本文關(guān)鍵詞：定向增發(fā)、大股東控制與盈余管理　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：盈余管理一直是會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)術(shù)界常說常新的話題,股權(quán)再融資前的盈余管理是盈余管理研究的重要內(nèi)容,以往的研究表明,上市公司在公開股權(quán)再融資前為了達(dá)到再融資資格要求或者影響股價(jià)會(huì)進(jìn)行盈余管理。2006年以來,定向增發(fā)憑借其自身優(yōu)勢(shì)超越配股、公開增發(fā)等公開股權(quán)再融資方式成為上市公司股權(quán)再融資時(shí)的首選。上市公司是否會(huì)在定向增發(fā)前進(jìn)行盈余管理呢?本文對(duì)大股東控制下上市公司定向增發(fā)前的盈余管理進(jìn)行研究,揭示大股東控制對(duì)盈余管理的影響,并將真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理加入研究范圍,研究上市公司定向增發(fā)前應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理和真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的選擇偏好。 一方面,定向增發(fā)與大股東利益息息相關(guān),另一方面,我國(guó)“一股獨(dú)大”的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)使大股東在上市公司決策中“一言堂”現(xiàn)象嚴(yán)重,這就使定向增發(fā)時(shí)大股東有動(dòng)機(jī)通過盈余管理活動(dòng)侵占中小股東利益。實(shí)踐中定向增發(fā)的發(fā)行對(duì)象一般包括公司股東(包括大股東)和國(guó)內(nèi)外機(jī)構(gòu)投資者,面對(duì)不同的發(fā)行對(duì)象,上市公司可能在大股東控制下進(jìn)行不同方向的盈余管理：當(dāng)上市公司僅向大股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方進(jìn)行定向增發(fā)收購(gòu)其資產(chǎn)時(shí),支付方式多為資產(chǎn)認(rèn)購(gòu),此時(shí)上市公司有動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行向下盈余管理,因?yàn)楦偷挠鄮砉蓛r(jià)下跌,大股東可以用同樣的資產(chǎn)換取更多股份；當(dāng)上市公司僅向機(jī)構(gòu)投資者進(jìn)行定向增發(fā)募集資金時(shí),支付方式為現(xiàn)金認(rèn)購(gòu),此時(shí)上市公司有動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行向上盈余管理,因?yàn)楦每吹墓緲I(yè)績(jī)有助于提高公司股價(jià),使公司募集到更多資金,使大股東獲得更多財(cái)富增加值。同時(shí),大股東持股比例的高低與其從盈余管理活動(dòng)中獲取利益的能力和大小密切相關(guān),因此大股東持股比例很可能對(duì)盈余管理程度產(chǎn)生影響。 盈余管理有應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目和真實(shí)活動(dòng)兩種方式,國(guó)外研究發(fā)現(xiàn)由于應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理更容易被監(jiān)管方和會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所識(shí)別,故上市公司會(huì)選擇真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理作為其替代方式,然而我國(guó)審計(jì)質(zhì)量與發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家相比還有一定距離,加之監(jiān)管環(huán)境較為薄弱,因此應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目和真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的成本都不高,且均可獲得巨大收益,這就導(dǎo)致上市公司可能同時(shí)采用兩種方式以達(dá)到最佳效果,即兩者之間可能存在同高同低互相聯(lián)動(dòng)的關(guān)系。 基于以上分析,本文的研究?jī)?nèi)容如下： 第一章緒論。本章首先介紹本文的研究背景,指出在此背景下的研究目的所在,然后明確研究方法,并建立論文結(jié)構(gòu)和研究框架,最后從理論和實(shí)踐兩方面介紹本文的研究貢獻(xiàn)。 第二章文獻(xiàn)綜述。本章分別從股權(quán)再融資與應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理、大股東控制與應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理,以及真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理三個(gè)方面對(duì)相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行梳理和分析,厘清以往學(xué)者相關(guān)研究的成果與方法,為本文提供一定的文獻(xiàn)基礎(chǔ)。 第三章定向增發(fā)、大股東控制與盈余管理的制度背景與理論基礎(chǔ)。本章首先回顧了我國(guó)定向增發(fā)制度的歷史沿革,并介紹定向增發(fā)的相關(guān)規(guī)定。然后從委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論和會(huì)計(jì)盈余的決策有用性理論三個(gè)方面尋找本研究的理論基礎(chǔ)。 第四章定向增發(fā)、大股東控制與盈余管理的研究設(shè)計(jì)。本章通過理論分析和合理推導(dǎo)提出三個(gè)假設(shè),并選取2006年至2011年進(jìn)行定向增發(fā)的331家A股上市公司作為研究對(duì)象,然后分別確定應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目和真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理程度的衡量方式,并建立研究模型。 第五章定向增發(fā)、大股東控制與盈余管理的實(shí)證結(jié)果及分析。本章共分為三個(gè)部分：上市公司定向增發(fā)前盈余管理的時(shí)間序列分布；定向增發(fā)、大股東控制與盈余管理的多元回歸檢驗(yàn)：應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目和真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的單變量相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)。通過檢驗(yàn),本文所提出的三個(gè)假設(shè)均得到證實(shí)。 第六章結(jié)論與啟示。本章首先根據(jù)第五章的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果總結(jié)出研究結(jié)論,然后分別從加強(qiáng)外部監(jiān)管、完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和提高對(duì)真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的重視程度等三個(gè)方面提出針對(duì)性建議,最后總結(jié)本研究的不足之處并對(duì)未來研究方向進(jìn)行展望。 本文的主要研究結(jié)論有以下四個(gè)： 第一,上市公司在定向增發(fā)前一年及增發(fā)當(dāng)年會(huì)進(jìn)行應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目和真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理活動(dòng),且這種活動(dòng)在定向增發(fā)前一年最明顯。 第二,上市公司定向增發(fā)前盈余管理的方向與發(fā)行對(duì)象有關(guān)。當(dāng)發(fā)行對(duì)象為大股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方(大股東型),上市公司通過定向增發(fā)收購(gòu)大股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方的資產(chǎn)時(shí),進(jìn)行向下的應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目和真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理；當(dāng)發(fā)行對(duì)象為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者(機(jī)構(gòu)投資者型),上市公司通過定向增發(fā)募集資金時(shí),進(jìn)行向上的應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目和真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理。這一結(jié)果表明上市公司在定向增發(fā)前通過盈余管理方向的選擇向大股東進(jìn)行“利益輸送”。 