本文選題：產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新 + 技術(shù)許可　； 參考：《華北電力大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：長期以來,國內(nèi)外學(xué)者對經(jīng)濟增長的影響因素已進行了大量的實證研究,結(jié)果表明,隨著時間的推移,技術(shù)進步在經(jīng)濟增長中的作用日益提高,并逐步取代了生產(chǎn)要素投入在經(jīng)濟增長中的主導(dǎo)地位。要保持我國的經(jīng)濟持續(xù)高速增長,就必須加強技術(shù)進步的力度,轉(zhuǎn)變經(jīng)濟增長方式,提高技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力,使經(jīng)濟增長逐步實現(xiàn)從要素驅(qū)動型向創(chuàng)新驅(qū)動型轉(zhuǎn)變。知識和技術(shù)的創(chuàng)新和創(chuàng)造性應(yīng)用越來越成為當(dāng)今知識經(jīng)濟時代技術(shù)進步、經(jīng)濟社會發(fā)展的推動力。創(chuàng)新的成果水平衡量指標(biāo)專利尤其是對發(fā)明專利的創(chuàng)造、擁有和運用,成為一個企業(yè)乃至一個國家在競爭中獲得優(yōu)勢的關(guān)鍵因素。然而,不容樂觀的是,專利成果轉(zhuǎn)化率并沒有明顯提高,大量專利得不到應(yīng)用而成為“沉睡專利”,科技成果轉(zhuǎn)化不成生產(chǎn)力。要徹底改變這種科技與經(jīng)濟脫節(jié)、科技向現(xiàn)實生產(chǎn)力轉(zhuǎn)化能力薄弱的局面,充分發(fā)揮知識和技術(shù)在推動我國經(jīng)濟增長方式轉(zhuǎn)變中的重要作用,需要積極研究和探討我國的技術(shù)市場交易與科技成果轉(zhuǎn)化。 技術(shù)許可是在技術(shù)市場上實現(xiàn)技術(shù)交易的主要形式之一,是技術(shù)要素流動的一種重要方式,也是技術(shù)充分發(fā)揮其經(jīng)濟主導(dǎo)力量的主要路徑。如何確定被轉(zhuǎn)移技術(shù)的價格契約方式是技術(shù)許可決策的核心。因此,隨著以創(chuàng)新為基礎(chǔ)的市場競爭日益激烈、科技水平的快速提升以及世界范圍內(nèi)對知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護的不斷加強,在許多產(chǎn)業(yè)的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移及擴散過程中,技術(shù)許可將不可避免地發(fā)揮越來越重要的作用。技術(shù)許可價格決策過程是十分復(fù)雜和困難的。研究技術(shù)許可的內(nèi)在價格決策行為無論對于提高企業(yè)、高校等市場主體的技術(shù)交易效率,促進科技成果向現(xiàn)實生產(chǎn)力轉(zhuǎn)化,提高創(chuàng)新技術(shù)對于經(jīng)濟增長的貢獻力,還是擴展技術(shù)許可契約理論研究的深度和廣度都是有一定的價值的。 本文提出產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可策略理論,是考慮與產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可活動相關(guān)的政府、研發(fā)者、許可方、被許可方以及消費者等決策主體,關(guān)于產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新許可相關(guān)的技術(shù)獲取模式、市場競爭結(jié)構(gòu)、需求結(jié)構(gòu)、產(chǎn)品耐用性、信息不對稱、不確定性等因素作用下的系統(tǒng)性產(chǎn)業(yè)組織框架下的技術(shù)許可決策模型研究。其中,產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新是技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的一種重要類型,實踐數(shù)據(jù)表明,產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新在技術(shù)創(chuàng)新中占據(jù)很大的比例。本文進行的主要工作如下： (1)比較分析了企業(yè)創(chuàng)新技術(shù)獲取策略。針對現(xiàn)實經(jīng)濟中企業(yè)創(chuàng)新技術(shù)獲取問題,首先運用包含創(chuàng)新及產(chǎn)出階段的博弈模型分析了合作創(chuàng)新模式；然后構(gòu)建了包含創(chuàng)新、許可及產(chǎn)出階段的博弈模型,并根據(jù)模型重點比較分析了技術(shù)許可模式；最后比較分析得出企業(yè)較優(yōu)的創(chuàng)新技術(shù)獲取策略。 (2)研究了寡頭壟斷市場結(jié)構(gòu)下質(zhì)量提高型創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策。按照典型寡頭壟斷市場結(jié)構(gòu)Cournot(古諾)市場、Stackelberg(斯坦伯格)市場、Bertrand(伯川德)市場結(jié)構(gòu)等,分別討論了不同市場結(jié)構(gòu)下質(zhì)量提高型創(chuàng)新技術(shù)的許可決策問題。由于產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可行為受到市場結(jié)構(gòu)的影響,考慮了基于產(chǎn)量競爭的靜態(tài)博弈和動態(tài)博弈模型,并分別比較不同市場結(jié)構(gòu)下固定費用許可、提成許可、兩部制許可的市場均衡,以及相應(yīng)的最優(yōu)許可決策及消費者剩余和社會剩余。同時,討論了產(chǎn)品差異Bertrand競爭市場結(jié)構(gòu)下質(zhì)量提高型創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策問題。 (3)論證了創(chuàng)新技術(shù)應(yīng)用后,產(chǎn)品市場需求結(jié)構(gòu)對質(zhì)量提高型創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策的影響。按照市場需求假設(shè)為線性市場需求、logit市場需求,分析不同市場需求條件下的質(zhì)量提高型創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策問題,并且討論了許可方為同時參與市場競爭的內(nèi)部創(chuàng)新者時的技術(shù)許可決策問題。