【摘要】：1979年伊朗伊斯蘭革命勝利后不久,霍梅尼發(fā)布法令,要求成立伊朗伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)(IRGC)。革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)作為新興政權(quán)的保護(hù)者,從建立初始發(fā)展至今,已經(jīng)不再是一個(gè)傳統(tǒng)意義上的軍事組織。如今,作為一個(gè)擁有廣泛社會(huì)基礎(chǔ)、深刻政治影響以及強(qiáng)大經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力的行為體,革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)的影響幾乎涵蓋了伊朗社會(huì)與政治生活的每一個(gè)角落。革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)在伊朗高度政治化的制度體系中力量十分強(qiáng)大。在此制度中,總統(tǒng)、許多內(nèi)閣成員、議會(huì)議員以及一些其他省級(jí)和地方的行政管理者都來(lái)自于革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)。伊斯蘭共和國(guó)一直依賴著存在于什葉派神職人員和伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)之間的基礎(chǔ)聯(lián)盟,這種聯(lián)盟直接導(dǎo)致了衛(wèi)隊(duì)不斷深化的政治參與。除了政治領(lǐng)域外,革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)還管理著強(qiáng)大的媒體資源、教育以及培訓(xùn)活動(dòng),通過(guò)不同渠道的宣傳和教育從而在加強(qiáng)整個(gè)社會(huì)對(duì)衛(wèi)隊(duì)的認(rèn)同以及對(duì)伊斯蘭政權(quán)的忠誠(chéng)。在經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域中,革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)擁有強(qiáng)大的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力以及多樣化的經(jīng)濟(jì)渠道,從大壩、公路、管道等公共設(shè)施的建設(shè)到汽車制造以及高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)再到黑市貿(mào)易,革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)參與了所有能夠創(chuàng)造利益的業(yè)務(wù),包括合法以及非法的貿(mào)易,革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)通過(guò)不同的方式將其影響擴(kuò)大到伊朗市場(chǎng)的每一個(gè)部門。這些經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)使得革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)已然成為伊朗伊斯蘭共和國(guó)最大的“商業(yè)企業(yè)”。作為伊朗伊斯蘭政權(quán)的守護(hù)者,衛(wèi)隊(duì)始終是霍梅尼思想理論的堅(jiān)定支持者,革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)自創(chuàng)立開始就扮演著輸出革命的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者角色,它強(qiáng)烈的意識(shí)形態(tài)是其能夠不斷擴(kuò)張影響的重要因素,通過(guò)革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)在海外的活動(dòng),伊朗伊斯蘭政權(quán)不斷提升其對(duì)周邊國(guó)家的影響從而使什葉派力量不斷壯大�？偟膩�(lái)說(shuō),由于伊朗獨(dú)特的國(guó)內(nèi)外發(fā)展環(huán)境,伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)從誕生發(fā)展至今,已經(jīng)取得了顯赫的政治支配地位。最初,它只是作為一個(gè)防御與安全方面的準(zhǔn)軍事力量,由于政權(quán)因生存考慮不斷向衛(wèi)隊(duì)賦權(quán),使得革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)超越了最初的角色和定位,如今的革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)不但是一個(gè)管理海軍、陸軍、空軍和圣城旅的傳統(tǒng)軍事組織,它更是一個(gè)擁有實(shí)質(zhì)影響的政治行為體,它的存在和發(fā)展一定程度上決定著未來(lái)伊朗政權(quán)的發(fā)展方向。
[Abstract]:Shortly after the victory of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979, Khomeini issued a decree calling for the establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).) As the protector of the new regime, the Revolutionary Guard Force has been no longer a traditional military organization since its initial development. Today, as an actor with a broad social base, profound political influence and strong economic power, the Revolutionary Guard's influence covers almost every corner of Iranian social and political life. The Revolutionary Guards are powerful in Iran's highly politicized system. In this system, the president, many cabinet members, members of parliament, and some other provincial and local administrators come from the Revolutionary Guards. The Islamic Republic has relied on a basic alliance between Shia clerics and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, which has led directly to their deepening political involvement. In addition to the political sphere, the Revolutionary Guards also manage strong media resources, education and training activities, through different channels of publicity and education to strengthen the whole society's identity to the Guard and loyalty to the Islamic regime. In the economic sphere, the Revolutionary Guards have strong economic power and diversified economic channels, from the construction of dams, roads, pipelines and other public facilities to automobile manufacturing and high-tech industries to black market trade. The Revolutionary Guards are involved in all profitable businesses, both legal and illegal, and in different ways extend their influence to every sector of the Iranian market. These economic activities have made the Revolutionary Guards the largest business enterprise in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a guardian of Iran's Islamic regime, the Guard has always been a staunch supporter of Khomeini's ideology and theory. Since its inception, the Revolutionary Guard has played a leading role in exporting revolutions. Its strong ideology is an important factor in its ability to expand its influence, and through the activities of the Revolutionary Guards abroad, Iran's Islamic regime has constantly enhanced its influence on neighboring countries, thus increasing the Shia power. In general, because of Iran's unique development environment at home and abroad, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has gained a prominent political dominance since its birth. At first, it was only a paramilitary force in defense and security. Because the regime was constantly empowering the guard for survival, the Revolutionary Guard transcended its original role and position. Today, the Revolutionary Guard is not only a management navy, The traditional military organization of the Army, Air Force and Al-Quds Brigade is also a political actor with substantial influence. Its existence and development to some extent determine the direction of the future Iranian regime.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D737.3

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