本文選題：小產(chǎn)權(quán)房 + 利益相關(guān)者�。� 參考：《江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：自1998年住房體制改革以后，“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)就隨著住房商品化的發(fā)展而發(fā)展起來(lái)。近些年來(lái)，村委會(huì)、鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府借著新農(nóng)村建設(shè)、舊城改造、土地整理等名目促進(jìn)了“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)規(guī)�；l(fā)展。這個(gè)灰色市場(chǎng)的日益壯大，其涉眾之廣，違法之深，都是不容忽視的社會(huì)問(wèn)題。為何“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”的參與者甘愿鋌而走險(xiǎn)？這其中有著怎樣的利益鏈條？要深入解決“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”問(wèn)題，我們就必須確定“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)參與人即利益相關(guān)者。 本研究首先成立了課題小組，小組成員運(yùn)用頭腦風(fēng)暴法初步擬定了利益相關(guān)者名單，接著邀請(qǐng)相關(guān)領(lǐng)域?qū)＜疫\(yùn)用德?tīng)柗品▽?duì)利益相關(guān)者作出進(jìn)一步的篩選。專家們分別從“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)主體的參與程度、占有支配程度、管理決策權(quán)利、糾紛可能性四個(gè)方面對(duì)各個(gè)參與對(duì)象進(jìn)行評(píng)分，得分越高者在市場(chǎng)中的參與度也就越高，反之亦然。經(jīng)過(guò)反復(fù)的評(píng)分與討論，最終確定出8類利益相關(guān)者，分別是：中央政府、地方政府、提供土地的農(nóng)民、購(gòu)房的城鎮(zhèn)居民、購(gòu)房的外村村民、村委會(huì)及鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府、“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”開(kāi)發(fā)商、中介組織。接著利用Grant分類理論將此8類利益相關(guān)者劃分為三大類，“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)的反對(duì)者——中央政府和地方政府；“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)的支持者——提供土地的農(nóng)民、購(gòu)房的城鎮(zhèn)居民、外村村民、村委會(huì)及鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府、“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”開(kāi)發(fā)商；邊緣者——中介組織。在確定了市場(chǎng)的利益相關(guān)者后，本研究借助非合作博弈理論中的完全信息靜態(tài)博弈理論對(duì)“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”利益相關(guān)者可能面臨的對(duì)策選擇進(jìn)行深入分析�？傮w的分析思路是將利益相關(guān)者按照“支持者”-“反對(duì)者”、“支持者”-“支持者”、“中間人”的關(guān)系進(jìn)行博弈分析，在每一大分類下又分別對(duì)8類利益相關(guān)者的博弈策略進(jìn)行細(xì)分討論。從而得知中央政府及地方政府是市場(chǎng)的外部牽引力，“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)的“支持者”是市場(chǎng)的內(nèi)部驅(qū)動(dòng)力。治理“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)，必定是用牽引力克制驅(qū)動(dòng)力。最后提出了治理“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)的政策建議。 本研究的創(chuàng)新之處是在利益相關(guān)者理論的基礎(chǔ)上運(yùn)用德?tīng)柗品?zhǔn)確界定了“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)的利益相關(guān)者，并對(duì)利益相關(guān)者之間博弈的可選策略進(jìn)行了深入的分析與解讀。最后得出了“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)反對(duì)者為市場(chǎng)外部“牽制力”，支持者為市場(chǎng)內(nèi)部“驅(qū)動(dòng)力”的結(jié)論。并根據(jù)利益相關(guān)者的相互博弈關(guān)系提出了根治“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”問(wèn)題的政策建議，從“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)參與者的利益角度出發(fā)以杜絕類似問(wèn)題的再度發(fā)生。本研究創(chuàng)新性的將完全信息靜態(tài)博弈模型引入了“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”的分析領(lǐng)域，細(xì)化了“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)利益相關(guān)者的判定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，，系統(tǒng)的運(yùn)用完全信息靜態(tài)博弈理論來(lái)分析“小產(chǎn)權(quán)房”市場(chǎng)的利益相關(guān)者。
[Abstract]:Since the reform of housing system in 1998, the market of "small property right" has developed with the development of housing commercialization. In recent years, village committees and township governments have promoted the development of "small property houses" market by means of new rural construction, old city transformation, land consolidation and so on. The growing grey market, its wide range of stakeholders and the depth of the law are social problems that cannot be ignored. Why are the participants willing to take risks? What kind of profit chain is there? In order to solve the problem of "small property right house", we must determine the market participant of "small property right house" that is the stakeholder. In this study, a task group was set up, and the members of the group made a preliminary list of stakeholders by using brainstorming method, and then invited experts in relevant fields to use Delphi method to further screen stakeholders. Experts scored each participant from four aspects: the participation of the main body of the market of "small property rights", the degree of dominance, the right of management decision-making, and the possibility of disputes. The higher the score, the higher the participation of the participants in the market. Vice versa. After repeated grading and discussion, eight types of stakeholders were finally identified, namely: central government, local government, farmers providing land, urban residents who bought houses, villagers from outside villages, village committees and township governments. "small property rights" developers, intermediary organizations. Then, using the Grant classification theory, the eight types of stakeholders are divided into three categories: the opponents of the "small property housing" market-central and local governments; the supporters of the "small property house" market; the farmers who provide land. Purchase of houses of urban residents, villagers outside villages, village committees and township governments, "small property" developers; marginal-intermediary organizations. After identifying the stakeholders of the market, this study makes a thorough analysis of the possible countermeasures that the stakeholders of "small property rights" may face with the help of the complete information static game theory in the non-cooperative game theory. The overall thinking of analysis is to analyze the relationship between the stakeholders according to the relationship between "supporters" and "opponents", "supporters"-"supporters" and "middlemen". Under each classification, the game strategy of 8 kinds of stakeholders is discussed separately. Therefore, the central government and local government are the external traction of the market, and the "supporters" of the "small property right" market are the internal driving force of the market. Governance of the "small property rights" market, must be the use of traction to control the driving force. Finally, it puts forward the policy suggestion of managing the market of small property right house. The innovation of this study is that based on stakeholder theory, Delphi method is used to accurately define the stakeholders in the market of "small property right house", and the selection strategy of the game between stakeholders is deeply analyzed and interpreted. Finally, the paper draws the conclusion that the market opponents are the outside of the market, and the supporters are the driving force inside the market. According to the game relation of stakeholders, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to cure the problem of "small property house", and from the angle of the interests of market participants of "small property right house", to prevent the recurrence of similar problems. This research innovatively introduces the static game model of complete information into the analysis field of "small property house", and refines the judgment standard of market stakeholders of "small property house". The systematic use of complete information static game theory to analyze the "small property rights" market stakeholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F299.23;F224.32

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