本文選題：會計穩(wěn)健性　切入點：終極控制股東　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2015年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：會計信息是公司信息的重要來源。高質(zhì)量會計信息的重要特征之一是會計穩(wěn)健性,即會計盈余確認好消息比確認壞消息具有更高的驗證要求,從而導(dǎo)致會計盈余反映壞消息比好消息更及時。會計確認好消息和壞消息的這種不對稱及時性被稱為會計穩(wěn)健性。會計穩(wěn)健性具有重要的公司治理作用。因為穩(wěn)健的會計信息能夠及時向股東、債權(quán)人等傳遞信號,緩解信息不對稱,有助于降低融資成本,提高融資效率,緩解投資過度與投資不足等問題,從而較好地保護投資者合法利益。21世紀(jì)初,安然、世通等重大財務(wù)舞弊案的爆發(fā),以及全球股市的衰退引起了理論界和實務(wù)界對會計信息質(zhì)量的高度重視。會計穩(wěn)健性成為學(xué)者、投資人、分析師、監(jiān)管者和財經(jīng)媒體等關(guān)注的重點問題。當(dāng)前,中國處于經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)軌時期,存在特殊的制度背景,比如,股權(quán)集中、投資者保護水平不高、經(jīng)理人市場不健全、接管市場機制薄弱等。終極控制股東與外部投資者之間的代理矛盾成為中國上市公司的主要矛盾。在中國特定的制度背景下,終極控制股東如何影響會計穩(wěn)健性?投資者保護是否提高了公司披露的會計信息的穩(wěn)健性?終極控制股東與會計穩(wěn)健性之間的關(guān)系是否以及如何受投資者保護的影響?這些問題是當(dāng)前中國資本市場發(fā)展和公司治理亟待解決的理論和實踐問題,也是研究會計穩(wěn)健性更為現(xiàn)實的視角�？v觀相關(guān)文獻,國內(nèi)學(xué)者對中國上市公司會計穩(wěn)健性的研究存在的問題表現(xiàn)在：缺乏對終極控制股東如何影響會計穩(wěn)健性的理論與實證的全面分析,如,金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、金字塔層級、終極控制股東派出董事席位及特征對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響有待進一步考察等；缺乏對投資者保護差異如何影響會計穩(wěn)健性的研究,如投資者保護水平的時期差異、區(qū)域差異等；缺乏投資者保護與終極控制股東的相互作用如何影響會計穩(wěn)健性的深入探討；缺乏對中國上市公司會計穩(wěn)健性制度背景的深入探究。為此,本文研究終極控制股東、投資者保護及二者的相互作用對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響。在中國特殊的制度背景下,開展終極控制股東、投資者保護與會計穩(wěn)健性之間關(guān)系研究具有重要的研究意義,主要體現(xiàn)在：第一,剖析終極控制股東的掠奪行為和信息操縱行為,揭示終極控制股東在會計穩(wěn)健性中的作用機理,有助于增強契約的效率性和投資者進行合理的投資決策,減緩信息和代理問題；第二,揭示投資者保護在會計穩(wěn)健性中的作用機理,尋求有利于提高會計穩(wěn)健性的制度因素,有助于提高上市公司和證券市場運作的透明度,降低信息披露主體的道德風(fēng)險和機會主義行為,推動公司治理機制的不斷完善,促進證券市場的健康發(fā)展；第三,剖析終極控制股東與會計穩(wěn)健性之間關(guān)系是否以及如何隨著投資者保護的變化而變化,探討提高包括會計穩(wěn)健性在內(nèi)的會計信息質(zhì)量的途徑或方法,為提高中國上市公司會計信息質(zhì)量和透明度,降低信息不對稱、優(yōu)化資本市場資源配置提供經(jīng)驗證據(jù)和政策建議。文章研究主要內(nèi)容表現(xiàn)在五個方面：第一,文章對投資者保護、終極控制股東和會計穩(wěn)健性三個方面的相關(guān)文獻進行回顧。通過文獻回顧發(fā)現(xiàn),在終極控制股東方面,國內(nèi)外學(xué)者主要從終極控制股東分布、盈余管理、公司價值、會計信息等角度進行了深入研究,為終極控制股東對盈余管理、公司價值、會計信息等的影響提供大量的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)。在投資者保護方面,國內(nèi)外學(xué)者主要研究了投資者保護對資本結(jié)構(gòu)、公司價值、融資成本,以及會計信息等方面的影響。在會計穩(wěn)健性方面,國內(nèi)外學(xué)者重點研究了會計穩(wěn)健性的度量、會計穩(wěn)健性的存在性,以及會計穩(wěn)健性的影響因素。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在終極控制股東、投資者保護與會計穩(wěn)健性三者之間關(guān)系的探討方面,國外學(xué)者對不同法源下不同國家股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)(包括終極股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu))與會計穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系進行了國際比較,但是,未就特定國家投資者保護水平的時期差異和區(qū)域差異對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響進行研究,也未考察投資者保護是否以及如何影響終極控制股東與會計穩(wěn)健性之間的關(guān)系。國內(nèi)關(guān)于終極控制股東、投資者保護與會計穩(wěn)健性關(guān)系的研究存在許多不足,如內(nèi)容不全面,方法較單一等。第二,文章對中國上市公司會計制度、公司治理特征、資本市場發(fā)展?fàn)顩r、投資者法律保護等制度背景進行分析,為解釋中國上市公司投資者保護、終極控制股東與會計穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系提供現(xiàn)實背景和理論依據(jù)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),中國的會計穩(wěn)健性原則是在中國計劃經(jīng)濟向市場經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)化的過程中從國外引入,在中國會計與國際會計接軌和趨同的過程中得到加強。中國獨特的制度背景以及由此導(dǎo)致的會計與證券監(jiān)管是中國會計穩(wěn)健性得以強化的外在制度原因。雖然中國投資者保護措施不斷完善,但是,投資者保護水平總體較低。這些制度背景決定了中國上市公司終極控制股東、投資者保護與會計穩(wěn)健性之間的關(guān)系具有自身特征。第三,理論分析了終極控制股東、投資者保護與會計穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系,并提出研究假設(shè)。金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)能夠在保證權(quán)力不被稀釋的情況下通過金字塔層級的杠桿作用放大終極控制股東的控制權(quán),實現(xiàn)以較小的現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)控制數(shù)倍價值的公司,從而增加了終極控制股東的掠奪動機與能力。為了逃避其掠奪行為的法律制裁和社會監(jiān)督,控制股東通過操縱財務(wù)報告過程和信息披露政策掩蓋其機會主義行為。因此,金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)及受其影響的終極控制股東股權(quán)特征(包括金字塔層級、現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)、兩權(quán)偏離度、派出董事等)影響上市公司會計穩(wěn)健性水平。投資者保護影響股權(quán)集中度,是抑制控制股東掠奪行為的重要機制,也是解決會計信息質(zhì)量問題的重要措施。第四,應(yīng)用會計穩(wěn)健性度量模型檢驗終極控制股東特征(包括金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、金字塔層級、現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)、兩權(quán)偏離度、派出董事等)、投資者保護(包括投資者保護時期差異和區(qū)域差異)及二者的相互作用對中國上市公司會計穩(wěn)健性水平的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),西方國家會計穩(wěn)健性的影響因素對會計穩(wěn)健性的作用機理不能完全解釋中國會計穩(wěn)健性狀況,中國制度層面貫徹會計穩(wěn)健性原則對上市公司會計穩(wěn)健性影響較大；擁有金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的公司比不具有金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的公司的會計穩(wěn)健性水平更低。終極控制股東的金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)安排加劇了終極控制股東與外部投資者之間的代理矛盾；金字塔層級與會計穩(wěn)健性負相關(guān),即金字塔層級越多的公司會計穩(wěn)健性越低。這些公司的終極控制股東可能成為及時披露會計信息的阻滯力量；終極控制股東現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)對會計穩(wěn)健性產(chǎn)生負面影響,這一影響主要通過延遲確認損失產(chǎn)生；終極控制股東兩權(quán)偏離度越大的公司會計穩(wěn)健性越低；國有終極控制和非國有終極控制兩類公司在會計穩(wěn)健性方面差異較大,例如,與國有終極控制公司相比,非國有終極控制公司金字塔層級對會計穩(wěn)健性的負面影響更大；國有終極控制股東兩權(quán)偏離度越大的公司會計越不穩(wěn)��；在現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)方面,與非國有終極控制公司相比,國有終極控制股東持有現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)越大的公司延遲確認了好消息和壞消息；終極控制股東派出董事能夠在不增加持股的情況下加大對董事會的控制。