人,作為忤逆者的尊嚴(yán)——文藝復(fù)興與“尊嚴(yán)”發(fā)軔的譜系
發(fā)布時間:2018-05-02 14:46
本文選題:尊嚴(yán) + 文藝復(fù)興; 參考:《世界哲學(xué)》2014年01期
【摘要】:作者嘗試通過對文藝復(fù)興時期意大利四位重要思想家代表作的解讀,還原出"尊嚴(yán)"這一倫理學(xué)概念發(fā)軔的最初譜系。作者認(rèn)為倫理史上對"尊嚴(yán)"問題的正式關(guān)注始于14至16世紀(jì)的文藝復(fù)興時期,在相關(guān)思想家的作品中,"人"是以"忤逆者"的特殊相貌、從傳統(tǒng)神學(xué)的話語控制下爭得其基本"尊嚴(yán)"的。"人"作為忤逆者,向強(qiáng)勢的傳統(tǒng)神學(xué)體系要回自身的"尊嚴(yán)"的過程是一個從妥協(xié)到曖昧、從委婉到直接的過程,構(gòu)成了"人"作為"忤逆者"的這一"尊嚴(yán)"的發(fā)軔譜系。
[Abstract]:The author attempts to restore the original pedigree of the ethical concept of "dignity" through the interpretation of the masterpieces of four important Italian thinkers during the Renaissance. The author holds that the formal attention to the issue of "dignity" in the history of ethics began during the Renaissance period from the 14th to the 16th century. In the works of relevant thinkers, "man" is the special appearance of "disobedient". From the traditional theological discourse under the control of its basic "dignity". As a disobedient, the process of "dignity" from the strong traditional theological system is a process from compromise to ambiguity, from euphemism to directness, which constitutes the origin of "dignity" of "man" as "disobedient".
【作者單位】: 中國社會科學(xué)院哲學(xué)所;
【基金】:中國博士后科學(xué)基金第52批面上資助“意大利文藝復(fù)興時期倫理思想的多重互他者關(guān)系研究”的階段性研究成果
【分類號】:B82-091
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本文編號:1834349
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