本文選題：控制權 + 概率投票模型��； 參考：《山東大學》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文以張小茜和汪煒(2008)概率投票模型為理論基礎,采用我國上市公司樣本,計算并分析了普通決議機制和特殊決議機制下的控制權和有效控制份額,并以股權分置改革為背景對我國公司控制權安排的變化進行了深入考察。改善我國的資本市場,保護中小投資者利益是股權分置改革的主要目標,本文從控制權變化角度和控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離的角度探索了股權分置改革的目前的成效。 文章的研究主線首先應用張小茜和汪煒(2008)概率投票模型對選定樣本期間上市公司第一大股東的控制權進行計算,然后統(tǒng)計分析樣本期間控制權及有效控制份額的特點。分析發(fā)現(xiàn)控制權在樣本年間比較穩(wěn)定,而且最大股東的變更與上市公司控制權有顯著負向關系：控制權越小的控股股東樣本期內越容易發(fā)生股東的更替；樣本期間我國上市公司的最大股東的持股比例大于有效控制份額(普通決議機制0.99對應)的次數(shù)占比60%-70%，，顯示出我國上市公司股權高度集中的特點；然后選擇了股權變更頻繁的上市公司深國商為例子對其公司股權安排進行了剖析,得到我們計算的控制權值在公司股權變更中的重要作用。然后文章分析了股權分置改革前后控制權的變化,并從大股東控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離的角度驗證了股改前后大股東“渠道效應”的變化,文章發(fā)現(xiàn)盡管第一大股東的持股比例在股改之后顯著下降,但是并沒有有效抑制大股東的“渠道效應”。最后文章對所選參數(shù)進行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗,發(fā)現(xiàn)參數(shù)的選擇不會動搖文章的結論。 資本市場不完善是制約我國企業(yè)發(fā)展的瓶頸,而投資者保護尤其是中小投資者利益的保護又是資本市場發(fā)展的瓶頸。控制權牢牢控制在第一大股東手中是一把雙刃劍,雖然會維護公司的穩(wěn)定性但也造成有的公司控制權高度集中損害中小股東的利益。我們的研究為評價股權分置改革在改善中小股東利益和資本市場發(fā)展方而提供了依據(jù),同時有關政策部門可以借鑒文章的結論考慮使用立法或者行政規(guī)定來壓制控股股東在重大事項中的控制權,避免其他股東在股東會中可有可無的作用,保護中小股東的利益和話語權。 另外本文的研究也證實了股東持股比例和控制度是對控制權不同的度量標準,公司或者有關部門叮以從控制度的角度在公司章程或者規(guī)定中制定相應條款在限制第一大股東過大的控制權,而不僅僅從持股比例上規(guī)定；因為通過一定的股權安排持股比例小可以控制公司。 當然文章的結論也可以給公司控股股東提供股權預警信號和股權安排啟發(fā)。
[Abstract]:Based on the probabilistic voting model of Zhang Xiaoxi and Wang Wei (2008), using the sample of listed companies in China, this paper calculates and analyzes the control rights and effective control shares under the ordinary resolution mechanism and the special resolution mechanism. And with the background of split share structure reform, the change of corporate control arrangement in China is investigated. To improve the capital market and protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors is the main goal of the split share structure reform. This paper explores the current results of the reform from the perspective of the change of control rights and the separation of control and cash flow rights. The main line of this paper is to use the probabilistic voting model of Zhang Xiaoxi and Wang Wei Xi 2008 to calculate the control rights of the largest shareholders of the listed company during the selected sample period, and then to analyze the characteristics of the control rights and effective control shares during the sample period. It is found that the control rights are relatively stable in the sample years, and the change of the largest shareholders has a significant negative relationship with the control rights of listed companies: the smaller the control rights are, the more likely is the replacement of shareholders in the sample period of the controlling shareholders; During the sample period, the proportion of the largest shareholders of the listed companies in our country is larger than the effective control share (corresponding to 0.99 of the ordinary resolution mechanism), which shows the characteristics of the high concentration of the stock rights of the listed companies in our country. Then we choose Shenzhen BCCHK, a listed company with frequent stock rights change, as an example to analyze its equity arrangement, and get the important role of our calculated control value in the stock right change. Then the paper analyzes the change of control right before and after the reform of split share structure, and verifies the change of "channel effect" of large shareholder before and after the reform from the angle of separation of control right and cash flow right of large shareholder. The paper finds that although the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder decreases significantly after the stock reform, it does not effectively restrain the "channel effect" of the major shareholder. Finally, the paper tests the robustness of the selected parameters and finds that the selection of the parameters will not waver the conclusion of the article. The imperfect capital market is the bottleneck restricting the development of Chinese enterprises, and the protection of investors' interests, especially the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors, is the bottleneck of the development of the capital market. Controlling power firmly in the hands of the largest shareholder is a double-edged sword, although it will maintain the stability of the company, but also cause some company control rights highly concentrated damage to the interests of minority shareholders. Our research provides a basis for evaluating the interests of minority shareholders and the development of the capital market. At the same time, the relevant policy departments can draw lessons from the conclusions of the article to consider using legislation or administrative regulations to suppress the controlling rights of controlling shareholders in major matters, so as to avoid the unnecessary role of other shareholders in shareholders' meetings. To protect the interests and voice rights of minority shareholders. In addition, the research of this paper also proves that the shareholding ratio and the degree of control are different measures of the control right. The company or the relevant department makes the corresponding clause in the articles of association or the stipulation from the angle of the degree of control in order to limit the control right of the largest shareholder, not only from the shareholding ratio; Because through a certain shareholding arrangement of small proportion can control the company. Of course, the conclusion of the article can also provide stock warning signal and equity arrangement inspiration to the controlling shareholders of the company.
【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F279.23;F832.51

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