 1994 US-DPRK Nuclear Framework Agreement and the 2007 "213" Joint document.What was the game between the United States and North Korea that led to two agreements?What strategy did the two countries choose to implement in order to achieve the transition from confrontation to "cooperation"?What are the characteristics of the game model between the two countries?This is a matter of concern to the author.Based on Robert Axelrod, a professor of political science at the University of Michigan, this paper analyzes the "repeated prisoner's dilemma" game around the North Korean nuclear issue in the United States and North Korea.And the policy behavior of the United States and North Korea in the game during the tough and cooperative degree of assignment, draw the process of policy behavior of both sides.Finally, based on these process diagrams and analysis, this paper summarizes the behavioral characteristics of the game.This paper is divided into five chapters, starting from the framework of game theory, this paper expounds the outbreak of nuclear crisis in North Korea, stalemate and the United States and North Korea in the process of resolving the game.The first chapter is the analysis frame of game theory and the research content of this paper.The third and fourth chapters use the method of the policy behavior process diagram to analyze the game process of the United States and North Korea in the two North Korean nuclear crises, their behavior strategies and policy trends, respectively.And analyzed the two agreements before and after the agreement between the United States and North Korea between the "exchange of interests."The fifth chapter analyzes the behavior characteristics of the United States and North Korea in the crisis game.After analyzing the game process between the United States and North Korea by using the method of process diagram, it is found that the game pattern of the United States and North Korea in the two nuclear crises accords with the characteristics of "repeated prisoner's dilemma".Moreover, the process of the two sides also proves the validity of Professor Esclarde's theory of "cooperative evolution".This paper concludes that, on the one hand, the strategic behavior of the United States toward North Korea shows the characteristics of a two-tier game; on the other hand, in addition to the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis,Since then, North Korea's strategy towards the United States has shown a strong synchronization with the United States' strategy towards the DPRK, especially after the DPRK implemented the "tit-for-tat" strategy, before the United States really realized the DPRK's stance and returned to the negotiating table.This achieved from confrontation to reach an agreement, ease the evolution of the crisis.After the signing of the "213" common document, the political structure and security situation of the Korean Peninsula have also undergone tremendous changes, and the development of the Korean nuclear crisis is also facing a series of new circumstances and factors.If the United States and North Korea continue the "tit-for-tat" game rules of the past, the North Korean nuclear crisis will be difficult to extricate itself from the dilemma of mistrust between the United States and North Korea.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D815.2

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