公路工程監(jiān)理道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制的組合策略模型及應(yīng)用研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-05-17 05:14
【摘要】：道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題是當(dāng)前金融業(yè)、保險(xiǎn)業(yè)、銀行業(yè)等領(lǐng)域研究的熱點(diǎn)問題。文獻(xiàn)研究表明：工程建設(shè)領(lǐng)域的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題研究非常匱乏,尤其是針對(duì)控制和消除公路工程監(jiān)理單邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的研究。在公路工程項(xiàng)目建設(shè)中,信息不對(duì)稱導(dǎo)致公路工程監(jiān)理契約的不完備性,也導(dǎo)致項(xiàng)目業(yè)主和公路工程監(jiān)理雙邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)存在。有鑒如此,論文研究得出了控制和消除公路工程監(jiān)理單邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的組合策略模型。論文突破傳統(tǒng)的委托代理問題分析思路,在契約關(guān)系分析研究中假設(shè)公路工程項(xiàng)目建設(shè)參與者從“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”轉(zhuǎn)換到“社會(huì)人”,即項(xiàng)目業(yè)主和公路工程監(jiān)理都是有限理性,雙方都有機(jī)會(huì)主義及自利行為傾向。論文也分析了公路工程項(xiàng)目建設(shè)中復(fù)雜的委托代理關(guān)系：即公路工程項(xiàng)目建設(shè)中多委托人與多代理人,項(xiàng)目業(yè)主與公路工程監(jiān)理的多任務(wù)目標(biāo)委托代理關(guān)系。論文還分析項(xiàng)目業(yè)主和公路工程監(jiān)理信息不對(duì)稱性及未來(lái)環(huán)境不確定性因素：即項(xiàng)目業(yè)主和公路工程監(jiān)理的私人信息不可消除,雙方私人信息是導(dǎo)致項(xiàng)目業(yè)主和公路工程監(jiān)理雙邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)永久存在的關(guān)鍵因素。論文基于項(xiàng)目業(yè)主及公路工程監(jiān)理的雙邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)視角,對(duì)公路工程監(jiān)理道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)理論及其模型條件進(jìn)行了基本假設(shè),在Holmstrom-Milgrom多任務(wù)委托代理模型基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行拓展,構(gòu)建了公路工程監(jiān)理的關(guān)系契約模型、監(jiān)理工作多任務(wù)目標(biāo)關(guān)聯(lián)程度模型、串謀行為博弈模型、最優(yōu)監(jiān)督模型、信譽(yù)評(píng)價(jià)模型的組合策略。論文認(rèn)為要控制和消除公路工程監(jiān)理單邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),必須建立一套能夠約束雙方行為的契約關(guān)系,又要強(qiáng)化對(duì)代理人行為激勵(lì)誘導(dǎo)及監(jiān)督,更要對(duì)代理人行為進(jìn)行社會(huì)信譽(yù)評(píng)價(jià)機(jī)制的組合策略。論文研究組合策略模型之首的最優(yōu)契約機(jī)制,認(rèn)為應(yīng)該建立以公路工程監(jiān)理正式契約為主、關(guān)系契約為輔的公路工程監(jiān)理契約機(jī)制,依靠公路工程監(jiān)理關(guān)系契約中“自我履約性”的實(shí)施來(lái)達(dá)到控制和消除公路工程監(jiān)理的單邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)目的：組合策略之二的激勵(lì)誘導(dǎo)機(jī)制,通過對(duì)監(jiān)理工作目標(biāo)任務(wù)的數(shù)理分析及關(guān)聯(lián)程度實(shí)證研究分析,認(rèn)為項(xiàng)目業(yè)主應(yīng)該對(duì)互補(bǔ)性任務(wù)加強(qiáng)激勵(lì)誘導(dǎo),通過激勵(lì)誘導(dǎo)方式解決代理人努力程度問題,促使監(jiān)理工作目標(biāo)任務(wù)實(shí)現(xiàn),達(dá)到控制和消除公路工程監(jiān)理單邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的目的；組合策略之三的最優(yōu)監(jiān)督機(jī)制,通過對(duì)公路工程監(jiān)理串謀行為的博弈分析及委托人最優(yōu)監(jiān)督效用分析,認(rèn)為委托人只有加強(qiáng)監(jiān)督才會(huì)有效控制公路工程監(jiān)理的串謀行為及“不努力”和“不講真話”行為,達(dá)到控制和消除公路工程監(jiān)理單邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的目的；組合策略之四的信譽(yù)評(píng)價(jià)機(jī)制,通過對(duì)分析信譽(yù)評(píng)價(jià)對(duì)代理人努力程度的影響,認(rèn)為聲譽(yù)評(píng)價(jià)機(jī)制能夠有效的提高公路工程監(jiān)理的監(jiān)理工作努力程度,可以達(dá)到控制和消除公路工程監(jiān)理單邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的目的。論文提出的最優(yōu)契約、激勵(lì)誘導(dǎo)、最優(yōu)監(jiān)督、信譽(yù)評(píng)價(jià)機(jī)制是控制和消除公路工程監(jiān)理單邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的最佳組合策略；論文認(rèn)為這種組合策略的運(yùn)用是信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、委托代理理論、契約理論等在公路工程項(xiàng)目建設(shè)領(lǐng)域的有益嘗試,是理論應(yīng)用上的有益創(chuàng)新。論文研究的組合策略模型是有效控制和消除公路工程監(jiān)理單邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的創(chuàng)新性舉措。
[Abstract]:The problem of moral hazard is the hot issue in the current financial industry, insurance industry, banking and other fields. The research of the literature shows that the research of moral hazard in the field of engineering construction is very scarce, especially for the control and elimination of the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision. In the construction of the highway engineering project, the information asymmetry leads to the incompleteness of the highway engineering supervision contract, and also leads to the existence of the bilateral moral hazard of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision. In this way, the paper studies the combined strategy model of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision. The paper breaks through the traditional analysis of the agency problem, and in the study of the contract relation, it is assumed that the construction participants of the highway project from the "economic man" to the "social person", that is, the project owner and the highway engineering supervision are both limited and rational, and both sides have the opportunism and the self-interest behavior tendency. The paper also analyzes the complex principal-agency relationship in the construction of the highway engineering project: the multi-client and multi-agent, the project owner and the highway engineering supervision's multi-task target commission agent relationship. The