【摘要】：目前,國家針對鄉(xiāng)村治理制定了相關(guān)的政策,但是政策的具體實(shí)施卻遇到了很大的困難,影響了鄉(xiāng)村治理的改進(jìn),不利于整個(gè)鄉(xiāng)村的發(fā)展。主要原因在于鄉(xiāng)村治理中各個(gè)利益主體為了各自利益最大化而進(jìn)行的博弈策略選擇,忽視了鄉(xiāng)村整體利益的最大化。本文從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博弈論的角度分析了對鄉(xiāng)村治理具有最重要影響的利益主體——村民內(nèi)部之間利益主體的博弈。以經(jīng)典的"智豬博弈"為模型分析精英村民和普通村民的博弈選擇,分析二者為了追求各自利益的最大化而展開博弈策略選擇的結(jié)果,從共同利益最大化的角度,提出了解決方法,使之達(dá)到博弈均衡。
[Abstract]:At present, the country has formulated the related policies for rural governance, but the concrete implementation of the policy has encountered great difficulties, which has affected the improvement of rural governance and is not conducive to the development of the whole village. The main reason lies in the game strategy choice for the benefit maximization of each main body in the rural governance, neglecting the maximization of the whole rural interest. From the angle of economic game theory, this paper analyzes the game between the main interests of villagers, which has the most important influence on rural governance. This paper analyzes the game choice of elite villagers and ordinary villagers with the classic "Zhizhu Game" model, and analyzes the results of the game strategy selection between them in order to pursue the maximization of their respective interests, and from the angle of maximization of common interests. A solution is proposed to achieve game equilibrium.
【作者單位】： 吉林大學(xué)生物與農(nóng)業(yè)工程學(xué)院;
【分類號】：D422.6;F224.32;F323.6
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本文編號：2187633