本文選題：合作微分博弈 + 非理性行為操縱條件�。� 參考：《青島大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：合作是人類社會(huì)活動(dòng)的基礎(chǔ),合作博弈亦成為國際管理科學(xué)研究前沿。在動(dòng)態(tài)合作博弈進(jìn)程中,如果條件允許,局中人可能使用非理性行為來索取額外的收益,而不是執(zhí)行一開始所達(dá)成的合作契約。Yeung(2006)提出了單個(gè)局中人的非理性行為操縱條件(IBP),使得在合作機(jī)制下,即使在博弈中非理性行為出現(xiàn),局中人在合作機(jī)制下仍然是更好的。Yeung等(2010)提出了聯(lián)盟的IBP條件,證明了對于污染成本控制模型Shapley值是滿足聯(lián)盟的IBP條件的。對于局中人非理性行為的研究是本文的第一個(gè)重點(diǎn),本文提出了一個(gè)全新的條件,使得在博弈中即使非理性行為出現(xiàn),局中人在合作機(jī)制下仍然是更好的。并且更進(jìn)一步,如果非理性行為出現(xiàn)的越晚,即參與合作的時(shí)間越長,那么局中人獲得的支付越高,從而可以促使局中人更持久的合作。針對國家之間合作控制污染成本的微分博弈問題,本文提出了該博弈問題的異步非理性行為操縱條件(AIBP),并證明了這個(gè)全新的AIBP條件可以促使國家之間更持久的合作。此外,對于兩個(gè)相鄰國家之間合作控制污染成本的微分博弈問題,本文得到了該模型的激勵(lì)均衡策略和可信性條件,這是論文研究的另一個(gè)重點(diǎn)。本文證明了對于污染成本控制博弈提出的線性激勵(lì)策略并不總是可信的。本文研究了兩個(gè)國家之間的成本分擔(dān)問題,設(shè)計(jì)了沿著時(shí)間分擔(dān)局中人總成本的機(jī)制,使得任意時(shí)刻局中人在合作下的即時(shí)成本低于他的非合作成本。
[Abstract]:Cooperation is the foundation of human social activities, and cooperative game has become the frontier of international management science research. In the dynamic cooperative game process, if conditions permit, people in the game may use irrational behavior to obtain additional benefits. Instead of executing the cooperation agreement reached at the beginning, Yeungn 2006) proposed the manipulation conditions of irrational behavior of the individual bureau, so that under the cooperation mechanism, even in the game of irrational behavior, In this paper, the author puts forward the IBP condition of the alliance, and proves that the Shapley value of the pollution cost control model satisfies the IBP condition of the alliance. The first focus of this paper is the study of irrational behavior of people in the game. A new condition is put forward in this paper, so that even if irrational behavior occurs in the game, the person in the game is still better under the cooperative mechanism. Furthermore, if the irrational behavior appears later, that is, the longer the time to participate in the cooperation, the higher the payoff of the player in the game, which can promote the long-term cooperation of the player in the game. In view of the differential game problem of cooperative pollution cost control between countries, this paper proposes the asynchronous irrational behavior manipulation condition of the game problem, and proves that this new AIBP condition can promote more lasting cooperation between countries. In addition, for the differential game problem of cooperative control of pollution cost between two neighboring countries, this paper obtains the incentive equilibrium strategy and credibility conditions of the model, which is another focus of this paper. This paper proves that the linear incentive strategy proposed for the pollution cost control game is not always credible. In this paper, the problem of cost sharing between two countries is studied, and a mechanism is designed to share the total human cost along the time, so that the real time cost of the person in the bureau is lower than his non-cooperative cost under the cooperation at any time.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：青島大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：O225

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 WANG Lei;GAO HongWei;PETROSYAN Leon;QIAO Han;SEDAKOV Artem;;Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures[J];Science China(Mathematics);2016年05期

，

本文編號：1959395