paper also analyzes the asymmetry of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision information and the uncertainty of the future environment: that is, the private information of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision is not eliminated, The private information of both parties is a key factor leading to the permanent existence of the bilateral moral hazard between the project owner and the highway engineering supervision. Based on the two-sided moral hazard of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision, the paper makes a basic assumption about the moral hazard theory and the model condition of the highway engineering supervision. On the basis of Holmstrom-Milgrom multi-task proxy model, the relationship contract model of the highway engineering supervision is constructed. The combination strategy of the multi-task target association degree model, the conspiracy behavior game model, the optimal supervision model and the reputation evaluation model of the supervision work. In order to control and eliminate the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision, it is necessary to set up a set of contract relation which can restrain the behavior of the two parties, and to strengthen the inducement and supervision of the agent's behavior, and the combination strategy of the social credit evaluation mechanism of the agent's behavior. The paper studies the optimal contract mechanism in the first place of the combination strategy model, and it is thought that the highway engineering supervision contract mechanism, which is based on the formal contract of the highway engineering supervision and the relationship contract, should be established. On the basis of the implementation of the "self-compliance" in the highway engineering supervision relationship contract, the aim of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision is achieved: the incentive and inducing mechanism of the combination strategy two, through the mathematical analysis of the task of the supervision work and the empirical study of the correlation degree, It is considered that the project owner should strengthen the incentive induction to the complementary task, solve the problem of the agent's efforts through the incentive-inducing way, and promote the task of the supervision work, so as to achieve the purpose of controlling and eliminating the single-side moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision; The optimal supervision mechanism of the combination strategy ter, through the game analysis of the supervision of the highway engineering supervision and the analysis of the optimal supervision utility of the client, is of the opinion that only the strengthening supervision of the client can effectively control the collusive behavior and the "do not work hard" and the "to tell the truth" behavior of the highway engineering supervision. To achieve the aim of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision, the four-way credit evaluation mechanism of the combination strategy can effectively improve the supervision work degree of the highway engineering supervision through the analysis of the influence of the reputation evaluation on the agent's efforts, And the purpose of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision can be achieved. The optimal contract, incentive-induced, optimal supervision and reputation evaluation mechanism proposed in this paper are the best combination strategies to control and eliminate the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision. The beneficial attempt in the field of highway engineering project construction, such as the contract theory, is a useful innovation in the theoretical application. The combined strategy model of the thesis is an innovative approach to effectively control and eliminate the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長(zhǎng)沙理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：U415.12
本文編號(hào)：2478830
[Abstract]:The problem of moral hazard is the hot issue in the current financial industry, insurance industry, banking and other fields. The research of the literature shows that the research of moral hazard in the field of engineering construction is very scarce, especially for the control and elimination of the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision. In the construction of the highway engineering project, the information asymmetry leads to the incompleteness of the highway engineering supervision contract, and also leads to the existence of the bilateral moral hazard of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision. In this way, the paper studies the combined strategy model