本文選題：非對等股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) + 關(guān)聯(lián)交易　； 參考：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：傳統(tǒng)委托代理理論主要是基于Berle和Means(1932)所提出的觀點,認(rèn)為公司的所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)高度分離,導(dǎo)致了管理者和股東之間的利益沖突。二十世紀(jì)九十年代中后期,隨著各國公司治理之間比較研究的深入和新興市場經(jīng)濟(jì)國家公司治理理論的興起,越來越多的學(xué)者發(fā)現(xiàn),大部分國家上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)相對比較集中且存在有控制能力的大股東,其中亞洲新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體尤為突出。由于股權(quán)集中于較少的控股股東手中,從而就產(chǎn)生了大股東控制問題,即大股東憑借其擁有公司多數(shù)的投票權(quán)而犧牲中小股東和債權(quán)人的利益,為自己謀取比所持股份相應(yīng)資本收益更大的額外收益。 中國的上市公司中普遍存在著“一股獨大”的現(xiàn)象,大股東憑借著對上市公司的控制權(quán),頻繁的利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易犧牲中小股東的利益以實現(xiàn)其自身利益的最大化,例如：猴王股份、美爾雅、三九藥業(yè)、幸福實業(yè)、濟(jì)南輕騎等,這使得關(guān)聯(lián)交易已經(jīng)成為我國上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)失衡的一個重要標(biāo)志。由于我國的經(jīng)濟(jì)體制是由計劃經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)向市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的,上市公司多是由國有企業(yè)改制而成,并且與改組以前的母公司及子公司之間有著千絲萬縷的聯(lián)系,這使得其與控股股東發(fā)生了許多關(guān)聯(lián)購銷、租賃、擔(dān)保等行為。同時,我國資本市場的建立比西方發(fā)達(dá)國家要晚,各方面的制度安排還有缺陷、法律法規(guī)的建設(shè)還有待完善,這都為控股股東謀求私利,侵害中小股東利益創(chuàng)造了條件�？梢娢覈局卫碇写嬖谟袊�(yán)重的大股東控制問題,如何緩解大股東控制所帶來的委托代理問題已經(jīng)成為公司治理理論研究的新方向。 大部分學(xué)者對公司治理中大股東控制問題的研究是以Berle和Means的研究范式為基礎(chǔ),這種研究范式的前提假設(shè)是股權(quán)高度分散,已經(jīng)不適應(yīng)現(xiàn)在股權(quán)相對集中的實際情況。那么在股權(quán)集中的條件下,控股股東利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易對中小股東和外部投資者進(jìn)行利益侵占的內(nèi)在機(jī)理是什么?投資者法律保護(hù)能否緩解大股東控制所帶來的委托代理問題?解決這些問題是本文的研究焦點。本文通過對經(jīng)典理論和相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行梳理后借鑒了LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1999)和Johnson (2000)的研究,認(rèn)為我國的上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)相對集中且控股股東擁有的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)和投票權(quán)存在分離,控股股東正是憑借這種非對等股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)擁有的超額控制權(quán),利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易等手段對中小股東和外部投資者進(jìn)行利益侵害。本研究將控股股東追溯到最終控制人并計算出其擁有的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)和投票權(quán)及兩權(quán)的分離程度,以此來衡量在股權(quán)相對集中條件下的非對等股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)；根據(jù)沈藝峰等(2004)和王鵬(2008)等學(xué)者的研究,構(gòu)造了2003—2009年我國投資者法律保護(hù)指數(shù)。最終選定了2003—2009年614家上市公司為研究樣本,從非對等股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與關(guān)聯(lián)交易的關(guān)系、投資者法律保護(hù)對這種關(guān)系的影響兩個方面進(jìn)行了研究。 本文關(guān)于非對等股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與關(guān)聯(lián)交易之間關(guān)系的實證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：最終控制人的兩權(quán)(現(xiàn)金流權(quán)和投票權(quán))分離會對關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模產(chǎn)生正向的影響,即上市公司最終控制人兩權(quán)分離程度越大,上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易規(guī)模就越大；最終控制人擁有的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)會對關(guān)聯(lián)交易產(chǎn)生負(fù)向的影響,上市公司最終控制人擁有的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)越大,他們就越有動機(jī)監(jiān)督并激勵高級管理人員,控制公司的經(jīng)營管理風(fēng)險從而創(chuàng)造出更高的價值,此時他們用關(guān)聯(lián)交易的方式轉(zhuǎn)移公司的資產(chǎn)和利潤或者將風(fēng)險轉(zhuǎn)嫁給公司的動機(jī)將大大的降低,這就導(dǎo)致了上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易規(guī)模的減小。由此可知,非對等股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是一把雙刃劍,既可能會鼓勵最終控制人監(jiān)督經(jīng)理人和減弱對中小股東和外部投資者掏空動機(jī)的作用,又可能會導(dǎo)致其利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易等手段謀取私利。 本研究關(guān)于投資者法律保護(hù)在非對等股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和關(guān)聯(lián)交易之間關(guān)系影響的實證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：投資者法律保護(hù)會對關(guān)聯(lián)交易產(chǎn)生負(fù)向的影響,然而在以往的研究中并沒有直接的證據(jù)證明投資者法律保護(hù)會對關(guān)聯(lián)交易產(chǎn)生影響,而本文通過實證數(shù)據(jù)的分析得出了投資者法律保護(hù)會對關(guān)聯(lián)交易產(chǎn)生負(fù)向的影響。得出這種的結(jié)論的原因可能會是：隨著法律保護(hù)機(jī)制的健全,信息披露制度越來越嚴(yán)格且加大了對控股股東侵害上市公司利益的行為的懲罰力度,提高了其掏空的成本,減弱了最終控制人侵害中小股東的動機(jī),導(dǎo)致了上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模減��；投資者法律保護(hù)對兩權(quán)分離和關(guān)聯(lián)交易的調(diào)節(jié)關(guān)系是負(fù)向的,即法律保護(hù)水平的提高能減弱最終控制人因為現(xiàn)金流權(quán)和投票權(quán)的分離而運(yùn)用關(guān)聯(lián)交易的手段對上市公司進(jìn)行掏空。