本文選題：黨員高管 + 在職消費(fèi)��； 參考：《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：腐敗給人們的社會(huì)生活和經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展帶來(lái)了巨大的危害。腐敗治理乃是大勢(shì)所趨、大眾所望。2012年,中共中央政治局審議通過(guò)了關(guān)于改進(jìn)工作作風(fēng)、密切聯(lián)系群眾的“八項(xiàng)規(guī)定”,將我國(guó)的腐敗治理推向了高潮。在剛剛結(jié)束的舉世矚目的G20杭州峰會(huì)上,反腐敗是峰會(huì)的重點(diǎn)議題之一,G20各國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人一致批準(zhǔn)通過(guò)了《二十國(guó)集團(tuán)反腐敗追逃追贓高級(jí)原則》和《二十國(guó)集團(tuán)2017-2018年反腐敗行動(dòng)計(jì)劃》,從此,腐敗治理更是上升到了國(guó)際合作的層面。既然腐敗治理如此重要,那么大到國(guó)家,小到每一家上市公司都應(yīng)該將腐敗治理作為一項(xiàng)重要工作來(lái)抓。從上市公司的微觀角度來(lái)看,除了不恰當(dāng)?shù)母咝匠曛?與“八項(xiàng)規(guī)定”有關(guān)的辦公費(fèi)、差旅費(fèi)、業(yè)務(wù)招待費(fèi)、通訊費(fèi)、出國(guó)培訓(xùn)費(fèi)、董事會(huì)費(fèi)、小車(chē)費(fèi)和會(huì)議費(fèi)等在職消費(fèi)是治理腐敗的重要陣地,因?yàn)楦吖苋藛T可以輕易通過(guò)這些項(xiàng)目報(bào)銷(xiāo)私人支出,將其轉(zhuǎn)嫁為公司費(fèi)用。但是上市公司的黨員高管作為高管中的一類(lèi)特殊群體,一般比普通高管具有更高的思想覺(jué)悟意識(shí)和更硬的組織紀(jì)律素質(zhì),更能自覺(jué)接受黨中央關(guān)于腐敗治理的精神。因此,本文的研究意在考察黨員高管是否對(duì)公司的超額在職消費(fèi)起到了抑制作用,從而促進(jìn)了腐敗治理。本文的主要內(nèi)容包括規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究?jī)刹糠�。�?guī)范研究提出了本文要研究的問(wèn)題,研究的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)價(jià)值,重點(diǎn)梳理了目前學(xué)術(shù)界有關(guān)高管特征幾方面維度的文獻(xiàn),包括高管性別、年齡、學(xué)歷、任期、職業(yè)經(jīng)歷和政治聯(lián)系六個(gè)方面。腐敗治理文獻(xiàn)綜述分為腐敗成因、腐敗后果和腐敗治理。所有權(quán)性質(zhì)文獻(xiàn)綜述主要從國(guó)企和非國(guó)企在各方面表現(xiàn)的差異進(jìn)行梳理。本文的理論基礎(chǔ)主要有委托代理理論、契約理論、黨員干部學(xué)理論和高層梯隊(duì)理論,在上述理論的基礎(chǔ)上,本文做出了黨員高管影響腐敗治理的作用機(jī)理。在實(shí)證研究部分,本文以2013—2015年全部A股上市公司為研究樣本,利用超額在職消費(fèi)計(jì)量模型研究黨員高管對(duì)企業(yè)腐敗治理的影響。首先,本文檢驗(yàn)了黨員高管人數(shù)、黨員占高管比例、董事長(zhǎng)是否為黨員、黨員高管的平均年齡、學(xué)歷和任期對(duì)腐敗治理的影響。其次,檢驗(yàn)所有權(quán)性質(zhì)對(duì)黨員高管影響腐敗治理的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng),即考察在國(guó)有企業(yè)和非國(guó)有企業(yè)中,黨員高管治理腐敗的差異。最后,進(jìn)一步搜集2009-2011年的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),檢驗(yàn)“八項(xiàng)規(guī)定”前黨員高管對(duì)腐敗治理的影響,并與“八項(xiàng)規(guī)定”后即2013-2015年的結(jié)果作對(duì)比。本文的研究結(jié)論如下:(1)黨員高管對(duì)腐敗治理具有顯著促進(jìn)作用。(2)黨員高管的平均年齡越大、平均學(xué)歷越高、平均任期越長(zhǎng),腐敗治理的效果越好。(3)相比非國(guó)有企業(yè),國(guó)有企業(yè)黨員高管對(duì)腐敗的治理力度更大。(4)相比于“八項(xiàng)規(guī)定”頒布前,“八項(xiàng)規(guī)定”頒布后黨員高管加大了對(duì)腐敗的治理強(qiáng)度。本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)在于:第一,現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)除了對(duì)公司黨建方面的研究,單單針對(duì)高管是否為黨員這一特征的研究還不夠充分,尤其是在實(shí)證研究方面,有關(guān)黨員高管的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)比較稀缺。本文的研究為學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)高管特征的研究打開(kāi)了一個(gè)新視角。第二,對(duì)于企業(yè)腐敗的治理,除了有學(xué)者注意到內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量和管理層權(quán)力這兩個(gè)因素外,還有很大領(lǐng)域等待著學(xué)者們?nèi)ネ诰颉１疚膹墓局卫淼慕嵌?研究黨員高管在企業(yè)的腐敗治理中發(fā)揮的作用,為企業(yè)的腐敗治理找到了一個(gè)新對(duì)策。第三,本文將總體樣本分為國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本和非國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本,分別檢驗(yàn)黨員高管對(duì)腐敗治理的影響,并分析其中的差異,為不同所有權(quán)性質(zhì)導(dǎo)致的差異提供了一個(gè)新證據(jù)。本文的研究結(jié)果驗(yàn)證了黨員高管清正廉潔的道德修養(yǎng),肯定了他們?cè)谄髽I(yè)的腐敗治理中發(fā)揮的正向作用。對(duì)于企業(yè)而言,適當(dāng)增加黨員高管比例,組建一支適合公司健康發(fā)展的、遠(yuǎn)離腐敗的高管隊(duì)伍至關(guān)重要。最后,本文的研究可能會(huì)對(duì)存在奢靡在職消費(fèi)的公司起到警示作用,號(hào)召全體高管學(xué)習(xí)黨的先進(jìn)思想,遵守黨的規(guī)章制度,從而在一定程度上減少企業(yè)高管的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和逆向選擇,希望本文的研究能夠在抑制超額在職消費(fèi)方面給企業(yè)的腐敗治理提供些許借鑒。
[Abstract]:Corruption has brought great harm to people's social life and economic development. Corruption governance is the trend of the times. In.2012, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China examined and passed the "eight provisions" on improving work style and close contact with the masses, and pushed our country's corruption governance to a climax. In the just end of the world's attention G20 At the summit in Hangzhou, anti-corruption is one of the key issues of the summit. The leaders of the G20 countries approved the adoption of the "senior principle of the anti corruption pursuit and pursuit of stolen goods" by the group of twenty countries and the 2017-2018 year action plan for the anti corruption of the group of twenty. From then on, corruption governance has risen to the level of international cooperation. Since corruption governance is so important, it is so important. From the microcosmic point of view of the listed companies, in addition to the inappropriate high pay, the office fee, travel expenses, business hospitality, communication, training, board, car and conference fees are in service from the microcosmic angle of the listed company. Consumption is an important position to govern corruption, because executives can easily reimburse private expenditures through these projects and transfer them to company costs. However, as a special group of senior executives, senior executives of listed companies generally have higher awareness and more rigid organizational discipline than ordinary executives, and more conscientious. Accept the spirit of