發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-28 11:58

  本文選題：個(gè)體詞 + 專(zhuān)名��； 參考：《清華大學(xué)》2007年博士論文

【摘要】： 自弗雷格以來(lái),哲學(xué)家們對(duì)名稱(chēng)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了深入和富有成果的討論。弗雷格、羅素和克里普克等人都對(duì)名稱(chēng)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了分析和說(shuō)明,而且他們的觀點(diǎn)都不盡相同:弗雷格不區(qū)分專(zhuān)名和摹狀詞,認(rèn)為它們只要指稱(chēng)相同,其他方面的不同都是可以容忍的;羅素嚴(yán)格區(qū)分了專(zhuān)名和摹狀詞;而克里普克卻認(rèn)為專(zhuān)名是嚴(yán)格的指示詞,摹狀詞是非嚴(yán)格的指示詞。這些討論豐富了哲學(xué)的理論內(nèi)容,促進(jìn)了哲學(xué)的研究和發(fā)展。但是應(yīng)看到,弗雷格、羅素和克里普克不但是哲學(xué)家而且也都是邏輯學(xué)家,他們的哲學(xué)理論都有他們各自的邏輯理論的支持,因此他們對(duì)專(zhuān)名的不同分析可以從一階邏輯與模態(tài)邏輯中找到依據(jù)。簡(jiǎn)言之,對(duì)專(zhuān)名的認(rèn)識(shí)依賴(lài)于對(duì)個(gè)體詞的邏輯性質(zhì)的認(rèn)識(shí)。 個(gè)體詞的邏輯性質(zhì)可以從句法和語(yǔ)義兩個(gè)方面來(lái)分析。句法方面,個(gè)體詞基本分為兩類(lèi):一類(lèi)是簡(jiǎn)單個(gè)體詞,一類(lèi)是復(fù)合個(gè)體詞。簡(jiǎn)單個(gè)體詞又包括個(gè)體變?cè)蛡�(gè)體常元;復(fù)合個(gè)體詞是指由簡(jiǎn)單個(gè)體詞添加函數(shù)符號(hào)產(chǎn)生的。個(gè)體變?cè)c個(gè)體常元的邏輯性質(zhì)不同,它們與謂詞、量詞組合的公式在一階邏輯與模態(tài)邏輯中的表現(xiàn)也是不同的。從語(yǔ)義上看,當(dāng)用來(lái)解釋非邏輯符號(hào)的結(jié)構(gòu)被確定,個(gè)體常元的解釋也就隨之確定,而個(gè)體變?cè)枰x值。對(duì)量化公式的解釋需要個(gè)體滿足謂詞規(guī)定的性質(zhì)才能說(shuō)明這些公式的真之條件,即需要可滿足來(lái)說(shuō)明。根據(jù)對(duì)個(gè)體詞邏輯性質(zhì)的認(rèn)識(shí)人們可以討論專(zhuān)名和摹狀詞,而根據(jù)不同邏輯系統(tǒng),比如一階邏輯或模態(tài)邏輯,人們可以對(duì)專(zhuān)名及其相關(guān)問(wèn)題提出不同的解釋,這樣也就有了弗雷格、羅素和克里普克等人不同的觀點(diǎn)。 傳統(tǒng)邏輯是類(lèi)邏輯,因而沒(méi)有關(guān)于個(gè)體詞的研究。在探討日常推理中的問(wèn)題時(shí),則把專(zhuān)名當(dāng)作類(lèi)來(lái)處理,因此存在許多問(wèn)題。傳統(tǒng)邏輯與現(xiàn)代邏輯有許多差異,而關(guān)于個(gè)體詞的處理,是一個(gè)探討其間差異,說(shuō)明其區(qū)別的重要途徑。 根據(jù)對(duì)個(gè)體詞邏輯性質(zhì)的說(shuō)明以及哲學(xué)上人們對(duì)個(gè)體詞的不同討論,我們可以清楚看出,邏輯與哲學(xué)具有十分密切的關(guān)系,邏輯對(duì)于哲學(xué)具有重要意義。
[Abstract]:Since Frege, philosophers have conducted in-depth and fruitful discussions on the issue of names. Frege, Russell and Kripke have all analyzed and explained the name problem, and their views are different: Frege does not distinguish between proper names and descriptions, as long as they refer to the same. Other differences are tolerated; Russell strictly distinguishes between proper names and descriptions, while Kripke thinks that proper names are strict deixis, and descriptions are non-strict deixis. These discussions enrich the theoretical content of philosophy and promote the research and development of philosophy. But it should be noted that Frege, Russell and Kripke are not only philosophers but also logicians, and that their philosophical theories are supported by their own logical theories. Therefore, their different analysis of proper names can be found in first order logic and modal logic. In short, the understanding of proper names depends on the understanding of the logical nature of individual words. The logical nature of individual words can be analyzed from syntactic and semantic aspects. Syntactically, individual words can be divided into two categories: simple individual words and compound individual words. Simple individual words include individual variables and individual constants, and compound individual words are generated by adding functional symbols to simple individual words. The logical properties of individual variables and individual constants are different, and the formulas of combination of predicates and classifiers are different in the first order logic and modal logic. From the semantic point of view, when the structure used to explain non-logical symbols is determined, the interpretation of individual constant elements is determined, and individual variables need to be assigned values. The interpretation of quantitative formulas requires that individuals satisfy the properties prescribed by predicates in order to explain the true conditions of these formulas, that is to say, they need to be satisfied to explain. Based on the understanding of the logical nature of individual words, one can discuss proper names and descriptions, while according to different logical systems, such as first-order logic or modal logic, one can give different interpretations of proper names and their related problems. This gives Frege, Russell and Kripke different views. Traditional logic is class logic, so there is no research on individual words. When discussing the problems in daily reasoning, the proper name is treated as a class, so there are many problems. There are many differences between traditional logic and modern logic, but dealing with individual words is an important way to explore the differences between them. According to the explanation of the logical nature of individual words and the different discussions on individual words in philosophy, we can clearly see that logic has a very close relationship with philosophy, and logic is of great significance to philosophy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：清華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：B812

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