終極控制股東派出董事代表控制股東利益,派出董事越多,代表債權(quán)人、職工等其他公司主體的利益越少；非國有終極控制股東派出董事的政府背景降低了會計穩(wěn)健性。政府背景是有價值的資源,帶給公司融資便利、稅收優(yōu)惠、降低政府管制等明顯的政策好處,從而降低了公司運營管理對穩(wěn)健會計信息的市場需求；投資者保護在一定程度上提高了會計穩(wěn)健性；東部地區(qū)相對更高的投資者保護水平促進了該地區(qū)會計穩(wěn)健性的提高；但是,中國投資者保護對會計穩(wěn)健性的促進作用尚未得到充分發(fā)揮；隨著投資者保護水平的提高,沒有充分的證據(jù)表明投資者保護降低了金字塔層級、終極控制股東現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)、兩權(quán)偏離度,以及終極控制股東派出董事與會計穩(wěn)健性之間的負相關(guān)關(guān)系。研究結(jié)論肯定了委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論和投資者保護理論等對會計穩(wěn)健性影響因素及作用方向的解釋。第五,根據(jù)結(jié)論為提高中國上市公司會計信息質(zhì)量、降低信息不對稱、緩解委托代理矛盾、保護投資者利益、優(yōu)化資本市場資源配置提供政策性建議。
[Abstract]:Accounting information is an important source of information. One of the important characteristics of high quality accounting information is the accounting conservatism, accounting earnings has confirmed the good news shows higher requirements than confirmed the bad news, resulting in accounting earnings reflect bad news than good news. More timely accounting recognition of good and bad news is the asymmetric timeliness known as accounting conservatism. Accounting conservatism plays an important role in corporate governance. Because the conservative accounting information can be timely to the shareholders, creditors and other signals, alleviate the information asymmetry, help to reduce financing costs, improve financing efficiency, alleviate the problem of excessive investment and insufficient investment, so as to better protect the legitimate interests of investors.21 century. Enron, WorldCom and other major outbreak of financial fraud, and the decline in global stock markets caused by the theory and practice of accounting information quality The degree of attention. Accounting conservatism becomes scholars, investors, analysts, regulators and other key issues of financial media attention. At present, Chinese in economic transition period, there are special institutional background, for example, equity concentration, investor protection level is not high, the manager market is not perfect, takeover market mechanism is weak. The contradiction between the ultimate controlling shareholder agency and outside investors become the main contradiction China listed companies. In Chinese specific system background, how the ultimate controlling shareholder influence accounting conservatism? Whether investor protection improves the company's disclosure of accounting information conservatism? Affect the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting conservatism whether and how to protect investors? These problems are the theory and the practice of the China development of capital market and corporate governance to be solved, as well as more research on Accounting Conservatism The point of view of the reality. The related literature, there are domestic scholars to study the China listed companies accounting conservatism problem in: the lack of a comprehensive analysis of the ultimate controlling shareholder theory and empirical how to influence accounting conservatism as Pyramid ownership structure, Pyramid level, the ultimate controlling shareholders sent board seats and the characteristics of influence on Accounting Conservatism further investigation; the lack of research on investor protection difference how to influence the accounting conservatism, such as differences in the level of investor protection period, regional differences; explore how interactions lack of investor protection and the ultimate controlling shareholder influence accounting conservatism; the lack of research on the background of accounting conservatism of listed companies Chinese system deeply. Therefore, the shareholders study on the influence of ultimate control, investor protection and the interaction of the two on Accounting Conservatism Chinese. In the special institutional background, carry out the ultimate controlling shareholder, has important significance to study the relationship between investor protection and accounting conservatism, mainly reflected in: first, the predatory behavior and information manipulation behavior analysis of ultimate controlling shareholder, and reveal mechanism of ultimate controlling shareholder in the accounting conservatism, helps to enhance the efficiency of the contract and investors to make reasonable investment decisions, reduce information and agency problems; second, to reveal the mechanism of investor protection in the accounting conservatism, seek to improve institutional factors of accounting