投資者法律保護(hù)作為一種外部的公司治理機(jī)制,較公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制是更為基礎(chǔ)的層面,隨著公司外部治理環(huán)境的改善,會促進(jìn)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)等內(nèi)部公司治理機(jī)制發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的作用；投資者法律保護(hù)對現(xiàn)金流權(quán)和關(guān)聯(lián)交易的調(diào)節(jié)關(guān)系是正向的,投資者法律保護(hù)水平的提高能增強(qiáng)最終控制人因為現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的增加而較少的運(yùn)用關(guān)聯(lián)交易的手段對上市公司進(jìn)行掏空,從而使關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模減小。隨著投資者法律保護(hù)水平的提高,可能會在一定程度上鼓勵上市公司的最終控制人監(jiān)督并激勵高級管理人員,控制公司的經(jīng)營管理風(fēng)險從而創(chuàng)造出更高的價值,對保護(hù)中小股東利益具有積極意義的行為起到了控制關(guān)聯(lián)交易規(guī)模的作用。 綜上所述,本文認(rèn)為緩解大股東控制問題應(yīng)從兩個方面入手：首先,政府和相關(guān)的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該合理的控制非對等股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)中兩權(quán)分離的比例,讓現(xiàn)金流權(quán)和投票權(quán)的分離程度維持在一個恰當(dāng)?shù)谋壤?使最終控制人與中小股東的利益趨向一致,從而緩解最終控制人對中小股東利益的侵害；其次,投資者法律保護(hù)作為一種公司治理的外部機(jī)制,能有效的抑制最終控制人對中小股東和外部投資者利益的侵占,也能有效的鼓勵最終控制人加強(qiáng)對管理者的監(jiān)督從而產(chǎn)生“激勵效應(yīng)”,可以看出這種外部治理機(jī)制能在一定程度上彌補(bǔ)內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的不足。所以說相關(guān)的法律制定者應(yīng)該考慮到法律對上市公司最終控制人的激勵和約束的作用,完善相關(guān)的投資者法律保護(hù)體系,例如：加強(qiáng)上市公司信啟、披露的監(jiān)管、明確大股東的義務(wù)與責(zé)任、提高中小投資者的參與權(quán)等,從而以實現(xiàn)各方面利益的平衡。
[Abstract]:The traditional principal-agent theory is based on the viewpoint proposed by Berle and Means (1932), that the company's ownership and control are highly separated, which leads to the conflict of interests between the managers and the shareholders. In the mid and late 1990s, with the further research on the corporate governance and the corporate governance of the emerging market economy countries More and more scholars have found that more and more scholars have found that the stock ownership structure of most listed companies is relatively concentrated and has the ability to control the large shareholders, among which the emerging economies of Asia are particularly prominent. As a result of the concentration of shares in the hands of less controlling shareholders, the problem of controlling large shareholders is produced, that is, the large shareholders have their own ownership. Most of the voting rights of the company sacrifice the interests of the small shareholders and creditors, and seek more extra profits for them than the corresponding capital gains of the shares held.
In China's listed companies, there is a common phenomenon of "one shareholder". With the control of the listed companies, the large shareholders often use related transactions to sacrifice the interests of small and medium shareholders to maximize their own interests, such as the monkey king, the mealya, the 39 medicine industry, the happiness industry, the Ji'nan light ride, etc., which makes the related transactions It has become an important symbol of the unbalance of the governance structure of the listed companies in China. As the economic system of our country turns from the planned economy to the market economy, the listed companies are mostly made up of the state-owned enterprises, and there are thousands of links between the parent companies and the subsidiary companies before the reorganization, which makes them with the controlling shareholders. At the same time, the establishment of China's capital market is more late than the western developed countries, the institutional arrangements of various aspects are still defective, and the construction of laws and regulations remains to be perfected. This has created conditions for the controlling shareholders to seek private profits and invade the interests of small and medium shareholders. It is obvious that there are serious problems in our corporate governance. How to mitigate the principal-agent problem brought by large shareholder control has become a new direction of corporate governance theory.
