本文關(guān)鍵詞：債轉(zhuǎn)股治理效應(yīng)的問題研究　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：國有企業(yè)和金融改革長期是我國經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型過程中的核心問題。20世紀(jì)80年代初以來，以“放權(quán)讓利”為主旋律的國有企業(yè)改革已將絕大多數(shù)的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營決策權(quán)從政府轉(zhuǎn)移至企業(yè)，并推動(dòng)我國經(jīng)濟(jì)快速發(fā)展，，但1998年金融危機(jī)中國有企業(yè)大面積虧損和銀行信貸巨額不良資產(chǎn)推動(dòng)政府實(shí)施了以債轉(zhuǎn)股為代表的國有企業(yè)改革和銀行不良資產(chǎn)處置政策。1999年國務(wù)院公布《關(guān)于實(shí)施債權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)股權(quán)的若干意見方案》，并推薦601戶債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)，建議金額達(dá)4596億元。債轉(zhuǎn)股作為我國國有企業(yè)改制的重大配套措施，其對(duì)信貸資源配置和國有企業(yè)公司治理的效應(yīng)受到政府各部門和金融機(jī)構(gòu)的極大關(guān)注。本文以1999-2008年中國滬深A(yù)股上市公司為觀察樣本，從理論和經(jīng)驗(yàn)上系統(tǒng)研究債轉(zhuǎn)股對(duì)公司治理的效應(yīng)，全文共分為六章，主要內(nèi)容如下： 本文首先概述了與公司治理相關(guān)的代理理論、投資理論、融資理論和激勵(lì)理論等，為后文分析債轉(zhuǎn)股問題提供理論基礎(chǔ)和分析思路；然后基于投資效率、融資結(jié)構(gòu)和高管激勵(lì)三個(gè)方面具體分析和檢驗(yàn)了債轉(zhuǎn)股的公司治理效應(yīng)，既為債轉(zhuǎn)股對(duì)公司治理和信貸配置的影響提供了經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)，也為債轉(zhuǎn)股是如何影響公司治理的路徑提供了證據(jù)；最后則以公司價(jià)值（財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)和市場(chǎng)指標(biāo)）這一綜合指標(biāo)來檢驗(yàn)了債轉(zhuǎn)股影響公司治理的綜合結(jié)果，同時(shí)也檢驗(yàn)債轉(zhuǎn)股影響公司價(jià)值的途徑。 通過研究，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)：（1）債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)過度投資和投資不足的程度均要低于非債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)，即債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)的投資效率要高于非債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)。結(jié)果表明，債轉(zhuǎn)股有利于緩和股東-債權(quán)人之間的利益沖突，從而提高投資行為的理性決策；（2）債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)更多依賴銀行債務(wù)融資，且債務(wù)融資與投資效率的敏感度高于非債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)；同時(shí)，債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)債務(wù)融資對(duì)投資效率的約束作用大于非債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)。結(jié)果表明，雖然債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)獲得了更多的債務(wù)融資，包括在中央銀行緊縮型貨幣政策時(shí)，但并不表明銀行股東對(duì)債轉(zhuǎn)股公司的貸款是預(yù)算軟約束的表現(xiàn)，相反，債轉(zhuǎn)股公司的債務(wù)融資在約束非效率投資行為方面體現(xiàn)了更高的約束作用，即債轉(zhuǎn)股改善了債務(wù)融資與投資行為之間的關(guān)系；（3）相對(duì)于非債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)來說，債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)的高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感性較高，而且，債權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)股權(quán)后，公司高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感性也得到了提高；（4）債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)的盈利能力得到了提高，市場(chǎng)投資者也獲得了較高的投資回報(bào)。研究結(jié)果表明，由于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的改善和代理成本的降低，相比于非債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)，債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)的投資效率和債務(wù)融資與投資效率的敏感度較高，且債務(wù)融資對(duì)公司投資效率的影響較大；同時(shí)債轉(zhuǎn)股提高了公司高管的薪酬業(yè)績敏感度，改善了盈利能力和投資者的市場(chǎng)回報(bào)，提高了企業(yè)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造能力。綜合概而言之，由于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的改善和代理成本的降低，相比于非債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)，債轉(zhuǎn)股企業(yè)的投資效率和債務(wù)融資與投資效率的敏感度較高，且債務(wù)融資對(duì)投資效率的影響較大；同時(shí)債轉(zhuǎn)股提高了公司高管的薪酬業(yè)績敏感度，改善了盈利能力和投資者的市場(chǎng)回報(bào)率，提高了企業(yè)價(jià)值。 本文是基于中國國有企業(yè)改制背景的一項(xiàng)關(guān)于上市公司債轉(zhuǎn)股的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的實(shí)證研究，彌補(bǔ)了債轉(zhuǎn)股改革的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)文獻(xiàn)，深入挖掘了債轉(zhuǎn)股對(duì)公司價(jià)值變化的具體驅(qū)動(dòng)因素，同時(shí)也在一定程度上可為我國商業(yè)銀行的混業(yè)經(jīng)營之改革提供初步的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。上述研究發(fā)現(xiàn)具有如下啟示作用：（1）銀行直接持有企業(yè)股權(quán)作為一種與企業(yè)形成長期交易穩(wěn)定型的銀企關(guān)系的重要方式，可以為銀行信貸決策所需信息的生產(chǎn)和利用提供較為持續(xù)便捷的渠道，有利于提高信貸配置與公司行為的敏感性；（2）銀行直接持有企業(yè)股權(quán)可以為債權(quán)人對(duì)公司治理的相機(jī)治理作用提供更有效的保障。大股東控制、內(nèi)部人控制等是我國公司治理的重要問題，若銀行持股，則既有助于改變債權(quán)人無權(quán)的狀況，又可以平衡公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)較為單一的問題。
[Abstract]:The state-owned enterprises and long-term financial reform is a key problem in the process of China's economic transformation in the.20 century since the beginning of 80s, the reform of state-owned enterprises in the "decentralization" as the theme of the vast majority of the decision-making power in production and operation transfer from the government to enterprises, and promote China's rapid economic development, but the financial crisis has pushed China 1998 the government has implemented the.1999 reform of state-owned enterprises and the bank non-performing assets disposal policy in debt on behalf of the State Council issued "on the implementation of the opinions of the debt to equity scheme > enterprises large losses and huge non-performing assets of bank credit, and recommend the 601 debt to equity swap enterprises, that amounted to 459 billion 600 million yuan. The major supporting measures as debt China's state-owned enterprise restructuring, the allocation of credit resources and the effect of corporate governance of state-owned enterprises has attracted great attention of various departments and financial institutions of the government. Taking Chinese Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A share as an observation sample, this paper systematically studies the effect of debt to equity swap on corporate governance from 1999-2008 aspects of theory and experience. The full text is divided into six chapters.
