本文選題：非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易　切入點：重大關(guān)聯(lián)交易　出處：《南京理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國的上市公司很大一部分是由原先的國有企業(yè)通過改制形成的,“國有股一股獨大”現(xiàn)象依舊是十分顯著的問題,上市公司和母公司以及子公司之間普遍存在著關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系,關(guān)聯(lián)方利用非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易來粉飾報表、虛增利潤、利益輸送、逃避稅收等情況已經(jīng)是不爭的事實。尤其是最近幾年來,上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易行為越來越受到證券市場廣泛的關(guān)注。作為一種公司的治理機制,獨立董事制度的一項重要職能就是對關(guān)聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管�！蛾P(guān)于在上市公司建立獨立董事制度的指導(dǎo)意見》(下文簡稱《指導(dǎo)意見》)明確提出,上市公司應(yīng)賦予獨立董事對于重大關(guān)聯(lián)交易的知情權(quán)、提議權(quán)、認(rèn)可權(quán)和發(fā)表獨立意見權(quán)。本文在對目前國內(nèi)外關(guān)于獨立董事制度對關(guān)聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管有效性的研究基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合我國自身情況,從理論和實證兩個方面來驗證獨立董事制度對上市公司非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管有效性。 本文實現(xiàn)了如下幾個寫作目的： (1)實現(xiàn)了獨立董事制度對上市公司非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管有效性的理論研究,分別從獨立董事制度的理論分析和獨立董事對關(guān)聯(lián)交易的經(jīng)濟學(xué)分析兩方面進行了深入研究�；谖写砝碚摵椭贫茸冞w視角分析,驗證獨立董事制度可以有效地監(jiān)管上市公司的非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易。 (2)實現(xiàn)了獨立董事制度對上市公司非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管有效性的實證分析,利用獨立董事制度的特征,用獨立董事比例、會計和法律專業(yè)獨立董事比例、獨立董事出席會議比例、獨立董事薪酬四項指標(biāo),加上公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和財務(wù)指標(biāo)作為控制變量,利用SPSS17.0對解釋變量和被解釋變量進行相應(yīng)的描述性統(tǒng)計,構(gòu)建了多元線性回歸模型,研究了獨立董事對不同類型的關(guān)聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管效果。 (3)利用主成分分析法,將重大交易的變量集構(gòu)建為一個綜合重大關(guān)聯(lián)交易指標(biāo),實現(xiàn)了獨立董事制度與上市公司整體的關(guān)聯(lián)交易情況的回歸分析。 實證結(jié)果表明獨立董事制度對上市公司非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管效果并不理想,本文為完善獨立董事制度提供了很好的建議。
[Abstract]:A large part of the listed companies in our country are formed by the former state-owned enterprises through the reform of the system. The phenomenon of "state-owned shares being dominant in one share" is still a very significant problem, and there is generally a relationship between the listed companies and their parent companies and their subsidiaries. It is an indisputable fact that related parties use unfair related party transactions to whitewash statements, inflate profits, transfer profits, evade taxes, etc., especially in recent years, The related party trading behavior of listed companies has been paid more and more attention to by the stock market. As a kind of corporate governance mechanism, One of the important functions of the independent director system is the supervision of related party transactions. The guidance on the Establishment of Independent Director system in listed companies (hereinafter referred to as "guidance opinion") is clearly put forward. Listed companies should give independent directors the right to know, propose, approve and express their independent opinions on major related party transactions. Combining with the situation of our country, this paper verifies the effectiveness of the independent director system in the supervision of unfair related party transactions of listed companies from both theoretical and empirical aspects. The purpose of this paper is as follows:. 1) realizing the theoretical research on the effectiveness of the independent director system in the supervision of unfair related party transactions of listed companies. Based on the theory of the independent director system and the independent director's economic analysis of the related party transaction, this paper analyzes the relationship between the independent director and the independent director from the perspective of principal-agent theory and institutional change. To verify the independent director system can effectively supervise the unfair related party transactions of listed companies. 2) realizing the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of the independent director system in the supervision of unfair related party transactions of listed companies, using the characteristics of the independent director system, using the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of independent directors in accounting and law, and the proportion of independent directors in accounting and law professions. The proportion of independent directors attending the meeting, the compensation of independent directors, the corporate governance structure and financial indicators are taken as control variables, and the explanatory variables and explained variables are analyzed by SPSS17.0. A multivariate linear regression model is constructed to study the effect of independent directors on the supervision of different types of related party transactions. 3) by using principal component analysis, the variable set of major transaction is constructed into a comprehensive index of significant related party transaction, and the regression analysis of independent director system and related party transaction of listed company as a whole is realized. The empirical results show that the effect of independent director system on the supervision of unfair related party transactions of listed companies is not ideal, and this paper provides a good suggestion for the improvement of independent director system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.51;F271;F224

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