其中,logit需求框架下的分析使得考慮新品牌產(chǎn)品相對于替代者的相對吸引力、邊際成本、產(chǎn)品差異水平以及消費者偏好的差異對于創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策的影響成為可能。 (4)研究了耐用品在縱向一體化結(jié)構(gòu)情況下的創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可相關(guān)決策問題。分析了創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)品是耐用品時,壟斷市場結(jié)構(gòu)對于創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策的影響。在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合上下游縱向獨立產(chǎn)業(yè)和產(chǎn)品耐用性的分析思路,重點討論了上游原料供應(yīng)市場不完全競爭,即存在壟斷勢力時,下游兩階段耐用品獨占壟斷廠商的質(zhì)量提高型和成本降低型技術(shù)創(chuàng)新激勵,以及在此背景下外部創(chuàng)新者的最優(yōu)許可方式的選擇問題。由于完全競爭在現(xiàn)實世界中不可能也從來沒有存在過,不完全競爭市場條件下的技術(shù)許可決策分析更具有現(xiàn)實意義。 (5)論證了信息不對稱性對創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策的影響。由產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新者對創(chuàng)新技術(shù)的創(chuàng)新規(guī)模,及技術(shù)應(yīng)用者對創(chuàng)新技術(shù)的應(yīng)用價值,擁有私有信息而產(chǎn)生的產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新技術(shù)的產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量信息不對稱,以及技術(shù)創(chuàng)新市場價值信息不對稱情況下的技術(shù)許可決策比較分析,尋求信息不對稱條件下的技術(shù)許可混同均衡、分離均衡以及對應(yīng)的最優(yōu)許可策略。 (6)提出了不確定性條件下產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可相關(guān)的決策模型。分析新產(chǎn)品研發(fā)不確定性條件下同時考慮研發(fā)、事前許可、事后許可以及政府補貼的博弈模型,討論了研發(fā)產(chǎn)品的差異性以及研發(fā)過程中的技術(shù)溢出效應(yīng)對于不確定條件下政府研發(fā)補貼的影響�；谄跈�(quán)博弈建立了新產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新面臨的市場需求不確定條件下的技術(shù)許可決策模型。
[Abstract]:For a long time, domestic and foreign scholars on the influencing factors of economic growth has carried out empirical research, a large number of results show that with the passage of time, the role of technological progress in economic growth is increasing, and gradually replaced the input of production factors in the economic growth in the leading position. To maintain China's sustained and rapid economic growth and we must strengthen efforts in technological progress, change the mode of economic growth, improve the ability of technological innovation, economic growth and gradually realize the transition from factor driven to innovation driven. Knowledge and technology innovation and creative applications increasingly become the era of knowledge economy and technology progress, economic and social development impetus innovation indicators to measure the level of. Created especially for the patent invention patents, and has become a key factor in use, an enterprise and even a country to obtain the advantage in the competition. However, not Optimistic is that the patent conversion rate was not significantly increased, a large number of patent applications do not become "sleeping patents", the transformation of scientific and technological achievements into productive forces. To change the gap between science and technology and the economic situation thoroughly, weak ability of science and technology into practical productive forces, give full play an important role in promoting the knowledge and technology transformation in the mode of economic growth, need to actively study and explore the technology of our country market and the transformation of scientific and technological achievements.
