【摘要】：近年來(lái)，隨著行政分權(quán)和分稅制改革的不斷深化，中央與地方關(guān)系格局發(fā)生了重大變化，地方自主權(quán)的不斷擴(kuò)大，為地方保護(hù)主義的興起和加劇提供了可乘之機(jī)。地方保護(hù)主義的危害極大，引起了理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界的高度關(guān)注。本文通過(guò)對(duì)地方保護(hù)主義的理論研究與存在現(xiàn)狀的分析，認(rèn)為地方保護(hù)主義之所以興起和發(fā)展，它的根源在于中央政府與地方政府的利益關(guān)系失衡。正是在這種思維邏輯的指引下，，本文以利益博弈理論及其中央與地方權(quán)力關(guān)系理論為基礎(chǔ)，結(jié)合我國(guó)地方保護(hù)主義的具體表現(xiàn)，分析了地方保護(hù)主義對(duì)我國(guó)政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)造成的危害，并深入探討了其產(chǎn)生的原因，據(jù)此提出了相關(guān)政策建議。筆者從博弈的角度分析了在中央與地方利益博弈時(shí)，地方政府為何會(huì)采取對(duì)抗而不是合作。首先，中央與地方博弈中的信息不對(duì)稱，使地方政府采取逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等機(jī)會(huì)主義行為來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)自身利益最大化的訴求；其次，中央與地方博弈中個(gè)體理性與集體理性的沖突，使地方政府面臨以國(guó)家利益為主還是以地方利益為主的選擇時(shí)，會(huì)舍棄集體理性或國(guó)家利益而選擇個(gè)體理性或者地方利益；再次，約束中央與地方博弈的制度缺失，直接導(dǎo)致處在博弈優(yōu)勢(shì)的地方政府違背博弈規(guī)制，采取不合作行為來(lái)追求自身利益最大化。中央與地方利益博弈所形成的地方保護(hù)主義問(wèn)題，不僅制約著中央政府宏觀調(diào)控效果和全國(guó)各地區(qū)基本公共服務(wù)的均等化，而且還妨礙著競(jìng)爭(zhēng)有序的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體系和全國(guó)統(tǒng)一市場(chǎng)的形成。因此，解決地方保護(hù)主義問(wèn)題刻不容緩，需要從多方面下功夫：第一，依法規(guī)范地方政府的自利性行為；第二，建設(shè)統(tǒng)一開(kāi)放競(jìng)爭(zhēng)有序的社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體系；第三，協(xié)調(diào)中央政府與地方政府的利益關(guān)系；第四，完善中央與地方的利益博弈機(jī)制；第五，盡快制定中央與地方利益關(guān)系法及其配套的法律體系；第六，完善地方政府官員政績(jī)考核制度等等。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the deepening of the reform of administrative decentralization and tax sharing, the pattern of the relationship between the central and local governments has undergone great changes, and the continuous expansion of local autonomy has provided an opportunity for the rise and intensification of local protectionism. The great harm of local protectionism has aroused great concern of the theorists and practitioners. Based on the theoretical research and analysis of the present situation of local protectionism, this paper holds that the origin of the rise and development of local protectionism lies in the imbalance between the interests of the central government and the local government. Under the guidance of this kind of thinking logic, this paper, based on the theory of interest game and the relationship between central and local power, and the concrete manifestation of local protectionism in our country, analyzes the influence of local protectionism on the politics of our country. The harm caused by economy and its causes are discussed, and the relevant policy suggestions are put forward. From the point of view of game, the author analyzes why the local government adopts confrontation rather than cooperation in the game between central and local interests. First, the information asymmetry in the game between central and local governments makes local governments adopt opportunistic behaviors such as adverse selection and moral hazard to maximize their own interests. The conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality in the game between central and local governments makes local governments choose individual rationality or local interest instead of collective rationality or national interest when they are faced with the choice between national interest and local interest. Thirdly, the lack of system to restrain the central and local game directly leads the local government in the game advantage to violate the game rules and regulations, and adopt the non-cooperative behavior to pursue the maximization of its own interests. The problem of local protectionism caused by the game between central and local interests not only restricts the effect of macro-control of central government and equalization of basic public services in all regions of the country. It also hinders the formation of a competitive and orderly market economy and a unified national market. Therefore, it is urgent to solve the problem of local protectionism, and we need to make efforts in many aspects: first, to regulate the self-interest behavior of local governments according to law; second, to build a unified, open, competitive and orderly socialist market economy system; and third, to build a socialist market economy system that is unified, open, and orderly. Coordinate the interest relationship between central government and local government; fourth, perfect the game mechanism between central and local interests; fifth, formulate the central and local interest relationship law and its supporting legal system as soon as possible; sixth, Improve the performance appraisal system of local government officials and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D630

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