回收渠道競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下的中國(guó)EPR制度設(shè)計(jì)研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-07-23 14:14
【摘要】：基于我國(guó)正規(guī)回收渠道和非正規(guī)回收渠道競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的現(xiàn)狀,通過構(gòu)造包含新產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)階段和廢舊產(chǎn)品回收處理階段的兩階段的博弈模型,并分析了不同的目標(biāo)下EPR制度的設(shè)計(jì)問題.結(jié)果表明,當(dāng)回收渠道之間的成本差較小時(shí),兩種目標(biāo)下的最優(yōu)合同是一致的,此時(shí)政府通過提高處置費(fèi)來降低市場(chǎng)上的廢舊電器量從而降低污染;反之,兩種目標(biāo)下EPR制度的設(shè)計(jì)不同,此時(shí)正規(guī)回收渠道的絕對(duì)處理量最大化目標(biāo)全面占優(yōu)正規(guī)回收渠道的相對(duì)處理量最大化目標(biāo).此外,還發(fā)現(xiàn)補(bǔ)貼對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中的企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者而言并不總是有利的.
[Abstract]:Based on the current situation of the competition between the formal and informal recovery channels in China, a two-stage game model including the production stage of new products and the stage of recycling and disposal of waste products is constructed, and the design problems of EPR system under different objectives are analyzed. The results show that when the cost difference between the recovery channels is small, the optimal contract under the two objectives is the same, and the government reduces the pollution by increasing the disposal fee to reduce the amount of used electrical appliances on the market. Under the two objectives, the design of EPR system is different. At this time, the absolute processing capacity maximization goal of the regular recovery channel dominates the maximization target of the relative processing capacity of the regular recovery channel. It is also found that subsidies are not always beneficial to firms and consumers in closed-loop supply chains.
【作者單位】： 河南大學(xué)商學(xué)院;華南理工大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71731006;71571070;71271089) 廣東省自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(2015A030311032) 廣東省哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)“十二五”規(guī)劃一般資助項(xiàng)目(GD12CGL16)
【分類號(hào)】：F274;O225
本文編號(hào)：2139670
[Abstract]:Based on the current situation of the competition between the formal and informal recovery channels in China, a two-stage game model including the production stage of new products and the stage of recycling and disposal of waste products is constructed, and the design problems of EPR system under different objectives are analyzed. The results show that when the cost difference between the recovery channels is small, the optimal contract under the two objectives is the same, and the government reduces the pollution by increasing the disposal fee to reduce the amount of used electrical appliances on the market. Under the two objectives, the design of EPR system is different. At this time, the absolute processing capacity maximization goal of the regular recovery channel dominates the maximization target of the relative processing capacity of the regular recovery channel. It is also found that subsidies are not always beneficial to firms and consumers in closed-loop supply chains.
【作者單位】： 河南大學(xué)商學(xué)院;華南理工大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71731006;71571070;71271089) 廣東省自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(2015A030311032) 廣東省哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)“十二五”規(guī)劃一般資助項(xiàng)目(GD12CGL16)
【分類號(hào)】：F274;O225
【相似文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前5條
1 韓小花;;不確定性閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收渠道的決策分析[J];工業(yè)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì);2010年02期
2 韓小花;;強(qiáng)零售商不確定性閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收渠道的決策分析[J];商業(yè)時(shí)代;2010年12期
3 趙一平;朱慶華;;中國(guó)汽車行業(yè)EPR實(shí)施績(jī)效及作用機(jī)理實(shí)證研究[J];預(yù)測(cè);2008年01期
4 鄭云虹;;基于EPR制度的企業(yè)回收決策模型[J];東北大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(自然科學(xué)版);2010年12期
5 徐愷;姚云剛;;基于EPR下的政府與非正規(guī)企業(yè)之間的博弈關(guān)系研究[J];中國(guó)西部科技;2008年28期
相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 韓小花;再制造的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收渠道的決策研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2008年
，本文編號(hào)：2139670
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/kejilunwen/yysx/2139670.html
最近更新
教材專著
