本文選題：Stackelberg博弈 + 產(chǎn)品族配置　； 參考：《工業(yè)工程與管理》2016年05期

【摘要】：在碳限額約束下,針對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)中不同決策主體的產(chǎn)品族配置優(yōu)化問題,剖析各決策主體間的博弈關(guān)系,提出一種基于Stackelberg博弈理論的產(chǎn)品族低碳配置主從關(guān)聯(lián)優(yōu)化理念與方法。在主從對(duì)策決策框架基礎(chǔ)上,建立了主從關(guān)聯(lián)優(yōu)化的非線性0—1雙層規(guī)劃模型,模型的上、下層分別對(duì)應(yīng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)中主導(dǎo)制造商與跟隨制造商各自的產(chǎn)品族低碳配置優(yōu)化問題,并構(gòu)建模型求解的雙層嵌套遺傳算法。將該優(yōu)化方法并應(yīng)用于產(chǎn)品筆記本電腦的案例研究中,分別對(duì)考慮碳限額約束與不考慮碳限額約束情境下的優(yōu)化結(jié)果進(jìn)行比較。
[Abstract]:Under the restriction of carbon quota, aiming at the problem of product family configuration optimization of different decision makers in competitive market, this paper analyzes the game relationship among different decision makers, and puts forward a new concept and method of product family low carbon configuration principal and subordinate association optimization based on Stackelberg game theory. Based on the decision framework of master-slave game, the nonlinear 0-1 bilevel programming model of master-slave association optimization is established. The lower layer corresponds to the low carbon configuration optimization problem of the leading manufacturer and the following manufacturer respectively in the competitive market and constructs the bilayer nested genetic algorithm for solving the model. The optimization method is applied to the case study of product notebook computer, and the optimization results are compared between the situation of considering carbon limitation constraint and that of not considering carbon limit constraint.
【作者單位】： 天津大學(xué)管理與經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)部;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71371132)
【分類號(hào)】：F426.671;F273.2

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1 劉北林;牟維哲;;面向服裝大規(guī)模定制的產(chǎn)品族模型研究[J];哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2008年01期

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本文編號(hào)：2035690