本文選題：從眾心理 + 非理性因素��； 參考：《吉林大學》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著科技的不斷發(fā)展，借助網絡，通訊等途徑傳播輿情信息對社會的危害正日益擴大。輿情信息是指那些在社交網絡中快速傳播的信息，這些信息可以是謠言，不法言論等等，也可以是一些帶有正能量的信息。由于科技的進步使得這些輿情信息可以快速傳播并造成較大的社會影響。由于網絡具有虛擬性，使得追查輿情信息的源頭變得很困難，這加大了控制輿情的難度。通�？刂戚浨閭鞑サ姆椒ㄊ窍拗破湓诰W絡中傳播，但是阻止信息在網絡中傳播這本身違背了網絡本身的優(yōu)點，同時會引起人們的反感，因此本文提出了另一種控制輿情傳播的方法。 本文提出了通過控制網絡中個體對輿情信息的認知來達到控制輿情傳播的目的。在本文的模型中，輿情信息可以隨意在網絡中傳播，而研究的重點放在了個體的對于輿情的認知過程上。只要網絡中的個體對于輿情信息有一個正確的認識，那么就會減輕輿情信息所帶來的社會影響。 本文采用了博弈論中的協調博弈模型來模擬網絡中個體的認知過程。協調博弈是要滿足預期行為一致的博弈。協調博弈本身描述的就是博弈參與者協商的過程，這和網絡中個體討論輿情信息的情況相似。 本文還加入了帶有非理性因素的協調博弈模型對鄰居之間交互進行建模，重點研究了在從眾心理的非理性因素的作用下，網絡中個體對于輿情信息認知的演化過程。這里的非理性并非通常所說的感性，而是博弈參與者選擇自身策略時不考慮收益，根據其他條件來選擇策略。博弈中的非理性因素是近些年所提出的，它擬補了傳統博弈論本身的局限，即博弈論假設參與者為純理性人，只考慮在博弈過程中所能獲得的收益，進而選取策略。非理性因素有很多，本文中的非理性因素為從眾心理，它是指博弈參與者不考慮收益，而是跟隨其鄰居選擇策略的情況，選擇多數鄰居所選擇的策略。 同時，本文還研究了一些其他因素，如冒險系數、初始偏好對個體認知過程的影響。冒險系數是對選擇風險策略的一種激勵，很多情況下由于一些傳統觀念等原因，正確的認知并不能被廣泛認同，這時就需要激勵那些能夠選擇正確認知的人，以達到整體認知趨于正確的目的�？梢哉f冒險激勵是一種控制輿情傳播的方法。在現實世界中，由于每個人所處的生活環(huán)境不同，社會經歷不同，對于同一實物看法也會不同，初始偏好就是用來模擬這種情況的。隨著不斷的博弈討論，初始偏好的影響也會逐漸降低。 實驗結果表明非理性因素不能改變總體的策略選擇偏好，但能對部分個體的策略選擇產生影響，，使得網絡中出現選擇不同策略的群體，且兩種群體不能互相侵入。冒險系數，初始偏好可以控制總體策略選擇，對輿情傳播的控制具有一定的作用。 針對輿情傳播在復雜網絡上的研究有助于了解網絡中輿情信息傳播的過程以及相關個體對于輿情信息的交互和認知規(guī)律，能夠進一步揭示真實世界社交網絡的輿情傳播規(guī)律，通過這些規(guī)律能過為社交網絡上的政策制定提供一定的理論基礎以及為遏制輿情帶來的危害提供相應的策略。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of science and technology, the public opinion information is spreading to the society by means of network and communication. Public opinion information is the information which is spread quickly in the social network. These information can be rumor, illegal speech and so on. It can also be some positive energy information. It makes it difficult to trace the source of public opinion because of the virtual nature of the network, which makes it more difficult to control public opinion. Generally, the way to control public opinion transmission is to restrict its spread in the network, but it is against the network itself to prevent the spread of information in the network itself. The advantages will also cause people's resentment. Therefore, this paper proposes another way to control the spread of public opinion.
This paper puts forward the purpose of controlling public opinion transmission by controlling the individual's cognition of public opinion information in the network. In this model, the public opinion information can be spread at random in the network, and the focus of the research is on the individual cognition process of public opinion. As long as the individual in the network has a correct recognition of public opinion information. Knowledge will reduce the social impact of public opinion information.
This paper uses the coordinated game model in the game theory to simulate the cognitive process of the individual in the network. The coordinated game is a game to satisfy the consistent expected behavior. The coordination game itself describes the process of negotiation among the players, which is similar to the individual discussion of public opinion information in the network.
In this paper, a coordinated game model with irrational factors is added to model the interaction between neighbors, and the evolution process of the individual's cognition of public opinion information in the network is studied under the effect of the irrational factors of the crowd. The irrationality here is not usually said by the perceptual, but when the game participants choose their own strategies. The irrational factor in the game is put forward in recent years without considering the income. The irrational factor in the game is proposed in recent years. It has made up the limitations of the traditional game theory itself, that is, the game theory assumes that the participants are purely rational, only considering the gains that can be obtained in the game process, and then select the strategy. There are many irrational factors and the non rational factors in this paper. Sexual factor is a herd mentality. It refers to the game participants who do not consider revenue but follow their neighbors' choice strategy and choose the strategy chosen by most neighbors.
At the same time, some other factors, such as the risk factor, the influence of the initial preference on the individual cognitive process. The risk factor is an incentive to choose the risk strategy, and in many cases, due to some traditional ideas, the correct cognition is not widely recognized, and then it is necessary to encourage those who can choose the right cognition. It can be said that risk incentive is a way to control the spread of public opinion. In the real world, because the living environment of each person is different, the social experience is different, the opinion of the same kind will be different, the initial preference is used to simulate this situation. With the continuous game discussion, The effect of initial preference will also gradually decrease.
The experimental results show that irrational factors can not change the overall strategic choice preference, but it can affect the selection of strategies for some individuals, which makes the network appear to select groups of different strategies, and the two groups can not invade each other. The risk coefficient, initial preference can control the selection of the general strategy, and the control of public opinion transmission is certain. The role.
Research on the spread of public opinion on complex networks helps to understand the process of dissemination of public opinion information in the network and the interaction and cognitive laws of relevant individuals on public opinion information. It can further reveal the law of public opinion dissemination in real world social networks. Through these laws, it can provide a certain reason for policy making on social networks. On the basis and provide corresponding strategies to curb the harm brought by public opinion.

【學位授予單位】：吉林大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：O157.5;O225

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