of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision. The paper breaks through the traditional analysis of the agency problem, and in the study of the contract relation, it is assumed that the construction participants of the highway project from the "economic man" to the "social person", that is, the project owner and the highway engineering supervision are both limited and rational, and both sides have the opportunism and the self-interest behavior tendency. The paper also analyzes the complex principal-agency relationship in the construction of the highway engineering project: the multi-client and multi-agent, the project owner and the highway engineering supervision's multi-task target commission agent relationship. The paper also analyzes the asymmetry of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision information and the uncertainty of the future environment: that is, the private information of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision is not eliminated, The private information of both parties is a key factor leading to the permanent existence of the bilateral moral hazard between the project owner and the highway engineering supervision. Based on the two-sided moral hazard of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision, the paper makes a basic assumption about the moral hazard theory and the model condition of the highway engineering supervision. On the basis of Holmstrom-Milgrom multi-task proxy model, the relationship contract model of the highway engineering supervision is constructed. The combination strategy of the multi-task target association degree model, the conspiracy behavior game model, the optimal supervision model and the reputation evaluation model of the supervision work. In order to control and eliminate the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision, it is necessary to set up a set of contract relation which can restrain the behavior of the two parties, and to strengthen the inducement and supervision of the agent's behavior, and the combination strategy of the social credit evaluation mechanism of the agent's behavior. The paper studies the optimal contract mechanism in the first place of the combination strategy model, and it is thought that the highway engineering supervision contract mechanism, which is based on the formal contract of the highway engineering supervision and the relationship contract, should be established. On the basis of the implementation of the "self-compliance" in the highway engineering supervision relationship contract, the aim of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision is achieved: the incentive and inducing mechanism of the combination strategy two, through the mathematical analysis of the task of the supervision work and the empirical study of the correlation degree, It is considered that the project owner should strengthen the incentive induction to the complementary task, solve the problem of the agent's efforts through the incentive-inducing way, and promote the task of the supervision work, so as to achieve the purpose of controlling and eliminating the single-side moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision; The optimal supervision mechanism of the combination strategy ter, through the game analysis of the supervision of the highway engineering supervision and the analysis of the optimal supervision utility of the client, is of the opinion that only the strengthening supervision of the client can effectively control the collusive behavior and the "do not work hard" and the "to tell the truth" behavior of the highway engineering supervision. To achieve the aim of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision, the four-way credit evaluation mechanism of the combination strategy can effectively improve the supervision work degree of the highway engineering supervision through the analysis of the influence of the reputation evaluation on the agent's efforts, And the purpose of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision can be achieved. The optimal contract, incentive-induced, optimal supervision and reputation evaluation mechanism proposed in this paper are the best combination strategies to control and eliminate the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision. The beneficial attempt in the field of highway engineering project construction, such as the contract theory, is a useful innovation in the theoretical application. The combined strategy model of the thesis is an innovative approach to effectively control and eliminate the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長(zhǎng)沙理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：U415.12
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