本文選題：績效薪酬 + 委托代理　； 參考：《青島大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營過程中,企業(yè)所有者的目的是獲得最大利潤,而利潤的獲得離不開員工的努力工作。如何有效地激勵(lì)企業(yè)員工的努力度,是企業(yè)提高產(chǎn)量、保證產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量,并進(jìn)一步拓展市場(chǎng)份額、提升市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能力的關(guān)鍵。因此設(shè)計(jì)一種科學(xué)高效的績效薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制,具有重要的意義和極高的研究價(jià)值。本文在委托代理理論框架下,考慮在生產(chǎn)過程中產(chǎn)出受代理人努力程度和干擾因素共同影響的生產(chǎn)關(guān)系,研究了有限理性下具有不同行為特征的委托人對(duì)具有不同行為特征的代理人的績效薪酬設(shè)計(jì)問題。利用累積前景理論,刻畫了委托人和代理人在有限理性下對(duì)利潤的感知,并分析了代理人和委托人的行為選擇。通過算例,解釋了各個(gè)因素對(duì)委托人和代理人行為選擇以及其感知價(jià)值的影響。本文先初步研究了完全理性績效薪酬模型中代理人和委托人的行為選擇及其利潤,并通過算例分析了基礎(chǔ)工資以及企業(yè)生產(chǎn)能力對(duì)代理人(或委托人)行為以及利潤的影響,隨后研究了具有損失厭惡行為特征的績效薪酬模型,并分析了加入這一有限理性行為特征后各因素對(duì)委托人和代理人行為選擇以及其感知價(jià)值的影響,最后又在績效薪酬模型中納入了損失概率厭惡行為特征,利用累積前景理論,采用非連續(xù)決策權(quán)重函數(shù)形式,分析了在添加了損失厭惡行為和概率損失厭惡行為特征后各個(gè)因素對(duì)代理人和委托人行為選擇以及其感知價(jià)值的影響。研究結(jié)果表明,代理人的行為選擇(最優(yōu)努力程度的選擇)受企業(yè)生產(chǎn)能力與委托人設(shè)置利潤分享系數(shù)共同影響,與其有限理性行為特征無關(guān),但其感知價(jià)值受其有限理性行為特征影響;委托人則不同,他所選擇的行為(利潤分享系數(shù)的設(shè)置)以及其感知價(jià)值均受其有限理性行為特征影響。
[Abstract]:In the process of production and operation, the purpose of the owner is to obtain the maximum profit, and the profit can not be obtained without the hard work of the staff. How to effectively encourage the effort of employees is the key to improve the output, ensure the quality of products, further expand the market share and enhance the competitiveness of the market. Therefore, the design of a scientific and efficient performance compensation incentive mechanism has important significance and high research value. Under the framework of principal-agent theory, this paper considers the production relations which are influenced by the degree of agency effort and interference factors in the production process. This paper studies the performance compensation design of agents with different behavior characteristics under limited rationality. Based on the theory of cumulative prospect, this paper describes the perception of profit between principal and agent under finite rationality, and analyzes the behavior choice of agent and agent. The influence of various factors on the behavior choice and perceived value of principal and agent is explained by an example. In this paper, the behavior choice and profit of agent and principal in complete rational performance compensation model are studied, and the effect of basic wage and enterprise productivity on agent (or principal) behavior and profit is analyzed through an example. Then, the paper studies the performance compensation model with loss aversion behavior, and analyzes the influence of various factors on the behavior choice and perceived value of principal and agent after adding this limited rational behavior feature. Finally, the loss probability aversion behavior is incorporated into the performance compensation model, and the cumulative foreground theory is used in the form of discontinuous decision weight function. After adding loss aversion behavior and probabilistic loss aversion behavior, the influence of each factor on agent and principal behavior choice and its perceived value is analyzed. The results show that the agent's behavior choice (the choice of the optimal effort level) is influenced by the productivity of the firm and the profit sharing coefficient set by the principal, but it has nothing to do with the characteristics of the limited rational behavior. However, its perceived value is influenced by its limited rational behavior characteristics, while the client's behavior (the setting of profit sharing coefficient) and its perceived value are all affected by its limited rational behavior characteristics.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：青島大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F272.92

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