本文選題：證券分析師　切入點(diǎn)：負(fù)面曝光事件　出處：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：在證券市場(chǎng)中,證券分析師比一般投資者擁有更全面的信息來(lái)源和專業(yè)的解讀分析能力,因而他們的投資建議對(duì)證券市場(chǎng)參與者產(chǎn)生直接或者間接的影響,他們的各種行為也對(duì)信息流動(dòng)、市場(chǎng)效率有至關(guān)重要的作用。但是證券分析師也是一個(gè)利益群體,他們的行為受到多方面因素的影響。相比西方國(guó)家,中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)有自己的特點(diǎn),證券分析師行業(yè)起步晚、發(fā)展快,各種情況層出不窮。因此,研究證券分析師的行為、利益沖突根源以及產(chǎn)生的結(jié)果,都是具有理論意義和實(shí)際意義的。 通常證券分析師在對(duì)信息進(jìn)行搜索、篩選、分析后給出“買入”、“賣出”等有利于投資者理解的推薦評(píng)級(jí)。但是,是否所有的推薦評(píng)級(jí)都是客觀有效的呢?分析師所處的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境會(huì)不會(huì)對(duì)他們的決策有影響呢?這些問(wèn)題不僅關(guān)系到分析師行業(yè)的信譽(yù)和證券行業(yè)的發(fā)展,也關(guān)系到投資者的投資決策和利益。這些問(wèn)題同樣是本文的研究目的。 本文篩選出在2010年1月至2012年12月期間發(fā)生過(guò)重大產(chǎn)品安全事件和污染事件的上市公司,收集事件發(fā)生前后兩個(gè)月內(nèi)證券分析師發(fā)表的股票評(píng)級(jí)作為研究樣本,從分析師角度和證券市場(chǎng)角度,通過(guò)事件研究、T檢驗(yàn)、秩和檢驗(yàn)等方法,對(duì)券商跟蹤、分析師跟蹤、持股或主承銷商關(guān)系、券商是否提供基金交易席位對(duì)分析師獨(dú)立性的影響以及分析師推薦評(píng)級(jí)的投資效果進(jìn)行了研究。 研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：分析師評(píng)級(jí)存在樂(lè)觀傾向,大多數(shù)分析師建議買入或者增持；假設(shè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益因素對(duì)分析師獨(dú)立性有不同程度的影響,關(guān)聯(lián)分析師往往給出更高的評(píng)級(jí)水平；分析師跟蹤和持股或主承銷商關(guān)系對(duì)分析師影響程度較大,而券商跟蹤、基金席位對(duì)分析師獨(dú)立性影響較弱；同時(shí)丑聞事件之后的股票市場(chǎng)波動(dòng)異常,分析師的評(píng)級(jí)報(bào)告有短期的指導(dǎo)價(jià)值。 最后,由實(shí)證結(jié)果提出政策建議,規(guī)范證券市場(chǎng),提高證券分析師的專業(yè)能力和職業(yè)素質(zhì),加強(qiáng)投資者的投資理念與自我保護(hù)意識(shí)。
[Abstract]:In the stock market, securities analysts have more comprehensive sources of information and professional ability to interpret and analyze than average investors, so their investment advice has a direct or indirect impact on participants in the securities market.Their actions also play a vital role in information flow and market efficiency.But securities analysts are also an interest group whose behavior is influenced by many factors.Compared with western countries, China's securities market has its own characteristics.Therefore, it is of theoretical and practical significance to study the behavior of securities analysts, the root causes of conflicts of interest and the resulting results.Usually, securities analysts give "buy", "sell" and other recommended ratings that are good for investors to understand after searching, sifting and analyzing information.But are all the recommended ratings objective and effective?Will the economic climate of analysts influence their decisions?These problems are not only related to the credibility of the analyst industry and the development of the securities industry, but also related to the investment decisions and interests of investors.These problems are also the purpose of this paper.From January 2010 to December 2012, we selected listed companies with major product safety events and pollution incidents, and collected stock ratings published by securities analysts within two months before and after the incident as research samples.From the perspective of the analyst and the securities market, through the event study T test, rank sum test and so on, we track the securities firm, the analyst tracking, the stock holding or the lead underwriter relationship.The impact on analysts' independence and the investment effectiveness of analysts' recommended ratings were studied whether brokers offered fund trading seats.The results show that the analyst rating tends to be optimistic and most of the analysts recommend buying or increasing their holdings. The hypothetical economic interest factors affect the independence of the analyst to varying degrees and the associated analysts tend to give a higher rating level.Analyst tracking and shareholding or lead underwriter relationships have a greater impact on analysts, while brokerage tracking, fund seats have a weaker impact on analysts' independence, and stock market volatility is unusual after the scandal.The analyst rating report has short-term guidance value.Finally, some suggestions are put forward to standardize the securities market, to improve the professional ability and professional quality of securities analysts, and to strengthen investors' investment concept and self-protection consciousness.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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