本文關(guān)鍵詞： 職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心 高管薪酬 企業(yè)績(jī)效 激勵(lì)　出處：《華中科技大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自從所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)兩權(quán)分離的現(xiàn)代企業(yè)形成,對(duì)于管理者的激勵(lì)約束問(wèn)題一直是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)理論研究的重點(diǎn)。委托代理理論是高管薪酬激勵(lì)研究的理論基礎(chǔ),然而,國(guó)內(nèi)外大量的實(shí)證研究結(jié)果與委托代理理論預(yù)期不符,并沒(méi)有發(fā)現(xiàn)高管薪酬與企業(yè)績(jī)效存在很強(qiáng)的正相關(guān)性,甚至我國(guó)有研究表明我國(guó)高管薪酬與企業(yè)績(jī)效負(fù)相關(guān)。高管薪酬績(jī)效低敏感性的困惑使得研究者跳出委托代理理論的框架,開(kāi)始探討企業(yè)外部市場(chǎng)因素對(duì)管理者行為的影響,職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心就是依托于經(jīng)理人市場(chǎng)而產(chǎn)生,能夠?qū)芾碚咝纬勺晕壹?lì)約束的行為。本文將績(jī)效薪酬契約激勵(lì)和職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心激勵(lì)結(jié)合起來(lái)考察,在委托代理理論框架下將績(jī)效薪酬契約的設(shè)計(jì)問(wèn)題模型化,推導(dǎo)出在職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心激勵(lì)作用下最優(yōu)績(jī)效薪酬契約的結(jié)構(gòu),發(fā)現(xiàn)職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心激勵(lì)對(duì)績(jī)效薪酬激勵(lì)具有替代作用,當(dāng)職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心激勵(lì)增強(qiáng)時(shí),薪酬績(jī)效敏感性降低。為了研究我國(guó)高管職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心激勵(lì)對(duì)薪酬績(jī)效敏感性的影響情況,本文首先基于理論分析結(jié)果提出了本文的研究假設(shè):隨著高管的年齡和任職時(shí)間增長(zhǎng),職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心激勵(lì)減弱,因此薪酬績(jī)效敏感性增強(qiáng)。緊接著,選取了我國(guó)制造業(yè)的234個(gè)非國(guó)有上市公司在2009—2012年的面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,結(jié)果表明隨著我國(guó)高管年齡的增長(zhǎng),薪酬績(jī)效敏感性增強(qiáng),但是隨著任職時(shí)間的增長(zhǎng),薪酬績(jī)效敏感性反而減弱。實(shí)證結(jié)果從一定程度上反映了我國(guó)高管職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心發(fā)揮了激勵(lì)作用,并對(duì)薪酬績(jī)效敏感性產(chǎn)生影響。最后,作為政策性建議,本文認(rèn)為在設(shè)計(jì)高管薪酬契約時(shí),將職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心激勵(lì)與績(jī)效薪酬激勵(lì)結(jié)合起來(lái)考慮是有益的,針對(duì)處于職業(yè)發(fā)展初期的高管,充分利用職業(yè)生涯關(guān)心激勵(lì)可以降低企業(yè)激勵(lì)成本,而對(duì)于接近退休的高管,適當(dāng)加大績(jī)效薪酬激勵(lì)則有益于企業(yè)績(jī)效的增長(zhǎng)。
[Abstract]:Since the formation of modern enterprises with the separation of ownership and management, the incentive and constraint of managers has been the focus of modern enterprise theory research. The principal-agent theory is the theoretical basis of executive compensation incentive research. However, a large number of empirical research results at home and abroad are not consistent with the principal-agent theory, and there is no strong positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance. Even some studies in our country show that executive compensation is negatively correlated with corporate performance. The confusion of low sensitivity of executive pay makes researchers jump out of the framework of principal-agent theory. Starting to explore the influence of external market factors on managers' behavior, career care is based on the managers' market. The performance compensation contract incentive and career concern incentive are combined to investigate the behavior of self-motivation and restraint of managers. In the framework of principal-agent theory, the design problem of performance compensation contract is modeled, and the structure of optimal performance compensation contract under the role of career motivation is deduced. It is found that career care incentive is a substitute for performance pay incentive, when career care incentive is enhanced. Pay performance sensitivity is reduced. In order to study the influence of career concern incentive on pay performance sensitivity of senior executives in China. Firstly, based on the theoretical analysis results, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis: with the increase of senior executives' age and tenure, career concern incentive weakens, so pay performance sensitivity increases. The panel data of 234 non-state-owned listed companies in China's manufacturing industry in 2009-2012 are selected for empirical analysis. The results show that pay performance sensitivity increases with the age of senior executives in China. However, with the increase of tenure, the pay performance sensitivity is weakened. The empirical results reflect the incentive role of senior executives' career concern to a certain extent. Finally, as a policy recommendation, this paper thinks that it is beneficial to combine career concern incentive and performance pay incentive when designing executive compensation contract. For the executives in the early stage of career development, the full use of career care incentives can reduce the cost of incentives, while for those close to retirement, appropriate increase of performance pay incentives will be beneficial to the growth of corporate performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F425

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