本文選題：國有土地　切入點：出讓模式　出處：《西安建筑科技大學》2013年博士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：當前招標拍賣掛牌出讓模式已成為城市國有土地使用權(quán)出讓的主要方式。土地招拍掛制度遵循市場公平交易的規(guī)則，按照“價高者得”的原則對稀缺的土地資源進行有效配置，大幅提高了政府土地出讓的收益。不過，伴隨土地招拍掛制度的實施，2003年起城市土地市場地價大幅提高，地王頻出，城市房價快速增長，地方政府土地收入顯著增加，引起社會的普遍關(guān)注和土地招拍掛制度的質(zhì)疑。那么招拍掛模式是否是推高地價房價的主要原因？“價高者得”的規(guī)則是否合理？如何治理地王問題？圍繞上述問題本文主要進行了如下方面的研究： 1）基于拍賣理論的土地出讓模式分析 為體現(xiàn)土地的價值類型特性和估價特點，改變基準模型的假設(shè)，建立了一級密封價格拍賣模型和英式拍賣模型，求解均衡報價發(fā)現(xiàn)土地公共價值u和投標均衡價bi之間存在正相關(guān)的關(guān)系，從而說明了招拍掛模式存在影響地價的內(nèi)在機制，房價地價的增長是外部市場供求因素和內(nèi)部制度性因素共同作用的結(jié)果，“價高者得”原則與政府追求土地價值最大化的要求是一致的。然后探討了現(xiàn)行土地招拍掛模式的不足，提出地方政府要從公共管理者角度重建土地出讓的目標，應追求合理適度的土地收益和提供更多的公共產(chǎn)品。最后從完善現(xiàn)有土地招拍掛模式的角度，結(jié)合實踐和理論分析，總結(jié)出幾種新型的土地出讓模式。 2）土地出讓模式與企業(yè)行為分析 本文通過從投標人企業(yè)行為研究我國土地出讓模式的完善問題，選擇“地王”作為研究對象說明土地市場失靈的情況。首先將投標者的風險態(tài)度引入基準模型進行分析求解，印證了投標者的風險態(tài)度是影響競標結(jié)果（如“地王”）的重要因素。再者在對“地王”后續(xù)開發(fā)研究中發(fā)現(xiàn)存在部分“地王囤地”的情況，通過建立動態(tài)博弈模型分析了產(chǎn)生問題的原因：政府監(jiān)管不力和市場自身缺陷。然后從事前預防、事中督查、事后處罰三個角度提出了遏制“地王”及“地王囤地”的對策和建議。最后通過一個數(shù)值模擬解釋了“面粉價貴于面包價”現(xiàn)象的合理性及風險。 3）土地出讓模式與政府行為分析 本文對地方政府行為對土地出讓模式的影響進行了研究。通過對地方政府及官員對城市土地出讓的干預行為、手段和尋租動機研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)掛牌出讓為主是地方政府干預的結(jié)果。通過研究地方政府的三種經(jīng)濟行為與供地行為的關(guān)系，，揭示了其控制供地行為發(fā)展地方經(jīng)濟的邏輯：地方政府通過支撐高房價高地價從土地出讓獲取巨額收益，并將收益用于基建投資和補貼工業(yè)用地，促進地區(qū)經(jīng)濟發(fā)展和新一輪的土地增值，從而實現(xiàn)土地收益和產(chǎn)出最大化的目標。但這種發(fā)展模式存在對土地財政的“路徑依賴”。 4）完善我國土地出讓模式的原則和建議 在總結(jié)前文研究基礎(chǔ)上，提出了完善土地招拍掛模式的三個原則，從多個方面給出了完善土地招拍掛模式的具體建議。
[Abstract]:The bidding auction listing mode has become the main way of city use right of state-owned land sold. The land auction system to follow the rules of the market even bargain, the effective allocation of scarce land resources in accordance with the "highest bidder" principle, a substantial increase in the government land transfer income. However, with the implementation of the land auction hung system, 2003 city land price increases, the most expensive land frequent City, the rapid growth of housing prices, the local government land revenue increased significantly, which caused widespread concern and social land auction system questioned. Then the auction model is the main reason for pushing up land prices of the "highest bidder"? The rules are reasonable? How to control the problem of the most expensive land? Around the above problems this paper mainly research on the following aspects:
1) analysis of land leasing model based on auction theory
For value type characteristics and features of land valuation, change the assumption of the benchmark model, established the first price sealed auction model and auction model, solving the equilibrium price found a positive correlation between U value and land public bidding equilibrium price Bi, which shows the existence of bidding mechanism of the influence of land hanging mode the price premium growth is the common factors of supply and demand of external market and internal institutional factors, the "highest bidder" principle and the government to pursue the maximum value of the land requirements are the same. And then discusses the current shortage of land auction hanging mode, the local government from the reconstruction of land target angle of public management that should be the pursuit of reasonable land revenue and provide more public products. Finally, from the improvement of the existing land auction model point of view, combined with the practice and theoretical analysis, Several new models of land transfer are summarized.
2) land leasing model and enterprise behavior analysis
In this paper, through the research on the improvement of China's land transfer mode from the bidder behavior of enterprises, select the most expensive land "as the object of study indicates that the land market failure. The bidder's risk attitude into the benchmark model for analysis, confirms the bidder's risk attitude is bidding results (such as" the most expensive land "). An important factor in" the most expensive land. In the subsequent development of research found in the part of "the most expensive land hoarding", by establishing a dynamic game model to analyze the cause of the problem: government supervision and market defects. And then engaged in the prevention, supervision and punishment afterwards that, three aspects were proposed to prevent the "the most expensive land" and "the most expensive land hoarding countermeasures and suggestions. Finally, through a numerical simulation explains the rationality and the risk price of flour in your bread price" phenomenon.
3) land leasing model and government behavior analysis
This paper studied the effect of local government on land transfer mode. Through the intervention of local government and officials of the city land transfer, research means and rent-seeking motives, found that landauction is mainly local government intervention results. Through the relationship between the three kinds of economic behavior of local government and for the behavior, reveals the the control for the behavior of the local economic development: the logic of local government through the support of high prices to obtain huge profits from the high price of land, and will return for investment in infrastructure and industrial subsidies, promoting the development of regional economy and a new round of land value, land revenue and output in order to achieve the goal of maximizing the development. Model on land finance "path dependence".
4) the principles and suggestions for improving the land leasing model in China
On the basis of summarizing the previous studies, three principles for improving the mode of land acquisition and auction are put forward, and the specific suggestions for improving the land auction mode are given from many aspects.

【學位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F299.23;F713.359

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本文編號：1577858