【摘要】：在自私的群體中合作行為的產(chǎn)生及維持一直是社會(huì)科學(xué)和自然科學(xué)領(lǐng)域內(nèi)一個(gè)重要問(wèn)題,近些年來(lái)吸引了來(lái)自心理學(xué),統(tǒng)計(jì)物理,行為科學(xué),進(jìn)化生物學(xué),數(shù)學(xué)及統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)等眾多學(xué)科的關(guān)注并取得了非常顯著的研究成果。尤其是物理學(xué)家將物理中的非線(xiàn)性動(dòng)力學(xué)和凝聚態(tài)物理的觀點(diǎn)引入空間演化博弈及隨著復(fù)雜網(wǎng)絡(luò)科學(xué)的快速發(fā)展更是為這一問(wèn)題的研究提升到了一個(gè)新的高度,另一方面進(jìn)化生物學(xué)家及演化經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家進(jìn)行的行為學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)進(jìn)一步豐富了這一問(wèn)題的研究�；谏鲜隹紤],本文主要從三個(gè)方面對(duì)合作行為的演化及維持進(jìn)行了研究。首先,由于空間網(wǎng)絡(luò)對(duì)合作行為演化的研究取得了非常多的成果,但少有從行為學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)的角度對(duì)這一促進(jìn)效應(yīng)進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證的。因此我們從行為學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)的角度設(shè)計(jì)出空間網(wǎng)絡(luò)上的重復(fù)囚徒困境實(shí)驗(yàn)并招募志愿者來(lái)參與實(shí)驗(yàn)。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),相對(duì)于充分混合的情況,空間網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu)確實(shí)能夠促進(jìn)合作行為的演化。這是由于處于空間結(jié)構(gòu)中的合作者可以形成團(tuán)簇,而這些團(tuán)簇一方面保護(hù)了團(tuán)簇內(nèi)部的合作者另一方面又抵御了團(tuán)簇外部背叛者的攻擊,因此空間中的合作者可以維持在一定的水平。其次,通過(guò)將非對(duì)稱(chēng)的適應(yīng)度計(jì)算機(jī)制引入空間演化博弈,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)相對(duì)于傳統(tǒng)的空間博弈模型我們的這種模型能夠極大的促進(jìn)合作行為的演化,并且這種促進(jìn)機(jī)制對(duì)不同的網(wǎng)絡(luò)類(lèi)型都具有普適性。最后,我們研究了空間博弈中的共演化問(wèn)題。所謂的共演化,就是在博弈過(guò)程中,不僅個(gè)體的策略更新,同時(shí)網(wǎng)絡(luò)拓?fù)浣Y(jié)構(gòu)或者個(gè)體的一些屬性也處于不斷的動(dòng)態(tài)變化中。而本文我們基于個(gè)體能力的的適應(yīng)度評(píng)估角度對(duì)共演化進(jìn)行了細(xì)致的探索,結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)共演化降低了個(gè)體能力的異質(zhì)性,進(jìn)而抑制了合作行為的演化。
[Abstract]:The generation and maintenance of cooperative behavior in selfish groups has been an important issue in the social and natural sciences and has attracted interest in recent years from psychology, statistical physics, behavioral science, evolutionary biology, Mathematics and statistics and many other disciplines of concern and achieved very significant research results. In particular, physicists introduce the concepts of nonlinear dynamics and condensed matter physics into the spatial evolutionary game, and with the rapid development of complex network science, the research of this problem has been raised to a new height. On the other hand, behavioral experiments carried out by evolutionary biologists and evolutionary economists further enrich the study of this problem. Based on the above considerations, this paper studies the evolution and maintenance of cooperative behavior from three aspects. First of all, many achievements have been made in the evolution of cooperative behavior in space networks, but few of them are verified from the point of view of behavioral experiments. Therefore, we design the repeated prisoner dilemma experiment on the spatial network from the perspective of behavioral experiment and recruit volunteers to participate in the experiment. The results show that the spatial network structure can promote the evolution of cooperative behavior. This is because the collaborators in the space structure can form clusters, and these clusters protect the cooperators within the clusters on the one hand, and resist the attacks of the external betrayors on the other. Thus the collaborators in space can be maintained at a certain level. Secondly, by introducing asymmetric fitness computer system into spatial evolution game, we find that compared with the traditional spatial game model, our model can greatly promote the evolution of cooperative behavior. And this promotion mechanism is universal to different network types. Finally, we study the co-evolution in space game. The so-called coevolution is that in the process of game, not only the individual strategy is updated, but also the network topology or some attributes of the individual are constantly changing. In this paper, based on the fitness evaluation of individual ability, we explore coevolution carefully. The results show that coevolution reduces the heterogeneity of individual ability, and then inhibits the evolution of cooperative behavior.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：O157.5;O225
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本文編號(hào)：2185518