本文選題：大股東控制　切入點(diǎn)：定向增發(fā)　出處：《石河子大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自2006年5月8日中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)頒布實(shí)施《上市公司證券發(fā)行管理辦法》（證監(jiān)會(huì)第30號(hào)令）后，資本市場(chǎng)的融資功能重新啟動(dòng)。并于股權(quán)分置改革之后，對(duì)資本市場(chǎng)的融資功能提出了“三步走”戰(zhàn)略，其中第一步就是恢復(fù)不增加即期擴(kuò)容壓力的定向增發(fā)以及以股本權(quán)證方式進(jìn)行的遠(yuǎn)期再融資，自此，定向增發(fā)成為一種制度性的融資舉措，并得到快速發(fā)展。2007年9月17日中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)發(fā)布實(shí)施了《上市公司非公開發(fā)行股票實(shí)施細(xì)則》，進(jìn)一步規(guī)定了上市公司非公開發(fā)行股票行為。雖然定向增發(fā)有助于企業(yè)以較低的成本實(shí)現(xiàn)融資、并有助于企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)整體上市、不會(huì)增加股市的即期擴(kuò)容、同時(shí)還有助于鞏固大股東的控制力。但是在定向增發(fā)的過程中也存在大股東控制下的財(cái)富轉(zhuǎn)移行為。因此，研究大股東控制對(duì)定向增發(fā)決策、規(guī)模、折價(jià)的影響以及定向增發(fā)行為對(duì)中小股東利益的影響具有重要的意義。 本文首先回顧了近幾年關(guān)于定向增發(fā)的相關(guān)研究，，并基于委托代理理論和信息不對(duì)稱理論闡述了大股東控制對(duì)定向增發(fā)行為的影響，在此基礎(chǔ)上分析大股東控制定向增發(fā)過程對(duì)中小股東利益的影響。接著以2006-2011年定向增發(fā)成功的上市公司為研究樣本，運(yùn)用回歸模型檢驗(yàn)了第一大股東持股比例、股權(quán)制衡、大股東性質(zhì)對(duì)定向增發(fā)決策、定向增發(fā)規(guī)模、以及定向增發(fā)折價(jià)的影響，最后進(jìn)一步研究了定向增發(fā)行為對(duì)中小股東利益的影響。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：（1）定向增發(fā)決策方面，第一大股東持股比例與定向增發(fā)決策成顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系，而且國(guó)有上市公司更傾向于進(jìn)行定向增發(fā)。股權(quán)制衡對(duì)于第一大股東持股比例與定向增發(fā)決策的關(guān)系沒有起到抑制作用，表現(xiàn)出第二到第五大股東持股比例與定向增發(fā)決策成顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系。（2）定向增發(fā)規(guī)模方面，第一大股東持股比例與定向增發(fā)規(guī)模成顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系，可以推測(cè)出當(dāng)定向增發(fā)規(guī)模較大時(shí)，大股東越有機(jī)會(huì)進(jìn)行財(cái)富的轉(zhuǎn)移。股權(quán)制衡對(duì)于定向增發(fā)規(guī)模起到制約作用，即大多數(shù)股東支持小規(guī)模的增發(fā)。（3）定向增發(fā)折價(jià)方面，第一大股東持股比例、第二到第五大股東持股比例與定向增發(fā)折價(jià)呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系，第一大股東的性質(zhì)與定向增發(fā)折價(jià)呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，但不顯著。（4）中小股東侵害方面，定向增發(fā)決策、定向增發(fā)折價(jià)對(duì)中小股東的侵害并不顯著，符合定向增發(fā)對(duì)中小股東侵害低于配股和公開增發(fā)的論據(jù)，折價(jià)不能代表對(duì)中小股東的侵害。定向增發(fā)的規(guī)模卻與中小股東的侵害呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系，說明當(dāng)定向增發(fā)達(dá)到一定規(guī)模后，仍會(huì)對(duì)中小股東造成侵害。 本文的研究結(jié)論對(duì)于投資者正確認(rèn)識(shí)定向增發(fā)有一定的指導(dǎo)意義，有助于證監(jiān)會(huì)合理制定定向增發(fā)的原則，防范各種危害中小股東利益的行為發(fā)生，保證定向增發(fā)的客觀性和有效性。本文的研究結(jié)論，對(duì)于不同股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的上市公司的股權(quán)融資政策的制定、中小股東對(duì)企業(yè)的投資決策、以及上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化有著重要的理論意義和實(shí)踐意義。
[Abstract]:Since May 8, 2006 Chinese Commission promulgated "the issuance of securities of listed companies management approach" (the Commission Decree No. thirtieth), capital market financing function. After the restart and the reform on equity, capital market financing function and put forward the "three step" strategy, the first step is to restore the long-term orientation does not increase spot the expansion pressure and the issuance of equity warrants way of refinancing, since then, private placement has become a system of financing initiatives and the rapid development of.2007 in September 17th China Commission promulgated the "rules for the implementation of the non-public offering of shares of listed companies, further provisions of the non-public offering of shares of listed companies. Although the private placement will help enterprises to lower the cost of financing, and help enterprises to achieve the overall market, will not increase the immediate expansion of the stock market, but also help. Solid control of major shareholders. But in the process of private placement are controlled by large shareholder wealth transfer behavior. Therefore, research on the scale of control of the private placement decisions, major shareholders, discount and the influence of the private placement impact is of great significance to the interests of small shareholders.
This paper reviews the related research on the private placement in recent years, and based on the principal-agent theory and asymmetric information theory to explain the impact of large shareholder control of private placement behavior, based on the analysis of large shareholders control the process of the private placement of the shareholders influence. Then in 2006-2011 years of successful private placement of listed companies the research sample, using the regression model to test the proportion of the first largest shareholder, equity balance, nature of major shareholders of private placement decisions, the size of private placement, and the discount of private placement, the last step of the private placement on the interests of small shareholders.
The study found that: (1) the decision of private placement, the proportion of the first shareholder and the decision of private placement has a significant positive correlation, and the state-owned listed companies prefer equity balance for private placement. The relationship between the proportion of the first shareholder and placement decision not to restrain, showed second to fifth major shareholders ownership and private placement decision was observablypositive. (2) the size of private placement, the proportion of the first largest shareholder and the size of private placement have a positive relationship can be inferred when the private placement of large scale, large shareholders have the opportunity to transfer more wealth. Equity balance for private placement to scale restrict action, namely the issuance of the majority shareholder support small scale. (3) the discount of private placement, the proportion of the first largest shareholder, the second to the fifth largest shareholding ratio and The discount was positively correlated with directional properties of the first major shareholder discount was negatively correlated, but not significant. (4) small shareholders, the decision of private placement, private placement discount infringement of minority shareholders is not significant, meet the placement of small shareholders than additional rights and public arguments against discount not representative of small and medium shareholders. The size of the private placement and medium-sized shareholders is positively related, that when the private placement reaches a certain size, will encroach on minority shareholders.
The conclusion of this paper for investors to correct understanding has certain guiding significance of private placement, help the Commission to formulate reasonable principles of private placement, to prevent the occurrence of various acts against the interests of minority shareholders, to ensure the objectivity and validity of private placement. The conclusion of this paper, for the development of different ownership structure of the listed company's equity financing policy the investment decision making of small and medium shareholders of enterprises, has important theoretical and practical significance and the optimization of the ownership structure of listed companies.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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