第三,在大股東型和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者型定向增發(fā)前,上市公司大股東持股比例對(duì)盈余管理程度有顯著的正向影響,即大股東持股比例越高,通過應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目(真實(shí)活動(dòng))進(jìn)行盈余管理的程度越高。這一結(jié)果表明定向增發(fā)前存在大股東對(duì)中小股東的利益侵占現(xiàn)象。 第四,定向增發(fā)前上市公司的盈余管理活動(dòng)既有應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目方式又有真實(shí)活動(dòng)方式,且兩種方式之間是一種同高同低的正向聯(lián)動(dòng)關(guān)系,即應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理程度越高,真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理程度越高。 本研究的貢獻(xiàn)主要有以下三個(gè)： (1)本文將真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理、如何管理、真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理與應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理的關(guān)系加入研究中,豐富了國(guó)內(nèi)關(guān)于真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的研究,也有助于提高對(duì)真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的重視程度。 (2)本文提出定向增發(fā)前大股東侵占中小股東利益的證據(jù),從更深層次上揭示了我國(guó)上市公司定向增發(fā)前盈余管理行為的動(dòng)機(jī)。 (3)本文從大股東控制的角度研究上市公司定向增發(fā)前的盈余管理行為,對(duì)于強(qiáng)化外部監(jiān)督管理、完善內(nèi)部公司治理等具有一定的啟示意義。 本研究的不足之處主要有以下兩個(gè) (1)本文僅研究了銷售、費(fèi)用和生產(chǎn)操控這三種真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理方式,除此之外,上市公司還會(huì)通過資產(chǎn)銷售、關(guān)聯(lián)交易等方式進(jìn)行真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理,本文未將這部分方式包括在內(nèi)。 (2)本文僅針對(duì)大股東型(發(fā)行對(duì)象為大股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方)和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者型(發(fā)行對(duì)象為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者)定向增發(fā)前的盈余管理進(jìn)行研究并得出相關(guān)結(jié)論,而對(duì)于混合型(發(fā)行對(duì)象既包括大股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方又包括機(jī)構(gòu)投資者)定向增發(fā)前的盈余管理并未得出有效結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:Earnings management has always been a new topic in accounting academic circles . Earnings management before equity refinancing is an important part of earnings management research . In 2006 , it is the first choice for listed companies to make a surplus management in order to meet the requirement of refinancing or affect stock price . On the one hand , it is closely related to the interests of big shareholders . On the other hand , the equity structure of " one big shareholder " in our country makes the big shareholders " one word hall " in decision - making of listed companies . When the listed company sells its assets to the large shareholder and its affiliated party , the company may pay more shares ; when the listed company only sells the funds to the big shareholder and its affiliated party , the listed company may take the same assets for more shares . At the same time , the company ' s performance will help to raise the stock price of the company , so that the large shareholder can obtain more wealth . At the same time , the proportion of the holding proportion of the big shareholder is closely related to the ability and the size of the benefit from the earnings management activity . There are two ways to manage the surplus management , and the foreign research finds that due to the fact that the surplus management of the accrual project is easier to be recognized by the regulator and the accounting firm , the listed company will choose the real activity earnings management as its alternative , but the audit quality of our country is relatively weak compared with the developed countries . Therefore , the cost of the project and the real activity surplus management is not high , and the listed company can achieve the best effect at the same time , that is , there may be the relationship between the same high and low linkage . Based on the above analysis , the research contents are as follows : The first chapter introduces the background of the research , points out the research aim in this background , then makes clear the research method , establishes the structure of the paper and the research framework , and finally introduces the research contribution from the two aspects of theory and practice . In chapter 2 , this chapter summarizes and analyzes the relevant literatures from three aspects of equity refinancing and accrual project earnings management , big shareholder control and accrual project earnings management , and real activity earnings management . The third chapter introduces the historical evolution of China ' s oriented growth and distribution system , and introduces the relevant regulations of directional augmentation . Then it looks for the theoretical basis of the research from three aspects : the theory of principal agent , the theory of information asymmetry and the decision - making utility theory of accounting earnings . In chapter 4 , the research and design of directional increase , big shareholder control and