conservatism, help to improve the listed companies and the securities market transparency, reduce the information disclosure of the main moral hazard and the opportunism behavior, promote improvement of corporate governance, promote the healthy development of the securities market; third, the analysis of ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting firm Whether the relationship between health and how to change with the change of investor protection, including to improve the accounting conservatism, the way the quality of accounting information or methods to improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies China and transparency, reduce information asymmetry, to provide empirical evidence and policy suggestions of optimizing the allocation of capital market resources. The main content of the article in five first, the article on the investor protection, literature review three aspects of the ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting conservatism. Through literature review found that the ultimate controlling shareholder, domestic and foreign scholars mainly from the ultimate controlling shareholder distribution, earnings management, corporate value, accounting information of in-depth research, as the ultimate control the shareholder on earnings management, the value of the company, provide accounting information such as a number of empirical evidence. In the protection of investors. Face, domestic and foreign scholars mainly study the protection of investors on the capital structure, corporate value, financing costs, and the influence of accounting information. In the aspect of accounting conservatism, measure of domestic and foreign scholars focus on the accounting conservatism, the existence of accounting conservatism, influencing factors and accounting conservatism. The study found that in the ultimate control the shareholders, to explore the relationship between investor protection and accounting conservatism of the three, foreign scholars of different countries under different legal ownership structure (including the ultimate ownership structure and accounting conservatism) relationship of the international comparison, however, no effect of the differences and regional differences in country specific investor protection level during the period of accounting conservatism. Also did not investigate whether and how investor protection affects the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting conservatism. The ultimate control Study on shareholders, investor protection and accounting conservatism has many deficiencies, such as the content is not comprehensive, the method is simple. Second, the China listed company accounting system, corporate governance, capital market development condition, investor legal protection system background analysis, in order to explain the investor protection China listed, to provide realistic background and according to the relationship between the theory of ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting conservatism. The study found that accounting conservatism principle is introduced into Chinese from abroad in the process of transforming Chinese planned economy to market economy, to be strengthened in the process of China accounting and international accounting standards and convergence. China unique institutional background and the resulting accounting and securities supervision is China accounting conservatism to external institutional reasons. Although China strengthen investor protection measures continue to improve, however, investors The level of protection is low. The system background determines the ultimate controlling shareholder of listed companies Chinese, the relationship between investor protection and accounting conservatism has its own characteristics. Third, the theoretical analysis of the ultimate controlling shareholder, the relationship between investor protection and accounting conservatism, and put forward the research hypothesis. The Pyramid ownership structure can guarantee the control of leverage through Pyramid power level is not diluted under the condition of amplification of the ultimate controlling shareholders, with the minimum cash flow rights control several times the value of the company, thus increasing the ultimate controlling shareholder plunder motivation and ability. In order to escape the legal sanction and social supervision of piracy, controlling shareholders by manipulating the financial reporting process and information disclosure policy conceal their opportunism behavior. Therefore, the ultimate controlling shareholder equity ownership structure and the characteristics