本文選題：終極控制人　切入點(diǎn)：關(guān)聯(lián)交易　出處：《大連理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來中國民營經(jīng)濟(jì)正經(jīng)歷著翻天覆地得發(fā)展,在取得驕人成績的同時(shí)也伴隨著許多亟待解決的現(xiàn)實(shí)問題。終極控制人為謀求自身利益利用手中控制權(quán)控制上市公司,通過關(guān)聯(lián)交易轉(zhuǎn)移上市公司資源,并最終達(dá)到攫取控制權(quán)私有收益的目的。關(guān)聯(lián)交易的頻繁發(fā)生不僅嚴(yán)重?fù)p害中小股東的利益,降低了企業(yè)在資本市場的誠信和盈利能力。盡管監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行監(jiān)督并加大懲罰力度,但由于終極控制人行為的隱蔽性導(dǎo)致公司治理問題較多且難以從根本上解決。 本文選取民營上市公司2007-2011五年數(shù)據(jù)作為研究對(duì)象,從終極控制人的視角實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)終極控制人的控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)與關(guān)聯(lián)交易的關(guān)系,并分析終極控制人關(guān)聯(lián)交易行為與公司績效的關(guān)系,最后對(duì)如何減少終極控制人關(guān)聯(lián)交易行為提出了相應(yīng)的建議。本研究運(yùn)用理論與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)合的方法進(jìn)行研究。理論研究主要針對(duì)民營上市公司終極控制人、關(guān)聯(lián)交易以及公司績效等相關(guān)內(nèi)容,然后構(gòu)建回歸模型通過實(shí)證進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn),研究結(jié)論總結(jié)如下： (1)民營上市公司中控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離的結(jié)構(gòu)占樣本整體比例達(dá)到64.99%,同時(shí)分離結(jié)構(gòu)上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易水平明顯高于兩權(quán)非分離上市公司,且兩權(quán)分離上市公司公司績效(每股收益)低于兩權(quán)非分離上市公司。 (2)終極控制人控制權(quán)與關(guān)聯(lián)交易水平呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,現(xiàn)金流權(quán)與關(guān)聯(lián)交易水平呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；且隨著兩權(quán)分離度的增加,終極控制人關(guān)聯(lián)交易逐漸增加；且當(dāng)終極控制人兩權(quán)分離度較大時(shí),上市公司績效與其關(guān)聯(lián)交易規(guī)模負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系被加強(qiáng)。 (3)實(shí)證發(fā)現(xiàn)隨著關(guān)聯(lián)交易水平的增加,公司每股收益水平隨之降低,二者呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；且在終極控制人現(xiàn)金流權(quán)較高的情況下,關(guān)聯(lián)交易水平與兩權(quán)分離度正相關(guān)關(guān)系被削弱。 (4)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)股權(quán)制衡度能夠制約終極控制人關(guān)聯(lián)交易行為,從而減少終極控制人對(duì)其他股東的侵占行為。因此,上市公司應(yīng)該引入更多機(jī)構(gòu)投資者或者大股東對(duì)終極控制人進(jìn)行有效制衡,最終提高公司績效。
[Abstract]:In recent years, China's private economy is experiencing earth-shaking development.The ultimate control controls the listed companies by using the control power to control the listed companies by seeking their own interests, transfers the listed companies' resources through the related party transactions, and finally achieves the purpose of seizing the private income of the control rights.The frequent occurrence of related party transactions not only seriously damages the interests of minority shareholders, but also reduces the integrity and profitability of enterprises in the capital market.Although regulators supervise related party transactions and increase punishment, the covert behavior of ultimate controller leads to more problems of corporate governance and is difficult to solve fundamentally.This paper selects the five year data of private listed companies from 2007-2011 as the research object, and empirically tests the relationship between the ultimate controller's right of control and cash flow right and related party transactions from the perspective of ultimate controller.The relationship between the behavior of the ultimate controller and the performance of the company is analyzed. Finally, the corresponding suggestions on how to reduce the behavior of the ultimate controller are put forward.This research uses the method of combining theory and empirical test to carry on the research.The theoretical research mainly focuses on the ultimate controller, related party transactions and corporate performance of private listed companies, and then constructs a regression model to test it through empirical analysis. The research conclusions are summarized as follows:1) the structure of separation of control and cash flow rights in private listed companies accounts for 64.99 percent of the sample, and the level of related party transactions of listed companies with separate structure is obviously higher than that of non-separate listed companies with two rights.And the company performance (earnings per share) of two separate listed companies is lower than that of non-listed companies.(2) there is a significant positive correlation between the control right of the ultimate controller and the level of the related party transaction, a significant negative correlation between the cash flow right and the level of the related party transaction, and with the increase of the degree of separation of the two rights, the related party transaction of the ultimate controller increases gradually.And when the separation degree of ultimate control rights is greater, the negative correlation between the performance of listed companies and the scale of related party transactions is strengthened.The empirical results show that with the increase of the level of related party transactions, the level of earnings per share decreases, and there is a significant negative correlation between the two, and in the case of higher cash flow rights of the ultimate controller,The positive correlation between the level of related transaction and the degree of separation of two rights has been weakened.4) it is found that the degree of equity balance can restrict the behavior of the ultimate controller in related party transactions, and thus reduce the behavior of the ultimate controller in encroaching on other shareholders.Therefore, listed companies should introduce more institutional investors or large shareholders to effectively balance the ultimate controller, and ultimately improve corporate performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.5;F224

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