本文選題：房地產(chǎn) + 高管薪酬��； 參考：《貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：目前，上市公司高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系研究逐步成為了熱點(diǎn)話題，從國(guó)內(nèi)上市公司目前發(fā)展的狀況來看，中國(guó)的上市公司與西方諸多上市公司一樣，都面臨著兩權(quán)分離所帶來的委托代理的問題。為了解決委托代理所面臨的問題，就需要在股東與管理者之間建立有效的激勵(lì)機(jī)制和監(jiān)督機(jī)制，形成一種契約的關(guān)系，將管理者的利益與公司績(jī)效相掛鉤，不斷激勵(lì)高級(jí)管理人員進(jìn)行生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)，以提高公司績(jī)效。高管薪酬作為這種契約關(guān)系的代表就應(yīng)運(yùn)而生了，它能同時(shí)滿足股東公司利益最大化和高管自身利益最大化的需求，很好地化解了委托代理關(guān)系中存在的問題。所以，本文認(rèn)為，，研究高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系，制定出符合本公司的一套合理的高管薪酬制度方案，既能有效激勵(lì)高級(jí)管理人員，又能約束其自利行為，使其與股東的利益保持一致，對(duì)提高公司的績(jī)效也起著至關(guān)重要的作用。 2012年房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)逐步進(jìn)入了微利時(shí)代，中央通過采取限制購房和限制貸款等相關(guān)措施，不斷對(duì)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)進(jìn)行政策調(diào)控，減緩房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)快速發(fā)展的腳步。面對(duì)持續(xù)從緊的調(diào)控政策，未來房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)外部狀況不容樂觀，本文期望從上市公司內(nèi)部環(huán)境進(jìn)行調(diào)控，以期推動(dòng)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)平穩(wěn)健康的發(fā)展。根據(jù)以上對(duì)研究背景的總述，本文最終選取了房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)，集中探討了該行業(yè)上市公司的高管薪酬和公司績(jī)效之間的相關(guān)性，希望對(duì)我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)上市公司的高管薪酬制度設(shè)計(jì)提供原則性的理論依據(jù)。 本文主要的研究思路是先進(jìn)行具體的理論研究，在此基礎(chǔ)上提出相應(yīng)的假設(shè)和構(gòu)建模型，最后進(jìn)行實(shí)證的檢驗(yàn)。首先，本文在充分借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外前人研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了較為系統(tǒng)的闡述，同時(shí)考慮到我國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)的實(shí)際情況，運(yùn)用規(guī)范研究的方法，從理論上分析了房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系。然后，選取房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)A股上市公司作為研究對(duì)象，從實(shí)證的角度對(duì)高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系及影響這種關(guān)系的主要因素進(jìn)行了研究，采用了描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析和多元線性回歸分析的方法對(duì)規(guī)范研究的結(jié)論進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。最后，對(duì)上述實(shí)證內(nèi)容進(jìn)行總結(jié)，得出兩個(gè)結(jié)論分別為：我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系，高管持股比例與公司績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系不顯著。并且提出對(duì)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬制度的優(yōu)化建議，期望能對(duì)薪酬理論應(yīng)用于實(shí)踐發(fā)展做出一點(diǎn)貢獻(xiàn)，也對(duì)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)上市公司內(nèi)部治理的完善和公司績(jī)效的提升有良好的指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:At present, the research on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of listed companies has gradually become a hot topic. From the current development of domestic listed companies, China's listed companies are like many western listed companies. Both are faced with the problem of entrustment and agency brought about by the separation of two rights. In order to solve the problems faced by principal-agent, it is necessary to establish an effective incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism between shareholders and managers to form a contractual relationship that links the interests of managers with corporate performance. Continuously motivate senior managers to carry out production and management to improve company performance. As the representative of this contractual relationship, executive compensation emerges as the times require, which can meet the needs of the maximization of shareholders' corporate interests and executives' own interests at the same time, and resolve the problems existing in the principal-agent relationship. Therefore, this paper holds that, by studying the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, we can draw up a set of reasonable executive compensation system scheme, which can not only effectively motivate senior managers, but also restrain their self-interest behavior. Keeping it in line with the interests of shareholders also plays a vital role in improving the company's performance. In 2012, the real estate industry gradually entered the era of small profits, the central government through the adoption of restrictions on housing purchase and restrictions on loans and other related measures, continue to control the real estate industry policy, slow down the pace of rapid development of the real estate industry. In the face of the continuous tight regulation and control policy, the external situation of the real estate industry is not optimistic in the future. This paper expects to regulate and control the internal environment of the listed companies in order to promote the steady and healthy development of the real estate industry. According to the above overview of the research background, this paper finally selected the real estate industry, focused on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of listed companies in this industry. This paper hopes to provide a theoretical basis for the design of executive compensation system of listed companies in real estate industry. The main research idea of this paper is to carry on the concrete theory research first, then put forward the corresponding hypothesis and build the model on this basis, finally carry on the demonstration test. First of all, based on the domestic and foreign predecessors' research results, this paper systematically expounds the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, and at the same time takes into account the actual situation of the real estate industry in China. The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in real estate industry is analyzed theoretically by means of normative research. Then, select A-share listed companies in real estate industry as the research object, from the perspective of empirical analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance and the main factors affecting this relationship, using descriptive statistical analysis. Correlation statistical analysis and multiple linear regression analysis are used to test the conclusion of normative research. Finally, the above empirical content is summarized, and two conclusions are drawn: there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance of listed companies in real estate industry, while the relationship between executive ownership ratio and corporate performance is not significant. And put forward to the real estate industry listed companies executive compensation system optimization suggestions, hoping to make a little contribution to the application of compensation theory in practice. It also has good guiding significance for the improvement of internal governance and corporate performance of listed companies in real estate industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F272.92;F299.233.4

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 岳軍;;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、報(bào)酬激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效的相關(guān)性[J];財(cái)經(jīng)論叢;2007年04期

2 檀力;汪金龍;;上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)績(jī)效關(guān)系研究綜述及展望[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2010年15期

3 王海波;韓素萍;杜蘭英;;湖北省上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)績(jī)效實(shí)證研究[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì);2006年06期

4 陳志廣;高級(jí)管理人員報(bào)酬的實(shí)證研究[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2002年05期

5 胡鐵軍;關(guān)明坤;李焱斌;;股權(quán)分置改革后上市公司高管激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績(jī)效關(guān)系的實(shí)證研究[J];遼寧石油化工大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2008年01期

6 張必武,石金濤;董事會(huì)特征、高管薪酬與薪績(jī)敏感性——中國(guó)上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析[J];管理科學(xué);2005年04期

7 魏剛;高級(jí)管理層激勵(lì)與上市公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2000年03期

8 林浚清 ,黃祖輝 ,孫永祥;高管團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)薪酬差距、公司績(jī)效和治理結(jié)構(gòu)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2003年04期

9 諶新民,劉善敏;上市公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者報(bào)酬結(jié)構(gòu)性差異的實(shí)證研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2003年08期

10 李增泉;激勵(lì)機(jī)制與企業(yè)績(jī)效——一項(xiàng)基于上市公司的實(shí)證研究[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2000年01期

本文編號(hào)：1965891