本文選題：地方政府博弈 + 彈性環(huán)境政策��； 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著環(huán)境污染治理的不斷深入,"京華煙云"、"霧霾傾城"等污染事件依然頻繁發(fā)生。針對(duì)污染治理和污染排放同時(shí)增加這一現(xiàn)象,已有研究主要圍繞國(guó)家和省級(jí)層面展開,忽略了城市群集合體。本文以城市群作為研究對(duì)象,探討環(huán)境政策、地方政府博弈與城市群環(huán)境質(zhì)量的關(guān)系。同時(shí),納入環(huán)境污染負(fù)外部性要素,構(gòu)建了兩階段動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型。首先分析地方政府博弈時(shí)企業(yè)產(chǎn)量決策和城市環(huán)境稅率決策,然后探討城市群整體企業(yè)最優(yōu)產(chǎn)量和環(huán)境稅率標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。本文認(rèn)為:第一,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)情況下企業(yè)最優(yōu)產(chǎn)量與本地區(qū)環(huán)境稅率反向變化,與相鄰地區(qū)環(huán)境稅率同向變化,"產(chǎn)業(yè)區(qū)位重置"假說成立;第二,中心—外圍城市環(huán)境稅率反向變動(dòng),污染性企業(yè)傾向布局在上游環(huán)境區(qū)位,產(chǎn)生"以鄰為壑"現(xiàn)象;第三,地方政府博弈產(chǎn)生的環(huán)境稅率低于城市群統(tǒng)一環(huán)境稅率,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)產(chǎn)量2q大于城市群最優(yōu)產(chǎn)量Q*,污染排放與產(chǎn)量成正相關(guān)時(shí),地方政府相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)惡化了城市群環(huán)境的狀況。本文采用長(zhǎng)江三角洲城市群16個(gè)城市2003～2014年樣本數(shù)據(jù),運(yùn)用ArcGIS和GeoDa檢驗(yàn)污染物是否存在空間自相關(guān)現(xiàn)象。在空間自相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)上,分別采用Queen Contiguity、Rook Contiguuity、Distance Contiguiuy三種方法進(jìn)行空間計(jì)量回歸。結(jié)論顯示:第一,工業(yè)廢氣存在空間自相關(guān)現(xiàn)象,工業(yè)廢水和工業(yè)固體廢棄物不存在空間自相關(guān);第二,中心城市環(huán)境稅與外圍城市環(huán)境稅、污染負(fù)外部性呈反比;第三,環(huán)境稅(排污費(fèi))政策有效控制了城市群環(huán)境污染排放,納入地方政府競(jìng)爭(zhēng)要素時(shí)排污費(fèi)政策與城市群污染物排放呈正比,地方政府之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)惡化了城市群整體環(huán)境。
[Abstract]:With the continuous deepening of environmental pollution control, the pollution events such as "JINGWAH smoke cloud" and "fog and haze dumping" still occur frequently. In view of the phenomenon of pollution control and pollution emission increasing at the same time, the existing research mainly focuses on the national and provincial levels, neglecting the urban agglomeration. This paper takes the urban agglomeration as the research object and discusses the environmental policy, The relationship between the game of local government and the environmental quality of urban agglomeration. At the same time, the two stage dynamic game model is built into the negative externality of environmental pollution. First, it analyzes the decision of the enterprise production and the urban environmental tax rate when the local government game, and then discusses the optimal output of the whole enterprise and the standard of the environmental tax rate. This paper holds that first, In the case of competition, the optimal output of the enterprise and the environmental tax rate in the local area is reversed, and the environmental tax rate is changed in the same area. The hypothesis of "industrial location reset" is set up. Second, the reverse change of the environmental tax rate in the central and peripheral cities, the layout of the polluting enterprises in the upstream environment area, the "beggar thy neighbour" phenomenon, and the third, the game of local government. The environmental tax rate is lower than the unified environmental tax rate of the urban agglomeration, the competitive output 2q is greater than the optimal output of urban agglomeration Q*. When the pollution discharge is positively related to the output, the local governments compete with each other to deteriorate the condition of the urban agglomeration. This paper uses the sample data of the 16 cities of the Yangtze River Delta city group for 2003~2014 years, and uses ArcGIS and GeoDa to test the pollution. On the basis of spatial autocorrelation, on the basis of spatial autocorrelation, the spatial autocorrelation of three methods, Queen Contiguity, Rook Contiguuity and Distance Contiguiuy, is used respectively. The conclusions are as follows: first, there are spatial autocorrelation phenomena in industrial waste gas, and there is no spatial autocorrelation in industrial waste water and industrial solid waste; second, The environmental tax in the central city is inversely proportional to the external environmental tax and the negative externality of the pollution. Third, the environmental tax (pollutant discharge fee) policy effectively controls the environmental pollution emission of the urban agglomeration. The pollution discharge policy of the local government is proportional to the pollutant discharge of the urban agglomeration, and the competition between the local governments worsens the overall environment of the urban agglomeration.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：X196;F224.32;F299.2
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本文編號(hào)：1854406