本文選題：碳減排 + 利益相關(guān)者　； 參考：《上海師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著全球環(huán)境問(wèn)題日益嚴(yán)重,世界各國(guó)都面臨著溫室效應(yīng)、氣候變化等生態(tài)環(huán)境問(wèn)題,如何應(yīng)對(duì)環(huán)境變化,是國(guó)際和國(guó)內(nèi)都在探討的話(huà)題。節(jié)能環(huán)保、綠色低碳已經(jīng)成為全世界共同關(guān)心的熱點(diǎn)。由于二氧化碳大量排放而造成溫室氣體的集聚,成為溫室效應(yīng)最主要因素。所以,減少碳排放量成為全球各國(guó)共同合作、共同承擔(dān)的義務(wù)。對(duì)中國(guó)而言,幾十年來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)快速發(fā)展,成為最大的發(fā)展中國(guó)家,但卻付出了能源短缺、生態(tài)環(huán)境破壞、霧霾加劇的慘痛代價(jià),并且成為了世界上二氧化碳排放量最大的國(guó)家。在低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的背景下,中國(guó)政府對(duì)降低二氧化碳排放量目標(biāo)所做出的承諾展示著我國(guó)對(duì)于碳減排任務(wù)的決心,也對(duì)作為碳減排實(shí)施主體的企業(yè)提出了完成碳減排目標(biāo)的要求,企業(yè)實(shí)施碳減排勢(shì)在必行。但是企業(yè)碳減排行為涉及到多方面的因素,企業(yè)的利益相關(guān)者對(duì)企業(yè)實(shí)施碳減排的態(tài)度與策略也影響著企業(yè)最終的策略選擇。本文是在這樣的背景下,運(yùn)用利益相關(guān)者理論、博弈理論和演化博弈理論,確定企業(yè)碳減排相關(guān)的核心利益相關(guān)者,構(gòu)建核心利益相關(guān)者與企業(yè)之間的博弈模型,分析各自的博弈策略,對(duì)企業(yè)實(shí)施碳減排提供理論基礎(chǔ)及策略建議,以促進(jìn)我國(guó)碳減排目標(biāo)的達(dá)成。本文的主要研究分為三個(gè)部分:第一部分是運(yùn)用利益相關(guān)者的分類(lèi)方法和權(quán)力/利益矩陣,確定出強(qiáng)制減排與自愿減排兩個(gè)機(jī)制下企業(yè)碳減排的核心利益相關(guān)者為政府部門(mén)、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者,并對(duì)其各自的利益訴求與相互間的博弈沖突進(jìn)行梳理;第二部分是運(yùn)用靜態(tài)博弈構(gòu)建政府部門(mén)與企業(yè)、企業(yè)與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手企業(yè)、企業(yè)與消費(fèi)者的雙方博弈模型,求出每個(gè)博弈模型的最佳均衡解,分析了模型雙方的最佳均衡策略;第三部分是運(yùn)用演化博弈理論構(gòu)建政府部門(mén)、企業(yè)與消費(fèi)者的三方演化博弈模型,利用穩(wěn)定性分析求出四個(gè)均衡點(diǎn),分析出每個(gè)均衡點(diǎn)的成立條件和各自的演化策略選擇。最后對(duì)這三個(gè)主要研究部分各自得出的結(jié)論進(jìn)行匯總,對(duì)企業(yè)碳減排的核心利益相關(guān)者:政府部門(mén)、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者,分別提出不同的促使企業(yè)實(shí)施碳減排的策略建議,提出將強(qiáng)制減排與自愿減排機(jī)制結(jié)合起來(lái),共同對(duì)企業(yè)產(chǎn)生激勵(lì)作用。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly serious global environmental problems, all countries in the world are faced with ecological environmental problems such as Greenhouse Effect and climate change. How to cope with environmental change is a topic that is being discussed both internationally and domestically. Energy saving and environmental protection, green and low carbon have become the focus of common concern all over the world. The accumulation of greenhouse gases due to large amount of carbon dioxide emission has become the main factor of Greenhouse Effect. Therefore, reducing carbon emissions has become a common global cooperation and commitment. For China, the rapid economic development in recent decades has become the largest developing country, but it has paid the heavy price of energy shortage, ecological environment damage, haze aggravation, and has become the largest carbon dioxide emission country in the world. In the context of low-carbon economy, the commitment made by the Chinese government to reduce carbon dioxide emissions targets shows China's commitment to the task of reducing carbon emissions, and also puts forward the requirements for enterprises as the main players in the implementation of carbon emission reduction to achieve carbon emission reduction targets. It is imperative for enterprises to implement carbon emission reduction. However, carbon abatement behavior involves many factors, and the attitude and strategy of enterprise stakeholders to implement carbon emission reduction also affect the final strategy choice of enterprises. Under this background, using stakeholder theory, game theory and evolutionary game theory, this paper determines the core stakeholders of carbon emission reduction, and constructs the game model between the core stakeholders and enterprises. This paper analyzes their respective game strategies and provides theoretical basis and suggestions for enterprises to implement carbon emission reduction in order to promote the achievement of carbon emission reduction targets in China. The main research of this paper is divided into three parts: the first part is the use of stakeholder classification method and power / interest matrix to determine that the core stakeholders of carbon emission reduction under the two mechanisms of mandatory emission reduction and voluntary emission reduction are government departments. The second part is to use static game to construct government departments and enterprises, enterprises and rival enterprises, the second part is to use static game to construct government departments and enterprises, enterprises and rival enterprises. The best equilibrium solution of each game model is obtained, and the optimal equilibrium strategy of both parties is analyzed. The third part is to use evolutionary game theory to construct government departments. Based on the three-party evolutionary game model of enterprise and consumer, four equilibrium points are obtained by stability analysis, and the establishment conditions of each equilibrium point and the selection of their own evolution strategies are analyzed. Finally, the conclusions of the three main research parts are summarized, and the core stakeholders of carbon emission reduction: government departments, competitors and consumers, respectively, put forward different strategies to promote the implementation of carbon emission reduction. It is proposed to combine compulsory emission reduction with voluntary emission reduction mechanism to stimulate enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：X322;F279.2;F224.32

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