本文選題：真 + 斷定�。� 參考：《邏輯學(xué)研究》2017年02期

【摘要】："真"是不是斷定行為的規(guī)范?收縮論者能否接受"真"作為斷定的規(guī)范?懷特(Crispin Wright)回答"是"和"不能"。懷特嘗試從真之規(guī)范出發(fā)證明收縮論是內(nèi)在不一致的。他試圖建立兩條不一致性定理。然而懷特的論證并不成功:第二不一致性定理不能成立;第一不一致性定理則可以從另一途徑——考慮真與斷定的聯(lián)系與區(qū)別——建立,無關(guān)乎真之規(guī)范。
[Abstract]:Is "true" the norm for determining conduct? Can the contractionary accept "truth" as the norm of determination? White Crispin Wright answered yes and no. White tries to prove that the theory of contraction is inherently inconsistent from the norm of truth. He tried to establish two inconsistency theorems. However, White's argument was not successful: the second inconsistency theorem could not be established, and the first inconsistency theorem could be established from another way-considering the connection and difference between truth and determination-without reference to the criterion of truth.
【作者單位】： 中山大學(xué)邏輯與認知研究所;中山大學(xué)哲學(xué)系;
【分類號】：B815.3
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本文編號：1898297