本文選題：機構(gòu)投資者 + 創(chuàng)業(yè)板��； 參考：《江西財經(jīng)大學》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：盈余管理由于其對資本市場和投資者利益日益彰顯的影響，已經(jīng)成為會計研究的一個重要領(lǐng)域。會計信息應(yīng)該客觀、公允地反映企業(yè)的經(jīng)營狀況、經(jīng)營成果和現(xiàn)金流量，引導(dǎo)投資者和相關(guān)部門做出正確的決策，實現(xiàn)社會資源的有效配置，但是上市公司的盈余管理嚴重影響了會計信息的上述目的，嚴重影響了上市公司對外財務(wù)報告的質(zhì)量，使得財務(wù)報告不真實、不客觀，從而影響相關(guān)財務(wù)報告使用者做出正確的決策，嚴重損害了外部財務(wù)報告使用者的利益。 2009年9月，我國正式開設(shè)創(chuàng)業(yè)板，上市公司首次在深圳進行IPO的啟動。創(chuàng)業(yè)板開設(shè)的目的主要是為解決我國中小企業(yè)，特別是科技型中小企業(yè)的融資問題提供一個平臺，創(chuàng)業(yè)板的開設(shè)，不僅有助于我國多層次資本市場的發(fā)展，而且可以為解決我國高新中小企業(yè)的融資發(fā)揮重要作用，推動我國高新中小企業(yè)的發(fā)展。創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的上市標準與證券交易所主板市場相比較低，這就決定了創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場面臨著比主板市場更高的風險。 與主板市場相比，創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場上市公司規(guī)模偏小、雙職合一問題比較嚴重，容易出現(xiàn)內(nèi)部人控制，因此公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)還不完善，盈余管理動機可能比主板上市公司更強烈。我們知道，通過變更會計政策和會計估計、利用非經(jīng)常損益、利用關(guān)聯(lián)方交易等，這些都是上市公司進行盈余管理經(jīng)常使用的手段，以達到調(diào)增或遞延利潤的目的。實際中，由于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司與主板上市公司特征有所不同，創(chuàng)業(yè)板的上市公司多為新興的高科技公司，其所持有的無形資產(chǎn)比重大，知識產(chǎn)權(quán)風險比較高，在無形資產(chǎn)方面很容易發(fā)生盈余管理，因為其進行盈余管理的成本比較低，在無形資產(chǎn)方面很容易形成價值“黑洞”。研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的盈余管理行為，揭示創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的投資風險，為指導(dǎo)投資者更好地從已披露公司財務(wù)會計報告中獲取對自己有用的信息從而做出正確的決策，具有重要意義。 與此同時，我國證券市場中的機構(gòu)投資者也不斷發(fā)展，逐步壯大，其在資本市場上的作用也越來越大。擁有強大的資金實力，先進的管理技術(shù)，專業(yè)的資金投資技術(shù)，這是機構(gòu)投資者擁有而一般投資者無法與之比擬的優(yōu)勢。與一般投資者相比，機構(gòu)投資者其投資管理專業(yè)化、投資結(jié)構(gòu)組合化，投資行為規(guī)范化。機構(gòu)投資者利用其專業(yè)投資技術(shù)和信息優(yōu)勢，選擇真正有投資價值的股票，并中長期持有，不僅能夠抑制市場短期波動幅度過大，而且能夠?qū)肜硇�、成熟的投資理念，引導(dǎo)廣大中小投資者理性投資、鼓勵投資、遏制投機，促進證券市場規(guī)范、穩(wěn)健、高效地運作。機構(gòu)投資者不僅能在穩(wěn)定市場方面發(fā)揮作用，而且在豐富市場金融品種方面也能起到重要作用。 可以說，中國資本市場發(fā)展的過程本身也是機構(gòu)投資者不斷成長的過程。隨著我國經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展，機構(gòu)投資者也不斷發(fā)展壯大。2012年，在創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場上，在諸多機構(gòu)投資者當中，證券投資基金成為最具有實力的機構(gòu)投資者，其不僅持股量大，持股比例大，而且獲取的收益也比較可觀。而全國社�；鹋c券商作為代表新生力量也加快了發(fā)展的腳步，持股比例不斷加大，持股范圍也不斷擴大；相比，保險公司發(fā)展相對緩慢，其在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的持股比例比較��；同時合格境外機構(gòu)投資者（QFII）也發(fā)展很快，但是其在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的持股還不普遍，并且持股比例相對小。 本文在介紹機構(gòu)投資者、創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司及創(chuàng)業(yè)板上盈余管理有關(guān)理論的基礎(chǔ)上，，闡述了我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司特征及盈余管理的情況，然后根據(jù)我國機構(gòu)投資者的自身特點以及其在我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上持股的情況，運用橫截面修正瓊斯模型，以我國深圳創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司為樣本，構(gòu)建回歸分析模型，進行回歸分析，研究機構(gòu)投資者整體持股對創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司盈余管理的影響，以及證券投資基金、券商持股對創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司盈余管理的影響。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)： （1）機構(gòu)投資者整體持股對上市公司盈余管理的行為起到抑制作用，說明其在參與公司治理的過程中一定程度上發(fā)揮了其積極作用。 （2）不同類型機構(gòu)投資者的治理作用不同，抑制盈余管理的程度不同，證券投資基金、券商基金的治理作用比較明顯，證券投資基金、券商持股有助于抑制創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的盈余管理行為。 總之，機構(gòu)投資者在參與上市公司治理的過程中是進行了主動式監(jiān)督的，但監(jiān)督的力度和效果還不夠，還需進一步加強。最后，結(jié)合本文研究結(jié)論，對減少盈余管理給出建議。針對創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司，對以后如何使機構(gòu)投資者能有效抑制公司盈余管理、在公司治理中發(fā)揮積極作用提出建議。
[Abstract]:Because of its increasing influence on the capital market and the interests of investors, earnings management has become an important field in the research of accounting. The accounting information should objectively and objectively reflect the business situation, management results and cash flow, guide investors and related departments to make correct decisions and realize the effective allocation of social resources. However, the earnings management of listed companies seriously affects the above purpose of accounting information, which seriously affects the quality of the listed companies' external financial reports, making the financial reports untrue and objective, thus affecting the relevant financial reporting users to make correct decisions and seriously damage the interests of the external financial reporting users.
