本文關(guān)鍵詞： 機(jī)構(gòu)持股比例變動(dòng) 獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 非獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 公司績(jī)效　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái)，在“超常規(guī)”發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的政策下，，我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)展迅速，在資本市場(chǎng)中日漸占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位。由于不同類型的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在資金來(lái)源、業(yè)務(wù)關(guān)系、行政干預(yù)、所受法律法規(guī)的限制等方面都存在差異，這些差異將直接影響其監(jiān)督公司治理的積極性及目標(biāo)函數(shù)，從而導(dǎo)致不同類型的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)公司績(jī)效產(chǎn)生不同的影響。所以從異質(zhì)性的角度去研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響，就顯得尤為必要。這有助于加深我們對(duì)異質(zhì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的認(rèn)識(shí)，對(duì)監(jiān)管部門制定相關(guān)的政策和措施具有很好的參考價(jià)值。 一般來(lái)說(shuō)，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股后會(huì)通過(guò)參與公司治理提高公司治理水平，而公司治理水平的提升則表現(xiàn)為公司績(jī)效的改善。而不同機(jī)構(gòu)投資者之間存在異質(zhì)性，導(dǎo)致不同機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響也存在差異。因此本文就根據(jù)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的資金性質(zhì)、行政干預(yù)和業(yè)務(wù)聯(lián)系三個(gè)方面的差異將我國(guó)的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者分為獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和非獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者。獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的資金主要來(lái)源于散戶投資者，偏向于私有性，較少受政府的干預(yù)，同時(shí)與被投資公司一般都只存在股票投資的關(guān)系，僅僅作為上市公司的股東獲取投資收益，因此為了保障投資收益的最大化，其會(huì)積極參與公司的治理，提高公司的績(jī)效。而在非獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者中，一部分非獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)由于資金的公有性質(zhì)或者與地方政府的密切關(guān)系使其較容易受政府的行政干預(yù)；另一部分非獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)則由于與被投資公司存在業(yè)務(wù)聯(lián)系，不能對(duì)公司內(nèi)部人實(shí)施有效的監(jiān)督，這些就會(huì)削弱其參與公司治理的動(dòng)力，不利于公司績(jī)效的提高�；诖耍疚木吞岢鲅芯考僭O(shè)，收集整理數(shù)據(jù)，以公司績(jī)效為被解釋變量，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例變動(dòng)為解釋變量，實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)異質(zhì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股對(duì)上市公司績(jī)效的不同影響。 通過(guò)回歸分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：整體機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例變動(dòng)與公司績(jī)效顯著正相關(guān)；獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例變動(dòng)與公司績(jī)效在1%水平上顯著正相關(guān)；而非獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例變動(dòng)與公司績(jī)效不存在顯著相關(guān)性。這就說(shuō)明了整體機(jī)構(gòu)投資者積極作用的發(fā)揮主要得益于獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的存在，獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在持有公司股票后，會(huì)積極參與公司的治理，改善公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)，提高公司績(jī)效；而非獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)投資者由于持股規(guī)模和利益沖突的影響，難以發(fā)揮股東的積極主義，因此改善公司績(jī)效的作用不突出。
[Abstract]:In recent years, under the policy of "supernormal" development of institutional investors, institutional investors in China have developed rapidly and occupied a dominant position in the capital market day by day. Due to different types of institutional investors in the source of funds, business relations, administrative intervention, There are differences in the restrictions of laws and regulations, which will directly affect their enthusiasm and objective function in supervising corporate governance. As a result, different types of institutional investors have different effects on corporate performance. Therefore, from the perspective of heterogeneity to study the impact of institutional investors on corporate performance, This will help us to deepen our understanding of heterogeneous institutional investors and have a good reference value for regulators to formulate relevant policies and measures. Generally speaking, institutional investors can improve the level of corporate governance by participating in corporate governance, and the improvement of corporate governance is the improvement of corporate performance, and there is heterogeneity among different institutional investors. Therefore, according to the nature of the funds of the institutional investors, there are differences in the impact of different institutional investors on corporate performance. The differences of administrative intervention and business connection divide the institutional investors into independent institutional investors and non-independent institutional investors. The funds of independent institutional investors mainly come from retail investors and tend to be private. Less intervention by the government, at the same time with the invested companies generally only have stock investment relationship, only as shareholders of listed companies to obtain investment income, so in order to ensure the maximization of investment returns, they will actively participate in the governance of the company. Improving the performance of the company. Among the non-independent institutional investors, some of the non-independent institutions are more vulnerable to the administrative intervention of the government because of the public nature of the funds or their close relationship with the local government; The other part of the non-independent organizations, because of their business relationship with the invested company, can not carry out effective supervision over the company's insiders, which will weaken their motivation to participate in corporate governance and will not be conducive to the improvement of the company's performance. This paper puts forward research hypotheses, collects and collates the data, takes corporate performance as explained variable and institutional investor's shareholding ratio as explanatory variable, and empirically tests the different effects of heterogeneous institutional investor's shareholding on listed company's performance. Through regression analysis, it is found that the change of overall institutional investor's shareholding ratio is significantly positively correlated with corporate performance, while the change of independent institutional investor's shareholding ratio is significantly positively correlated with corporate performance at the level of 1%. However, there is no significant correlation between the change of non-independent institutional investors' shareholding ratio and corporate performance, which indicates that the positive role of the overall institutional investors is mainly due to the existence of independent institutional investors. Independent institutional investors will actively participate in the corporate governance, improve the corporate governance structure and improve corporate performance after holding company shares, while non-independent institutional investors will participate in corporate governance because of the impact of ownership size and conflicts of interest. It is difficult to give full play to shareholder activism, so the role of improving company performance is not prominent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.48

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