IMF貸款條件性對(duì)受援國(guó)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)利的影響研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-08 08:52
【摘要】：國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(International Monetary Fund,以下簡(jiǎn)稱IMF)自成立以來一直為維護(hù)世界金融秩序和成員國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)均衡發(fā)展貢獻(xiàn)力量。但近十幾年來,IMF在成員國(guó)遭受經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)時(shí)的表現(xiàn)卻顯得差強(qiáng)人意,一成不變的貶值貨幣、鼓勵(lì)刺激出口及緊縮財(cái)政政策,雖然使受援國(guó)在經(jīng)濟(jì)方面略有恢復(fù),但其公民的人權(quán)狀況,特別是社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)利狀況卻令人擔(dān)憂。居高不下的失業(yè)率、日益降低的勞動(dòng)者待遇以及社會(huì)保障待遇使受援國(guó)公民在飽受經(jīng)濟(jì)困難的同時(shí),又面臨著社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)利受損。而這些不良后果很大程度上是由IMF嚴(yán)苛的貸款條件性引起。貸款條件性(Conditionality)由借款國(guó)為獲得IMF貸款安排所須滿足的一系列實(shí)體內(nèi)容和程序條件構(gòu)成,長(zhǎng)期以來它常被批評(píng)可能侵犯借款國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)主權(quán)、影響受援國(guó)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)利狀況、易成為發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家控制發(fā)展中國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)命脈的工具等,但為了IMF的貸款能夠及時(shí)收回,貸款條件性的設(shè)置無(wú)可厚非。近年來,IMF著手對(duì)其貸款安排、貸款條件性等進(jìn)行改革,但改革措施似乎依舊未觸及發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在IMF中的主導(dǎo)地位。文章以IMF貸款條件性研究為題,運(yùn)用歷史分析、實(shí)證分析等研究方法,借IMF在希臘、阿根廷、韓國(guó)等國(guó)的貸款安排及社會(huì)影響探討IMF貸款條件性本身的不足及其與受援國(guó)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)利的內(nèi)在矛盾。雖然從根本上說,貸款條件性與受援國(guó)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)利的抵牾不可消除,但若能建立有效的監(jiān)督機(jī)制、優(yōu)化貸款條件性設(shè)置的程序并改革IMF中對(duì)于發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家而言不公平的因素,貸款條件性與受援國(guó)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)利的“納什均衡”應(yīng)該能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)。這也是中國(guó)作為在IMF中經(jīng)濟(jì)地位最重要的發(fā)展中國(guó)家,應(yīng)該推進(jìn)IMF改革的方向。
[Abstract]:The International Monetary Fund (International Monetary Fund,) has been contributing to the maintenance of the world financial order and the balanced development of member economies since its establishment. But in the last decade or so, the IMF's performance in the face of the economic crisis in its member countries has been subdued, with a steady devaluation of its currency, encouraging export stimulus and tightening fiscal policies, although it has allowed recipient countries to recover slightly in economic terms. But the human rights situation of its citizens, especially socio-economic rights, is worrying. The high unemployment rate, the decreasing labor treatment and the social security treatment make the citizens of the recipient country suffer from the economic difficulties, but also face the damage of the social and economic rights. And these adverse consequences are largely caused by the IMF's strict loan conditionality. Loan conditionality (Conditionality) consists of a series of substantive and procedural conditions that a borrower country must satisfy in order to obtain a IMF loan arrangement. For a long time, it has often been criticized that it may infringe upon the economic sovereignty of the borrowing country and affect the social and economic rights of the recipient country. It is easy to become a tool for the developed countries to control the economic lifelines of developing countries, but in order to get the IMF loans back in time, the conditionality of the loans can not be criticized. In recent years, the IMF has begun to reform its loan arrangements and loan conditionality, but the reform measures still do not seem to have touched the dominant position of developed countries in the IMF. Based on the research of IMF loan conditionality, this paper uses historical analysis, empirical analysis and other research methods to borrow IMF in Greece and Argentina. On the loan arrangement and Social impact of Korea and other countries the deficiency of the conditionality of IMF loan and its inherent contradiction with the social and economic rights of the recipient country are discussed. Although fundamentally speaking, the contradiction between the conditionality of loans and the socio-economic rights of recipient countries cannot be eliminated, but if an effective monitoring mechanism can be established, The "Nash equilibrium" between loan conditionality and the social and economic rights of recipient countries should be realized by optimizing the procedures of loan conditionality setting and reforming the unfair factors in IMF for both developed and developing countries. China, as the most important developing country in IMF, should promote the reform of IMF.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華僑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：D996.2
，
本文編號(hào)：2317977
[Abstract]:The International Monetary Fund (International Monetary Fund,) has been contributing to the maintenance of the world financial order and the balanced development of member economies since its establishment. But in the last decade or so, the IMF's performance in the face of the economic crisis in its member countries has been subdued, with a steady devaluation of its currency, encouraging export stimulus and tightening fiscal policies, although it has allowed recipient countries to recover slightly in economic terms. But the human rights situation of its citizens, especially socio-economic rights, is worrying. The high unemployment rate, the decreasing labor treatment and the social security treatment make the citizens of the recipient country suffer from the economic difficulties, but also face the damage of the social and economic rights. And these adverse consequences are largely caused by the IMF's strict loan conditionality. Loan conditionality (Conditionality) consists of a series of substantive and procedural conditions that a borrower country must satisfy in order to obtain a IMF loan arrangement. For a long time, it has often been criticized that it may infringe upon the economic sovereignty of the borrowing country and affect the social and economic rights of the recipient country. It is easy to become a tool for the developed countries to control the economic lifelines of developing countries, but in order to get the IMF loans back in time, the conditionality of the loans can not be criticized. In recent years, the IMF has begun to reform its loan arrangements and loan conditionality, but the reform measures still do not seem to have touched the dominant position of developed countries in the IMF. Based on the research of IMF loan conditionality, this paper uses historical analysis, empirical analysis and other research methods to borrow IMF in Greece and Argentina. On the loan arrangement and Social impact of Korea and other countries the deficiency of the conditionality of IMF loan and its inherent contradiction with the social and economic rights of the recipient country are discussed. Although fundamentally speaking, the contradiction between the conditionality of loans and the socio-economic rights of recipient countries cannot be eliminated, but if an effective monitoring mechanism can be established, The "Nash equilibrium" between loan conditionality and the social and economic rights of recipient countries should be realized by optimizing the procedures of loan conditionality setting and reforming the unfair factors in IMF for both developed and developing countries. China, as the most important developing country in IMF, should promote the reform of IMF.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華僑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：D996.2
，
本文編號(hào)：2317977
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