本文關(guān)鍵詞： 電子商務(wù) 網(wǎng)絡(luò)信用 CBC 電商平臺 第三方信用監(jiān)管 博弈　出處：《系統(tǒng)工程理論與實踐》2017年08期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：由于商戶與消費者間的信息不對稱性,電商失信問題日益突出.對此,作為電子商務(wù)的主要媒介,電商平臺的信用監(jiān)管職責不容忽視.在C2C電子商務(wù)模式中,引入電商平臺為第三方信用監(jiān)管方以形成C2B2C電子商務(wù)模式,并設(shè)計C2B2C電商信用監(jiān)管機制,包括:保證金收取機制,信用監(jiān)管機制,失信懲罰機制等.基于博弈理論,構(gòu)建了C2B2C電子商務(wù)模式下的演化博弈模型與雙價交易模型,對電商和消費者雙方的長期交易策略進行了分析,其結(jié)果表明:提高信用保證金、增強信用監(jiān)管力度、增加偽裝成本能有效避免電商失信行為,減少消費者在電子商務(wù)交易中的風險.
[Abstract]:Because of the asymmetry of information between merchants and consumers, the problem of e-commerce discredit is becoming more and more serious. Therefore, as the main medium of e-commerce, the credit supervision responsibility of e-commerce platform can not be ignored. This paper introduces the e-commerce platform as the third party credit supervisor to form the C2B2C e-commerce model, and designs the C2B2C e-commerce credit supervision mechanism, including: margin collection mechanism, credit supervision mechanism, credit penalty mechanism, etc. An evolutionary game model and a bivalent trading model under the C2B2C e-commerce model are constructed, and the long-term trading strategies of both e-commerce and consumers are analyzed. The results show that the credit margin is increased and the credit supervision is strengthened. Increasing the camouflage cost can effectively avoid the behavior of e-commerce dishonesty and reduce the risk of consumers in e-commerce transactions.
【作者單位】： 北京化工大學理學院;北京化工大學經(jīng)濟管理學院;北京航空航天大學經(jīng)濟管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金(71433001,71301006,71571010,71372195)~~
【分類號】：F224.32;F724.6

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1 戴建華;陳陽升;闞凱力;;電子商務(wù)從C2C到C2B2C模式的博弈分析[J];中國傳媒大學學報(自然科學版);2011年02期

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