發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-23 18:14

  本文選題：官員晉升 + 中長(zhǎng)期貸款集中�。� 參考：《廣東商學(xué)院》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文試圖通過(guò)基于地方政府官員晉升視角來(lái)討論中長(zhǎng)期貸款集中現(xiàn)象。從理論方面解釋?zhuān)ㄟ^(guò)建立“政治錦標(biāo)賽”博弈模型來(lái)分析官員在轄區(qū)內(nèi)有強(qiáng)烈的投資沖動(dòng)；通過(guò)梳理地方政府官員與商業(yè)銀行關(guān)系的變動(dòng)來(lái)分析兩者博弈從合作到不合作，再到合作；通過(guò)建立兩期完美動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型分析商業(yè)銀行基于個(gè)人利益最大化偏好政府項(xiàng)目貸款，相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)導(dǎo)致中長(zhǎng)期貸款集中。實(shí)證方面解釋?zhuān)紫葟娜司鵊DP、人均財(cái)政收入、城鎮(zhèn)登記失業(yè)率三個(gè)方面構(gòu)建了官員晉升壓力指數(shù)，并用K Mean聚類(lèi)分析優(yōu)化了壓力指數(shù)。回歸基本結(jié)果得出官員晉升壓力使得轄區(qū)內(nèi)中長(zhǎng)期貸款占比增速升高約1.2個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。利用工具變量等工具對(duì)基本結(jié)果進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)，回歸系數(shù)還是正數(shù)，兩者正相關(guān)。進(jìn)一步我們分地區(qū)討論，東部地區(qū)的地方官員晉升壓力對(duì)中長(zhǎng)期貸款集中現(xiàn)象最有顯著，西部次之，中部沒(méi)有這樣的影響；分官員年齡討論，年齡60的省委書(shū)記省長(zhǎng)推動(dòng)更多地政府項(xiàng)目中長(zhǎng)期貸款，這樣的影響因子為0.567；分官員任期討論，任期4的地方官員壓力指數(shù)與中長(zhǎng)期貸款正相關(guān)，影響因子為0.415，但是沒(méi)有通過(guò)顯著性檢驗(yàn)。因此，為“短期增長(zhǎng)而競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”政治錦標(biāo)賽的激勵(lì)機(jī)制是中長(zhǎng)期貸款集中的一個(gè)因素。
[Abstract]:This paper attempts to discuss the phenomenon of medium and long-term loan concentration from the perspective of promotion of local government officials. From the theoretical point of view, through the establishment of the "political Championship" game model to analyze the strong investment impulse of officials in the jurisdiction, by combing the changes of the relationship between local government officials and commercial banks to analyze the game from cooperation to non-cooperation. Then to cooperation; through the establishment of two perfect dynamic game model to analyze commercial banks based on personal interest maximization preference for government project loans, mutual competition leads to the concentration of medium- and long-term loans. The empirical analysis shows that the pressure index of official promotion is constructed from three aspects: per capita GDP, per capita financial income and urban registered unemployment rate, and the pressure index is optimized by K Mean cluster analysis. Returns to the basic results show that the official promotion pressure in the area of medium-and long-term loan growth rate increased by about 1.2 percentage points. The robustness test of the basic results is carried out by means of tools such as tool variables. The regression coefficient or positive number is positively correlated with each other. Further, we discuss by region, the promotion pressure of local officials in the eastern region has the most significant effect on the phenomenon of medium- and long-term loan concentration, followed by the western region, and there is no such effect in the central region. The governor, secretary of the provincial party committee of 60, pushed for more long-term loans for government projects, which has an impact factor of 0.567.The term of office of the official is discussed, and the local official pressure index for the fourth term is positively related to the medium- and long-term loans. The influence factor was 0.415, but the significance test was not passed. Thus, the incentive to compete for short-term growth at the political championships is a factor in the concentration of medium-to-long-term loans.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東商學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.4;D630.3;F224.32

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 皮建才;;政治晉升激勵(lì)機(jī)制下的地方重復(fù)建設(shè)——橫向與縱向的比較分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)科學(xué);2009年09期

2 蔣伏心;林江;;晉升錦標(biāo)賽、財(cái)政周期性與經(jīng)濟(jì)波動(dòng)——中國(guó)改革開(kāi)放以來(lái)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)[J];財(cái)貿(mào)經(jīng)濟(jì);2010年07期

3 林挺進(jìn);;中國(guó)地級(jí)市市長(zhǎng)職位升遷的經(jīng)濟(jì)邏輯分析[J];公共管理研究;2007年00期

4 何曉星;再論中國(guó)地方政府主導(dǎo)型市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)[J];中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2005年01期

5 王賢彬;徐現(xiàn)祥;周靖祥;;晉升激勵(lì)與投資周期——來(lái)自中國(guó)省級(jí)官員的證據(jù)[J];中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2010年12期

6 陶然;蘇福兵;陸曦;朱昱銘;;經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)能夠帶來(lái)晉升嗎?——對(duì)晉升錦標(biāo)競(jìng)賽理論的邏輯挑戰(zhàn)與省級(jí)實(shí)證重估[J];管理世界;2010年12期

7 李廣斌;王勇;黃明華;;基于地方政府博弈的區(qū)域合作困境分析[J];華東經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2009年12期

8 魏新亞;中國(guó)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)投資構(gòu)成的地區(qū)差異[J];上海經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2002年12期

9 李云林;;我國(guó)高投資率的成因分析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究參考;2008年41期

10 王賢彬;徐現(xiàn)祥;;地方官員晉升競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2010年06期

，

本文編號(hào)：1925809