本文選題：FH之謎 + 資本流動��； 參考：《遼寧大學》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：省際資本流動性高低關系到全國市場范圍的大小及資本的有效利用問題，斯密認為分工受市場范圍的限制，要素流動性的強弱是市場范圍的直接體現，要素的有效利用則關系到最終產出的大小。本文主要研究1992年深化市場經濟體制改革后省際間資本流動情況，時間為1992-2009，采用最新的面板時間序列方法，對省際間儲蓄率和投資率的關系進行了估計，進行面板單位根檢驗后，發(fā)現儲蓄率與投資率都是I（1）變量，但存在協(xié)整關系。傳統(tǒng)的固定效應、隨機效應模型得出儲蓄率與投資率之間高度相關，但這種估計忽視了個體異質性、相關性以及儲蓄留存系數隨時間的變化性，對個體間的相關性進行檢驗后發(fā)現不同個體間存在顯著相關性，為了克服異質性、時變性與相關性，分別用MG與CMG估計量估計，發(fā)現CMG估計的系數已經不顯著，而這一估計具有良好的統(tǒng)計性質。隨后用GMM方法對儲蓄與投資關系進行動態(tài)面板估計發(fā)現儲蓄留存系數依然是不顯著的。右手邊方程中加入fdi之后進行的同樣估計發(fā)現儲蓄留存系數依舊不顯著，在這些估計之后我們認為儲蓄率與投資率之間不存在顯著的關系。這一結論與Li Cheng(2010)和Boyreau-Debray and Wei（2004）的研究結果不一樣，主要原因在于我們這里使用的樣本區(qū)間為1992-2009，，而這一時間內省際間的資本和勞動等要素流動性已經有大幅度提高。 92年之后確立了建立市場經濟體制的目標，中央政府下決心打破地方保護主義建立統(tǒng)一的國內市場，進行了中央地方稅制改革，金融機構重組與垂直管理重塑；2001年加入了WTO，這都有利于要素流動。地方也有激勵來增加要素流動性，在政治集權與經濟分權的治理模式下，地方政府經濟上有很大的自主權，政治上存在晉升激勵。地方政府官員為了獲得政治上晉升，必須以政績?yōu)榛I碼，形成了為增長而競爭的格局。比較資本流動與不流動，資本流動對經濟增長是有利的，中央政府是福利性政府，追求經濟增長，地方政府在經濟增長方面的目標與中央政府一致，他們?yōu)榱双@得更快的經濟增長和政治晉升，地方政府增加基礎設施投資以及采取好的政策以吸引資本流入，地方政府間的競爭使得省際間的資本流動性增強。這種解釋與資本自動向收益高的地方流動不一樣，地方政府的干預使得資本流動性增強。Li Cheng（2010）也證實各省投資率與GDP增長率間并不存在明顯的Granger因果關系。說明資本并不必然流向收益高的地方。
[Abstract]:The inter-provincial capital liquidity is related to the size of the national market and the effective use of capital. Smith thinks that the division of labor is restricted by the market scope, and the strength of the factor liquidity is the direct embodiment of the market scope. The effective use of elements is related to the size of the final output. This paper mainly studies the situation of inter-provincial capital flow after deepening the reform of market economy system in 1992, the time is 1992-2009.Using the latest panel time series method, the paper estimates the relationship between inter-provincial savings rate and investment rate. After panel unit root test, it is found that both savings rate and investment rate are I / 1) variables, but there is cointegration relationship. The traditional fixed effect, stochastic effect model shows that the savings rate is highly correlated with the investment rate, but this estimate ignores individual heterogeneity, correlation and the variation of savings retention coefficient over time. In order to overcome the heterogeneity, time variability and correlation, MG and CMG estimators were used to estimate the coefficients of CMG estimation, and it was found that the coefficients of CMG estimation were not significant. This estimate has good statistical properties. Then the GMM method is used to estimate the relationship between savings and investment. It is found that the retention coefficient of savings is still not significant. After adding fdi to the right-hand side equation, the same estimate shows that the retention coefficient of savings is still not significant. After these estimates, we think there is no significant relationship between savings rate and investment rate. This conclusion is different from the findings of Li Cheng-2010 and Boyreau-Debray and Weiwei 2004. The main reason is that the sample interval we use here is 1992-2009, and the inter-provincial capital and labor mobility has been greatly improved during this period. After 92 years, the goal of establishing a market economy system was established. Determined to break local protectionism and establish a unified domestic market, the central and local tax system reform, the restructuring of financial institutions and vertical management remodeling; in 2001 joined WTO, which are conducive to the flow of factors. Under the governance mode of political centralization and economic decentralization, local government has great autonomy in economy and promotion incentive in politics. In order to get political promotion, local government officials must take achievements as chips and form a pattern of competition for growth. Compared with capital flow and non-mobility, capital flow is beneficial to economic growth. The central government is a welfare government and pursues economic growth. Local governments have the same goals in terms of economic growth as the central government. To achieve faster economic growth and political advancement, local governments have increased infrastructure investment and adopted good policies to attract capital inflows, and competition between local governments has increased inter-provincial capital mobility. This explanation is different from the automatic flow of capital to areas with high returns. The intervention of local governments enhances capital liquidity. Li Chengwei 2010) also proves that there is no Granger causality between the investment rate and GDP growth rate in each province. It shows that capital does not necessarily flow to areas with high returns.
【學位授予單位】：遼寧大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.5;F224

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 豆建民;國內資本流動對我國區(qū)域經濟增長的影響[J];當代財經;2005年08期

2 徐冬林;陳永偉;;區(qū)域資本流動:基于投資與儲蓄關系的檢驗[J];中國工業(yè)經濟;2009年03期

3 郭金龍,王宏偉;中國區(qū)域間資本流動與區(qū)域經濟差距研究[J];管理世界;2003年07期

4 傅勇;張晏;;中國式分權與財政支出結構偏向:為增長而競爭的代價[J];管理世界;2007年03期

5 陶然;蘇福兵;陸曦;朱昱銘;;經濟增長能夠帶來晉升嗎?——對晉升錦標競賽理論的邏輯挑戰(zhàn)與省級實證重估[J];管理世界;2010年12期

6 范劍勇;姚靜;;對中國制造業(yè)區(qū)域集聚水平的判斷——兼論地區(qū)間產業(yè)是否存在同構化傾向[J];江海學刊;2011年05期

7 胡凱;;中國省際資本流動規(guī)模實證研究[J];經濟地理;2011年01期

8 任曉紅;張宗益;余元全;;中國省際資本流動影響因素的實證分析[J];經濟問題;2011年01期

9 陳抗;Arye L.Hillman;顧清揚;;財政集權與地方政府行為變化——從援助之手到攫取之手[J];經濟學(季刊);2002年04期

10 徐現祥;李郇;王美今;;區(qū)域一體化、經濟增長與政治晉升[J];經濟學(季刊);2007年04期

本文編號：2031278