This paper outlines the agency theory and corporate governance, investment related theory, financing theory and incentive theory, provide theoretical basis and analysis method for the analysis of debt problems; then based on the efficiency of investment, the three aspects of concrete analysis and test the corporate governance effect of debt financing structure and executives incentive, provides experience evidence both for corporate governance and debt to influence credit allocation, but also for the debt is to provide evidence of the influence path of corporate governance; finally, the value of the company (financial index and market index) a comprehensive index to test the comprehensive results of debt the impact of corporate governance and inspection ways of debt effect of the value of the company.
Through the research, this paper found that: (1) swap enterprise excessive investment and insufficient investment levels are lower than that of non debt enterprises, the investment efficiency is higher than that of debt to equity swap enterprises. The results show that the debt to equity swap between shareholders and creditors to ease the conflict of interest, so as to improve the rational investment decision behavior; (2) the debt equity swap enterprises rely more on bank debt financing, and debt financing and investment efficiency of the sensitivity is higher than that of non debt enterprises; at the same time, the constraint effect of debt financing on investment efficiency of corporate debt than non corporate debt to equity swap. The results show that although the debt to equity swap enterprises to obtain more debt financing, including in the central bank tightened monetary policy, but does not mean that the shareholders of the bank loans to debt, is the soft budget constraint, on the contrary, the debt to equity swap company debt financing constraints in non efficiency investment Reflects the restriction effect of higher investment behavior, i.e. debt improves the relationship between debt financing and investment behavior; (3) compared to the non debt enterprise, pay performance sensitivity is higher, debt to equity and debt to equity, the company executive compensation performance sensitivity is improved; (4) swap enterprise profitability improved, market investors get a higher return on investment. The results show that, due to a decrease in the improvement of the ownership structure and agency cost, compared to the non debt to equity, investment and debt financing efficiency and investment efficiency of debt to equity swap enterprises is more sensitive, and the effect of debt financing on the efficiency of investment and debt greatly; to improve the company's executive compensation performance sensitivity, improve profitability and market rate of return of investors, improve the enterprise's value creation Build comprehensive ability. To sum up, due to a decrease in the improvement of the ownership structure and agency cost, compared to the non debt to equity, investment and debt financing efficiency and investment efficiency of debt to equity swap enterprises is more sensitive, and the effect of debt financing on investment efficiency is relatively large; also debt to improve the company's executive compensation performance sensitivity. To improve the profitability and the market return of investors, improve the enterprise value.
This paper is an empirical study on the economic consequences of debt restructuring of listed companies China state-owned enterprises based on the background, make an empirical test of debt to equity reform of literature, in-depth excavation of the specific driving factors of debt changes on the value of the company, but also to a certain extent can provide preliminary empirical evidence for the reform of mixed operation China's commercial banks. These findings have implications as follows: (1) the bank directly held corporate equity as an important way of long-term stable trading relationship with the formation of enterprises, production and use of more convenient channels can provide continuous for bank credit information needed for decision making, is helpful to improve the sensitivity of credit the configuration and the behavior of the company; (2) direct bank corporate equity holders can provide more effective protection for creditors' governance role on corporate governance. Shareholder control and insider control are important issues of corporate governance in China. If banks hold shares, they will help to change the situation of creditors' rights and balance the structure of corporate governance.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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