Most scholars study the control problem of large shareholders in corporate governance, based on the research paradigm of Berle and Means. The premise of this research paradigm is that the share of equity is highly dispersed and has not adapted to the actual situation of the relative concentration of stock right now. What is the internal mechanism of external investors' interest embezzlement? Can investor legal protection alleviate the principal-agent problem brought by the control of large shareholders? Solving these problems is the focus of this paper. After combing the classical theory and related literature, this paper draws on LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1999) and The study of Johnson (2000) holds that the ownership structure of the listed companies in China is relatively concentrated and the cash flow rights and voting rights of the controlling shareholders are separated. The controlling shareholders are right by virtue of the excess control owned by this non equivalent equity structure, and the interests of the middle and small shareholders and the external investors are infringed by the means of related transactions. After tracing the controlling shareholders to the final controller and calculating the right of cash flow and the right to vote and the separation of the two rights, the non equivalent ownership structure under the relative concentration of equity is measured. According to the research of Shen Yifeng and other scholars such as (2004) and Wang Peng (2008), the legal protection of the investors in China from 2003 to 2009 is constructed. Finally, we selected 614 listed companies from 2003 to 2009 as research samples, from the relationship between non equivalent equity structure and related transactions, and the influence of investor legal protection on this relationship in two aspects.
The empirical study on the relationship between non equivalent equity structure and related transaction shows that the separation of the two rights of the final controller (cash flow rights and voting rights) will have a positive impact on the scale of related transactions. That is, the greater the degree of separation of the two rights of the final controllers of the listed companies, the larger the scale of the related transactions of the companies in the market. The cash flow rights owned by people have a negative impact on related transactions. The greater the cash flow rights of the final controllers of the listed companies, the more motivated they are to supervise and motivate senior managers to control the risk of the management of the company and create higher value. At this time they transfer the company's assets in the way of related transactions. The motive of the transfer of profit or risk to the company will be greatly reduced, which leads to a reduction in the scale of the related transactions of the listed companies. Therefore, the non equivalent ownership structure is a double-edged sword, which may encourage the final controller to supervise the managers and weaken the effect on the tunneling of the East and the external investors. It will lead to the use of related transactions and other means to seek personal gain.
The empirical study on the influence of investor legal protection on the relationship between non equivalent equity structure and related transaction finds that investor legal protection has a negative impact on related transactions. However, in previous studies, there is no direct evidence to prove that the investor legal protection association has an impact on the related transactions. Through the analysis of the empirical data, it is concluded that the investor legal protection will have a negative impact on the related transactions. The reason for this conclusion may be: with the improvement of the legal protection mechanism, the information disclosure system is more and more strict and increases the punishment of the controlling shareholders to infringe on the interests of the listed companies. The cost of air reduces the motivation of the final controller to infringe on the small and medium shareholders, which leads to the reduction in the scale of the related transactions of the listed companies, and the regulatory relationship between the two rights separation and the related transaction is negative, that is, the improvement of the level of legal protection can weaken the final controller's separation of the cash flow rights and the voting rights. As an external corporate governance mechanism, the legal protection of investors is more basic than the internal governance mechanism of the company. With the improvement of the external governance environment of the company, the internal corporate governance mechanism, such as the ownership structure, will play its due role, and the investor's legal protection is guaranteed. The regulatory relationship between the right to cash flow and the related transaction is positive. The improvement of the legal protection level of the investor can enhance the final controller, because of the increase in the cash flow, and reduce the use of related transactions to the listed companies, thus reducing the scale of the related transaction. With the improvement of the legal protection level of the investor, To a certain extent, it will encourage the supervision of the final controllers of the listed companies and encourage the senior managers, control the risk of the management of the company and create higher value, and play a role in controlling the scale of the related transactions for the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders.
To sum up, this paper holds that the problem of controlling the control of large shareholders should be started from two aspects: first, the government and relevant regulators should reasonably control the proportion of the separation of the two rights in the non equivalent ownership structure, and keep the separation of the right of cash flow and the right to vote in a proper proportion, and make the interests of the final controller and the small and medium shareholders. It tends to be consistent, thus alleviating the infringement of the interests of the small and medium shareholders by the final controller. Secondly, as an external mechanism of corporate governance, the legal protection of investors can effectively restrain the invasion of the interests of the small and medium shareholders and the external investors by the ultimate controller, and can effectively encourage the ultimate controller to strengthen the supervision of the managers. "Incentive effect" can be seen that the external governance mechanism can make up for the lack of internal governance mechanism to a certain extent. Therefore, the relevant legal makers should consider the role of the law on the incentive and constraint of the final controller of the listed company, and improve the relevant legal protection system of the investors, for example, to strengthen the public company's letter and start, Disclosure regulation, clear the obligations and responsibilities of large shareholders, and improving the participation rights of small and medium investors, so as to achieve balance of interests in all aspects.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;D922.287

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