corruption governance by the Party Central Committee. Therefore, the research of this article is intended to examine whether the party members and executives have played a restraining effect on the excessive on-the-job consumption of the company, thus promoting the governance of corruption. The main contents of this paper include two parts: normative and empirical research. On the significance and practical value, it focuses on the literature of several aspects of the current academic circles, including six aspects of senior executive sex, age, education, term of office, career experience and political connection. The literature review of corruption governance is divided into corruption causes, corruption consequences and corruption governance. The literature review of ownership is mainly from state-owned enterprises and non enterprises. The theoretical basis of this paper mainly includes principal-agent theory, contract theory, party cadre theory and top echelon theory. On the basis of the above theory, this paper makes the mechanism of the effect of Party members' executives on corruption governance. In the part of the research, this paper is in all A shares from 2013 to 2015. In order to study the sample, the city company uses the excess on-the-job consumption measurement model to study the effect of Party members' executives on corporate corruption governance. First, this paper examines the number of Party members, the proportion of the party members, the average age of the members of the party members, the average age of the senior executives, the influence of academic qualifications and tenure on corruption governance. Secondly, to test the nature of ownership. Party members and executives affect the regulatory effect of corruption governance, that is, to examine the differences in corruption among the members and executives in state-owned and non-state enterprises. Finally, to further collect 2009-2011 years of relevant data to test the impact of Party members' executives on corruption governance before the "eight provisions" and to match the results of the "eight provisions", that is, 2013-2015 years after the "eight provisions". The conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) the party members' executives have a significant role in promoting corruption governance. (2) the higher the average age of the members of the party members, the higher the average academic degree, the longer the average term of office, the better the effect of corruption governance. (3) compared to non-state owned enterprises, the executives of state-owned enterprises are more effective in governance of corruption. (4) compared to the "eight regulations" Before the promulgation, after the promulgation of the "eight regulations", the members of the party members have increased the governance intensity of corruption. The main contributions of this article are as follows: first, in addition to the research on the party building of the company, the existing literature is not enough to study the characteristics of the party members as a party member, especially in the empirical research, the experience of the party members' executives. The evidence is scarce. The research of this paper opens a new perspective for the academic circles to study the characteristics of senior executives. Second, in addition to the two factors that have been paid attention to the quality of internal control and the power of management, there are many fields waiting for scholars to dig out the governance of enterprise corruption. The role of the executive in the corruption governance of the enterprise has found a new countermeasure for the corruption governance of the enterprise. Third, this paper divides the overall sample into the sample of state-owned enterprises and the samples of non-state-owned enterprises, and examines the influence of the party members and executives on corruption governance respectively, and analyzes the differences among them, which provides the difference in the nature of different ownership. A new evidence. The results of this paper verify that the honest and honest moral cultivation of the members of the members of the party members, affirms their positive role in the corruption governance of the enterprises. For enterprises, it is very important for the enterprises to increase the proportion of the party members and executives, to form a contingent of senior executives suitable for the healthy development of the company. It may serve as a warning to companies that have extravagant and on-the-job consumption. They call on all executives to learn the party's advanced ideas and abide by the rules and regulations of the party so as to reduce the moral hazard and adverse selection of the executives to a certain extent. A bit of reference.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D262.6;F275;F832.51

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