本文關(guān)鍵詞：財(cái)政分權(quán)體制下的地方政府干預(yù)與區(qū)域金融發(fā)展　出處：《浙江工商大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 財(cái)政分權(quán) 地方政府干預(yù) 金融發(fā)展 財(cái)政壓力

【摘要】：中國(guó)30多年的改革開(kāi)放在經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)上取得了巨大的成就。金融作為經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的催化劑,其在改革中的發(fā)展進(jìn)程無(wú)疑是我們重點(diǎn)關(guān)注的一個(gè)方面。始于20世紀(jì)80年代的財(cái)政分權(quán)改革,使得傳統(tǒng)的中央與地方的隸屬關(guān)系不復(fù)存在,地方政府開(kāi)始成為有一定的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的獨(dú)立的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。然而由于這種財(cái)政分權(quán)改革,特別是1994年的分稅制改革切斷了財(cái)政收入與財(cái)政支出的聯(lián)系,造成了財(cái)權(quán)與事權(quán)上的不對(duì)等,這為地方政府金融干預(yù)行為以及這種干預(yù)行為對(duì)區(qū)域金融發(fā)展的影響埋下了伏筆。 本文首先區(qū)分了金融約束與金融抑制理論,介紹了金融租金理論對(duì)政府行為的解釋,在財(cái)政分權(quán)與政府行為一般理論研究的基礎(chǔ)上,建立了財(cái)政分權(quán)體制下的地方政府行為與金融發(fā)展的理論分析框架。通過(guò)將地方政府、銀行和企業(yè)納入到同一個(gè)理論模型框架中,研究在地方政府的干預(yù)下,銀行的信貸資源如何在權(quán)力型關(guān)系貸款(PBRL)、市場(chǎng)型關(guān)系貸款(MBRL)和交易型貸款(TRAL)三種不同種類的銀行業(yè)務(wù)間進(jìn)行配置,得出了地方政府的干預(yù)行為降低了銀行信貸配置的效率,進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致了銀行發(fā)展和金融市場(chǎng)發(fā)展的低效率的結(jié)論。在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上本文選取了1985-2010年華東六省一市的省級(jí)面板數(shù)據(jù),從實(shí)證研究的角度對(duì)財(cái)政分權(quán)體制下,地方政府是否會(huì)因?yàn)樨?cái)政壓力和國(guó)有企業(yè)的因素來(lái)干預(yù)金融市場(chǎng)以造成區(qū)域金融發(fā)展的低效率做了進(jìn)一步的考察。證實(shí)了財(cái)政壓力和國(guó)有企業(yè)引發(fā)了地方政府的干預(yù)行為和地方政府干預(yù)行為造成了金融發(fā)展的低效率的分析結(jié)論。并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出相應(yīng)的政策建議。 全文分為六個(gè)部分：第一章為緒論。第二章為對(duì)財(cái)政分權(quán)、政府干預(yù)與金融發(fā)展的一般理論的研究。第三章為地方政府行為與金融發(fā)展的理論模型。第四章為財(cái)政分權(quán)體制下地方政府對(duì)金融資源配置的干預(yù)行為分析。先是從歷史分析的視角,通過(guò)將建國(guó)后的財(cái)政體制劃分為三個(gè)時(shí)期,從歷史發(fā)展觀的角度對(duì)政府行為的演變和發(fā)展進(jìn)行分析。再?gòu)牡胤秸畬?duì)金融資源配置的干預(yù)動(dòng)機(jī)和干預(yù)渠道兩個(gè)方面來(lái)考察現(xiàn)階段地方政府的干預(yù)金融行為。第五章為實(shí)證研究。基于1985-2010年華東地區(qū)六省一市的省級(jí)面板數(shù)據(jù),構(gòu)建計(jì)量模型組合。對(duì)財(cái)政壓力與國(guó)有企業(yè)對(duì)政府行為的影響以及政府行為對(duì)金融發(fā)展的影響進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,為文章的理論分析提供實(shí)證上的支持。第六章,結(jié)論與政策建議。對(duì)本文的研究成果進(jìn)行總結(jié),并對(duì)現(xiàn)階段的問(wèn)題提出有針對(duì)性的解決方法。
[Abstract]:Over 30 years of reform and opening up, China has made great achievements in economic construction. Finance is the catalyst for economic growth. Its development process in the reform is undoubtedly an aspect of our focus. The fiscal decentralization reform that began in 1980s makes the traditional relationship between central and local subordination no longer exist. Local governments began to become independent economies with certain economic interests. However, due to the fiscal decentralization reform, especially the tax distribution reform in 1994, the relationship between fiscal revenue and fiscal expenditure was cut off. It results in the inequality between financial power and administrative power, which sets the stage for the financial intervention of local government and its influence on the development of regional finance. This paper first distinguishes between financial constraint and financial restraint theory, and introduces the explanation of government behavior by financial rent theory, on the basis of the general theory of fiscal decentralization and government behavior. This paper establishes the theoretical analysis framework of local government behavior and financial development under the fiscal decentralization system. Through the integration of local government, banks and enterprises into the same theoretical model framework, the research is carried out under the intervention of local government. How to allocate the credit resources of banks in three different types of banking business: power relationship loan (PBRL), market-based relationship loan (MBRL) and transactional loan (TRAL). It is concluded that the intervention of local government reduces the efficiency of bank credit allocation. Then it leads to the inefficient conclusion of bank development and financial market development. On the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper selects the provincial panel data of six provinces and one city in East China from 1985 to 2010. From the perspective of empirical research on the fiscal decentralization system. Whether the local government will intervene in the financial market because of the financial pressure and the factors of the state-owned enterprises in order to cause the inefficiency of the regional financial development has been further investigated. It has been proved that the financial pressure and the state-owned enterprises have triggered the local government's. The intervention behavior and the local government intervention behavior have resulted in the inefficient conclusion of financial development. On this basis, the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward. The full text is divided into six parts: the first chapter is the introduction, the second chapter is the fiscal decentralization. Research on the general theory of government intervention and financial development. Chapter 3 is the theoretical model of local government behavior and financial development. Chapter 4th is the analysis of intervention behavior of local government on the allocation of financial resources under the system of fiscal decentralization. From the perspective of historical analysis. By dividing the financial system after the founding of the people's Republic of China into three periods. This paper analyzes the evolution and development of government behavior from the angle of historical development view, and examines the intervention behavior of local government at present from two aspects: the intervention motivation and the intervention channel of local government on the allocation of financial resources. Chapter 5th is an empirical study. Based on the provincial panel data of six provinces and one city in East China from 1985 to 2010. To construct the combination of econometric model. To make an empirical analysis of fiscal pressure and the influence of state-owned enterprises on government behavior and the influence of government behavior on financial development, and to provide empirical support for the theoretical analysis of the article. 6th chapter. Conclusion and policy suggestion. Summarize the research results of this paper, and put forward targeted solutions to the problems at this stage.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F127;F832.5;F224

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