surplus management are put forward . Three assumptions are put forward through theoretical analysis and reasonable derivation , and 331 A - share listed companies are selected as the research objects from 2006 to 2011 , then the measures to measure the degree of earnings management of accrual projects and real activities are respectively determined , and the research model is established . Chapter V is divided into three parts : the distribution of the time series of surplus management in the direction of the listed company , the multiple regression test of the control of the large shareholder and the surplus management , and the single variable correlation test of the accrual project and the real activity surplus management . The three assumptions proposed in this paper are confirmed . The sixth chapter summarizes the conclusions of the study according to the empirical test results of Chapter V , then puts forward some suggestions on strengthening external supervision , improving corporate governance structure and improving the importance of real - activity earnings management , and finally summarizes the shortcomings of this study and looks forward to the future research direction . The main conclusions of this paper are as follows : First , listed companies will conduct accrual projects and real - activity earnings management activities one year before and during the year , and this activity will be the most obvious one year before the orientation increase . Second , the direction of surplus management of listed company is related to the issue object . When the issue object is big shareholder and its related party ( big shareholder type ) , the listed company carries out downward accrual project and real activity surplus management when the listed company acquires the assets of the big shareholder and its related party through the directional increase . This results show that the listed company carries out " interest delivery " to the big shareholder through the choice of surplus management direction before the targeted increase . Thirdly , the proportion of large shareholders of listed companies has a significant positive influence on earnings management before large shareholder type and institutional investor - oriented increase . The higher the proportion of large shareholders , the higher the surplus management is carried out through the accrual project ( real activity ) . The results show that there is a large shareholder ' s invasion of minority shareholders before the targeted increase . Fourthly , the surplus management activities of the listed companies before and after the orientation increase have both the corresponding project way and the real activity way , and there is a positive linkage relationship with the same height and low , that is , the higher the surplus management degree of the accrual project , the higher the real activity surplus management degree . The contribution of this study is mainly as follows : ( 1 ) In this paper , the relationship between real - activity earnings management , how to manage , real - activity earnings management and surplus management of accrual projects is added into the study , which enriches domestic research on real - activity earnings management , and also helps to improve the attention to real - activity earnings management . ( 2 ) In this paper , we put forward the evidence of the shareholder ' s encroachment on the interests of small and medium - sized shareholders , and reveal the motive of the earnings management behavior of listed companies in our country from a deeper level . ( 3 ) This paper studies the earnings management behavior of listed companies from the perspective of big shareholder control , and has some implications for strengthening external supervision and administration and improving internal corporate governance . The deficiencies of this study are as follows : ( 1 ) In addition , listed companies will carry out real - activity earnings management by means of asset sales and related transactions , and this part is not included in this paper . ( 2 ) In this paper , the earnings management before and after the orientation of the large shareholder type ( big shareholder and related party ) and institutional investor type ( the issuer is institutional investor ) is studied and the relevant conclusion is drawn , and the surplus management before the direct increase of the mixed type ( including both the big shareholder and its affiliated parties and institutional investors ) is not reached .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F276.6;F832.51

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