In September 2009, China officially opened the gem, and the listed company started IPO for the first time in Shenzhen. The purpose of the opening of the gem is to provide a platform for solving the financing problems of small and medium sized enterprises in China, especially the small and medium sized enterprises in science and technology. The opening of the gem is not only helpful to the development of the multi-level capital market in China, but also for the development of the multilevel capital market in China. The financing of high and new and small and medium enterprises in China plays an important role in promoting the development of China's high and new and small and medium enterprises. The listing standards of the GEM market are relatively low with the main board market of the stock exchange, which determines that the gem is facing a higher risk than the main board market.
Compared with the main board market, the size of the listed companies in the GEM market is small, the problem of double duty is more serious and the insider control is easy to appear. Therefore, the corporate governance structure is not perfect, and the motivation of earnings management may be stronger than that of the main board listed company. In fact, because of the different characteristics of the GEM listed companies and the main board listed companies, the listed companies of the gem are mostly new high-tech companies, and the intangible assets they hold are more important than the knowledge production. The right risk is relatively high. It is easy to manage the surplus in the intangible assets, because the cost of earnings management is relatively low, and it is easy to form a "black hole" in the intangible assets. It studies the earnings management behavior of the GEM listed companies and reveals the investment risk of the gem listed companies. It is of great significance to obtain useful information from the company's financial accounting reports and make the right decisions.
At the same time, the institutional investors in China's securities market have also been developing, gradually growing, and their role in the capital market is becoming more and more important. With strong capital strength, advanced management technology and professional capital investment technology, this is the advantage that institutional investors have and ordinary investors can't compare with. Institutional investors are specialized in investment management, combination of investment structure, and standardization of investment behavior. Institutional investors use their professional investment technology and information advantages to choose shares of real investment value and hold in the medium and long term. It can not only inhibit the large market volatility, but also lead to rational and mature investment ideas. To guide the rational investment of small and medium-sized investors, encourage investment, curb speculation, promote the standard, sound and efficient operation of the securities market. Institutional investors can not only play a role in stabilizing the market, but also play an important role in enriching market financial varieties.
It can be said that the process of the development of China's capital market is also the process of the continuous growth of institutional investors. With the development of China's economy, institutional investors have also developed and expanded for.2012 years. In the GEM market, among the many institutional investors, the securities investment fund has become the most powerful institutional investor. The share ratio is large, and the income is also considerable. And the national social security fund and the brokerage firm as the representative of the new forces also accelerate the pace of development, the proportion of shareholding is increasing, the scope of ownership is also expanding; compared to the relatively slow development of the insurance company, the share ratio in the GEM listed companies is relatively small; at the same time, the qualification of the company is qualified. Foreign institutional investors (QFII) have also developed rapidly, but their shareholding on GEM companies is not widespread and their shareholding ratio is relatively small.
On the basis of introducing the theories of institutional investors, GEM listed companies and the earnings management on the gem, this paper expounds the characteristics of Chinese GEM listed companies and the situation of earnings management. Then, according to the characteristics of institutional investors in China and their shareholding in China's gem, the cross section is used to modify the Jones model. Taking the Shenzhen GEM listed company in China as the sample, the regression analysis model is constructed and the regression analysis is made to study the influence of the overall shareholding of institutional investors on the earnings management of the GEM listed companies, and the effect of the securities investment fund and the stock holding stock on the earnings management of the GEM listed companies. The results are as follows:
(1) the overall shareholding of institutional investors inhibits the behavior of earnings management of the listed companies, indicating that it plays a positive role in the process of participating in corporate governance.
(2) different types of institutional investors have different governance roles, and the degree of restraining earnings management is different. Securities investment funds and securities firms are more effective in governance. Securities investment funds and securities firms' shareholding can help to restrain earnings management behavior of GEM listed companies.
In a word, institutional investors have been supervised actively in the process of participating in the governance of the listed companies, but the strength and effect of supervision are not enough and need to be further strengthened. Finally, some suggestions are given to reduce earnings management by combining the conclusions of this paper. Earnings management plays a positive role in corporate governance.
【學位授予單位】：江西財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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