Technology licensing is one of the main forms of technology trading in the technology market, is an important means of technology factor mobility, but also give full play to the main path leading technology strength of its economy. How to determine the price of contract transfer technology is the core technology licensing decision. Therefore, with the innovation based market competition intense, continue to strengthen the rapid technological upgrading of the world and within the scope of protection of intellectual property rights in many industries, technology transfer and diffusion process, technology licensing will inevitably play an increasingly important role. The technology licensing price decision process is very complicated and difficult. The price decision behavior of technology licensing for both to improve the enterprise, universities and other market players technology transaction efficiency, promote scientific and technological achievements into practical productive forces, improve the technology innovation for The contribution of economic growth, or the depth and breadth of the theory of expanding the theory of licensing contracts, is of certain value.
This product innovation licensing strategy theory, is to consider the related technology licensing and product innovation activities of the government, developers, Licensor, Licensee and consumer decision-making body, acquisition mode for product innovation licensing related technology, market competition structure, demand structure, product durability, information asymmetry, technology licensing decision model the system of industrial organization framework under uncertainty. Among them, product innovation is an important type of technological innovation, practical data show that the product innovation in technology innovation occupies a large proportion in the new. The main work of this paper is as follows:
(1) a comparative analysis of the strategy of acquiring enterprise innovation technology. Aiming at the problem of obtaining the real economy innovation technology, firstly using the game model including the innovation and output stage analysis of cooperative innovation mode; then constructs the game model including the innovation, licensing and output stage, and according to the model focus on comparative analysis of the mode of technology licensing; the comparative analysis of the enterprise technology innovation strategy of getting better.
(2) on the quality of the oligopoly market structure and improve the innovative technology licensing decision. According to the typical oligopoly market structure Cournot (Cournot) market, Stackelberg (Steinberg), Bertrand (Bo Chuande) market structure, are discussed under different market structure to improve the quality of innovative technology licensing decision problem. The behavior of innovation technology licensing products are influenced by the structure of the market, considering the static and dynamic game model based on output competition, and to compare the different market structures of fixed fee licensing, licensing, licensing two market equilibrium, and the corresponding optimal licensing decision and the consumer surplus and social surplus. At the same time, discusses the quality structure difference Bertrand product market competition to improve innovative technology licensing decision problems.
(3) demonstrates the application of innovative technology, product market demand structure to improve the quality of influence of innovative technology licensing decision. According to the market demand is assumed to be linear logit market demand, market demand, quality analysis of different market demand under the condition of improving innovation technology licensing decision problem, and discussed the Licensor for licensing decision problems at the same time to participate in the market competition inside innovators. Among them, logit demand analysis under the framework of the consideration of the new brand products relative to the attractiveness of alternatives marginal cost, differences in the level of product differentiation and consumer preferences for innovative technology licensing decision possible.
(4) research on innovative technology licensing related decision problems of durable goods in the vertical integration of the structure. The analysis of innovative products are durable goods, influence of monopoly market structure to the innovation of technology licensing decision. On the basis of previous studies, combined with the analysis of the longitudinal independent industry and product durability, focus on the upstream raw material supply market is not perfectly competitive, namely the existence of monopoly power, downstream of the two stage quality durable goods monopoly manufacturers improve the type and cost reducing technology innovation incentive, selection of optimal licensing and external innovation under the background of the competition. Due to completely impossible in the real world has never existed. Technology licensing, decision analysis of incomplete market conditions is more practical significance.
(5) demonstrates the impact of information asymmetry on innovation of technology licensing decision. By the innovator of products of innovation innovation scale, application value and application of innovative technology, product quality information asymmetry product innovation technology which has private information, comparative analysis of technology licensing decision and technology innovation market value of information asymmetry under the condition of seeking under the condition of asymmetric information technology licensing pooling equilibrium separating equilibrium and the corresponding optimal licensing strategy.
(6) this paper proposes a decision model related to product innovation technology licensing under uncertainty analysis. The research and development of new products under uncertainty and consider the development, prior permission, after the game model permit and government subsidies, discusses the technology spillover effect of differences in product research and development process for the uncertain impact of government R & D the subsidy conditions. Based on option game built facing new product innovation and market demand uncertainty decision-making model under the condition of technology licensing.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F124.3

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