of Pyramid affected by the packet ( The Pyramid level, cash flow rights, two right deviation, sent to the directors etc.) affect the accounting conservatism of listed companies. The level of investor protection affects ownership is an important mechanism for controlling shareholders, suppression of piracy, but also an important measure to solve the quality problem of accounting information. Fourth, application of accounting conservatism measurement of ultimate control shareholders inspection model (including Pyramid Pyramid level, ownership structure, cash flow rights, two right deviation, sent to the directors etc.), investor protection (including the differences and regional differences of investor protection period) influence the level of accounting conservatism and the interaction between the two of China listed companies. The study found that the factors can affect accounting conservatism in western countries to fully explain the accounting conservatism China accounting conservatism, the system level Chinese implementation of accounting conservatism of listed companies Accounting conservatism has a greater impact; Pyramid equity structure of the company to lower the level of accounting conservatism than Pyramid does not have the ownership structure of the company. The Pyramid equity structure the ultimate controlling shareholder arrangement intensifies the agency conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholder and external investors; negative correlation between the Pyramid level and accounting conservatism, namely Pyramid level more companies lower accounting conservatism the ultimate controlling shareholders. These companies may be blocking force of timely disclosure of accounting information; the ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow right have a negative impact on accounting conservatism, this effect mainly through delayed loss; the ultimate controlling shareholder of two right deviation degree is the larger the company Accounting Conservatism is lower; for example, state-owned and non state-owned ultimate control the ultimate control of two larger companies, differences in accounting conservatism, and the ultimate control of state-owned We compared the negative impact of non-state companies in Pyramid the level of accounting conservatism more state-owned shareholders; the ultimate control of two right deviation degree more corporate accounting is not stable; in the cash flow rights, compared with non-state companies, state-owned ultimate controlling shareholder holding cash flow rights greater delay confirm the good news and bad news; the ultimate controlling shareholder can increase the directors appointed control board. Under the condition of not increasing ownership of ultimate controlling shareholder on behalf of directors appointed shareholders, directors appointed more representative of creditors, employees and other corporate interests less; non state-owned ultimate controlling shareholder directors appointed by the the background of the government to reduce the accounting conservatism. The background is a valuable resource, to bring the company financing convenience, preferential tax, reduce government regulation obvious political Good policy, so as to reduce the company's operational management of robust accounting information market; investor protection in a certain extent improve the accounting conservatism; investor protection level of the eastern region is relatively higher promoted accounting conservatism in the region increased; however, China promotes the protection of investors for accounting conservatism has not been brought into full play; along with raising the level of investor protection, there is no evidence to show that investor protection reduces the level of Pyramid, the ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow right, two right deviation degree, the negative relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders and directors appointed and accounting conservatism. The conclusion of the study confirmed the principal-agent theory to explain the influencing factors and the role of accounting conservatism direction the asymmetric information theory and the theory of investor protection. Fifth, according to the conclusion in order to improve the China listed company The policy recommendations are provided for the quality of information, reducing information asymmetry, alleviating principal and agency contradictions, protecting the interests of investors, and optimizing the allocation of resources in the capital market.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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