本文選題：關(guān)系型信貸 + 大型商業(yè)銀行�。� 參考：《山東大學》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：中小企業(yè)在我國國民經(jīng)濟中發(fā)揮著主力軍作用,然而融資約束是中小企業(yè)成長和發(fā)展過程中面臨的首要問題。國內(nèi)外學者普遍認為,中小企業(yè)融資難根源在于銀企之間信息不對稱。關(guān)系型信貸在解決信息不對稱、中小企業(yè)融資問題上發(fā)揮重要作用。理論界認為大銀行適合運用交易型信貸技術(shù)對大企業(yè)發(fā)放貸款,中小銀行在運用關(guān)系型信貸技術(shù)對中小企業(yè)發(fā)放貸款上具有比較優(yōu)勢,即“小銀行優(yōu)勢論”。這一觀點表明大型商業(yè)銀行不適合對中小企業(yè)實施關(guān)系型信貸,從而對中小企業(yè)難以發(fā)放貸款。 然而,目前我國大型商業(yè)銀行面臨金融制度變遷、銀行業(yè)激烈競爭的局面,亟需發(fā)展新客戶源如中小企業(yè)客戶。現(xiàn)在的問題是,中小企業(yè)擔保抵押不足,傳統(tǒng)的交易型信貸技術(shù)不適合中小企業(yè)貸款,因此在大型商業(yè)銀行中實施關(guān)系型信貸則成為必然趨勢。所以,本文突破以往研究分析框架,建立“大銀行—關(guān)系型信貸—中小企業(yè)”的新框架來研究大型商業(yè)銀行與關(guān)系型信貸形成之間的關(guān)系。 本文從理論和實證兩個方面對我國大型商業(yè)銀行的信貸制度與關(guān)系型信貸形成之間關(guān)系進行分析。理論分析包括兩方面：一是銀行的激勵約束機制對軟信息數(shù)量的影響；二是銀行的信貸審批權(quán)分配制度對軟信息被利用程度的影響。理論研究結(jié)果表明：(1)在不發(fā)生道德風險情況下,基于信貸員利益最大化原則,銀行的獎勵與懲罰需滿足一定條件,在此條件下,銀行獎勵越多,懲罰越少,信貸員的期望利潤越大,則軟信息搜集數(shù)量越多。(2)中心行通過對比代理成本與信息成本大小來決定信貸審批權(quán)分配。信貸審批權(quán)分配越傾向于分支行,則軟信息被利用程度就越高。在上述理論研究基礎上,本文提出三個理論假說,利用調(diào)研問卷數(shù)據(jù),通過建立實證模型檢驗了這三個假說。 綜上,我國大型商業(yè)銀行現(xiàn)有信貸制度不利于關(guān)系型信貸的形成與發(fā)展。在激勵與約束機制的改革上,應區(qū)分資質(zhì)較好的大企業(yè)和資質(zhì)較差的中小企業(yè)。對中小企業(yè)貸款過程中,銀行應設計合理的激勵約束機制,使其滿足一定條件,在此條件下,增加銀行獎勵、減小貸款懲罰,從而促進信貸員搜集軟信息的積極性。審批權(quán)分配不應一刀切,銀行在對代理成本和信息成本進行對比之后,如果代理成本大于信息成本,則審批權(quán)分配應更傾向于中心行,如果代理成本小于信息成本,則審批權(quán)應更傾向于分支行,提高軟信息被利用程度。
[Abstract]:Small and medium-sized enterprises play a major role in our national economy, but financing constraints are the most important problems in the process of their growth and development. Scholars at home and abroad generally believe that SMEs financing difficulties are rooted in information asymmetry between banks and enterprises. Relational credit plays an important role in solving the problem of information asymmetry and SME financing. The theorists think that large banks are suitable to use transactional credit technology to grant loans to large enterprises, and small and medium-sized banks have comparative advantages in using relational credit technology to grant loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, that is, "advantage of small banks". This view shows that large commercial banks are not suitable for implementing relational credit to SMEs, so it is difficult to extend loans to SMEs. However, at present, the large commercial banks in our country are faced with the changes of financial system and the fierce competition of the banking industry, so it is urgent to develop new customer sources such as small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Now the problem is that the guarantee mortgage of small and medium-sized enterprises is insufficient and the traditional transactional credit technology is not suitable for small and medium-sized enterprises, so the implementation of relational credit in large commercial banks has become an inevitable trend. Therefore, this paper breaks through the previous research and analysis framework, and establishes a new framework of "big bank-relational credit-small and medium-sized enterprises" to study the relationship between large commercial banks and relational credit formation. This paper analyzes the relationship between the credit system and the formation of relational credit in China's large commercial banks from both theoretical and empirical aspects. The theoretical analysis includes two aspects: one is the influence of the incentive and constraint mechanism of banks on the amount of soft information; the other is the influence of the distribution system of credit approval power of banks on the degree to which soft information is used. The theoretical results show that: 1) in the absence of moral hazard, based on the principle of maximizing the benefit of the credit officer, the reward and punishment of the bank should meet certain conditions. Under this condition, the more the reward, the less the punishment. The larger the expected profit of the credit officer, the more the amount of soft information is collected.) the center bank determines the distribution of credit approval power by comparing agency cost with information cost. The more the distribution of credit approval power tends to separate branches, the more soft information will be used. On the basis of the above theoretical research, this paper puts forward three theoretical hypotheses and tests the three hypotheses by using the questionnaire data and establishing an empirical model. In summary, the existing credit system of large commercial banks is not conducive to the formation and development of relational credit. In the reform of incentive and restraint mechanism, it is necessary to distinguish better-qualified large enterprises from poorly qualified small and medium-sized enterprises. In the process of SME loan, banks should design reasonable incentive and constraint mechanism to satisfy certain conditions. Under this condition, increase bank incentives and reduce loan punishment, thus promoting the enthusiasm of credit officers to collect soft information. After comparing the agency cost with the information cost, if the agency cost is greater than the information cost, the power distribution should be more inclined to the central bank, if the agency cost is less than the information cost, Then the power of approval should be more inclined to separate branches, improve the use of soft information.
【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.4;F224

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本文編號：1809867