本文選題：私人股權(quán)投資 + 道德風(fēng)險��； 參考：《上海交通大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文在契約理論與基于道德風(fēng)險的委托代理理論的基礎(chǔ)上，從私人股權(quán)投資的各行為主體的利益分配與博弈的角度分析引入約定退出方式的契約安排對于削減投資過程中道德風(fēng)險問題的有效性、風(fēng)險企業(yè)家經(jīng)營行為的激勵效用，以及企業(yè)后續(xù)經(jīng)營績效的影響。 研究首先構(gòu)建了不完全信息下的雙邊合約理論模型，研究普通股投資方式與退出契約安排下企業(yè)家努力經(jīng)營的條件，并發(fā)現(xiàn)私人股權(quán)投資中所廣泛使用的退出契約安排條款對中等道德風(fēng)險的企業(yè)家具有顯著的激勵作用。 其次，，本文從實證分析角度對理論模型成果進(jìn)行了驗證，發(fā)現(xiàn)私人股權(quán)的參與能夠提升企業(yè)的經(jīng)營績效表現(xiàn)，且不會對企業(yè)IPO后長期的經(jīng)營業(yè)績產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。中等道德風(fēng)險企業(yè)在IPO前具有顯著更好的盈利表現(xiàn)。 最后，本文說明退出契約安排條款與企業(yè)家向投資者出售的看跌期權(quán)之間的等價性。并利用B-S期權(quán)定價公式計算該條款價值，分析影響私人股權(quán)投資對該條款偏好的因素。 本研究有助于加深對于私人股權(quán)投資防范投資過程中信息不對稱問題的方式方法與制度設(shè)計的了解，并探究私人股權(quán)投資的契約設(shè)計與投資行為與被投資企業(yè)管理層的經(jīng)營決策與后續(xù)經(jīng)營績效間的相互關(guān)系。補充了目前針對私人股權(quán)投資工具以及委托代理理論的實務(wù)應(yīng)用的研究，對我國私人股權(quán)投資業(yè)的發(fā)展將起到借鑒作用。
[Abstract]:Based on the contract theory and the principal-agent theory based on moral hazard, From the point of view of benefit distribution and game of the actors of private equity investment, this paper analyzes the effectiveness of the contractual arrangement of the contractual arrangement in the process of reducing the moral hazard in the process of investment, and the incentive effect of the venture entrepreneur's management behavior. And the influence of the enterprise's subsequent operation performance. First of all, the paper constructs the bilateral contract theory model under incomplete information, studies the common stock investment mode and the conditions of entrepreneur's hard operation under the withdrawal contract arrangement. It is also found that the withdrawal contract arrangement clause widely used in private equity investment plays a significant role in motivating middle moral hazard entrepreneurs. Secondly, this paper verifies the theoretical model from the perspective of empirical analysis, and finds that the participation of private equity can improve the performance of business performance, and will not have a negative impact on long-term business performance after IPO. Medium moral hazard companies have significantly better earnings performance before IPO. Finally, this paper explains the equivalence between the exit contract arrangement clause and the put option that the entrepreneur sells to the investor. The B-S option pricing formula is used to calculate the value of the clause and the factors affecting the preference of private equity investment to the clause are analyzed. This study is helpful to deepen the understanding of the ways, methods and system design of preventing information asymmetry in the process of private equity investment. It also explores the relationship between the contract design and investment behavior of private equity investment and the management decision of the invested enterprise and the subsequent business performance. It complements the current research on the application of private equity investment tools and principal-agent theory, which will serve as a reference for the development of China's private equity investment industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F830.91;F224

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