發(fā)布時間：2018-01-04 03:39

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：代理沖突、公司治理與盈余質(zhì)量相關(guān)性的實證研究　出處：《安徽財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 公司治理 盈余質(zhì)量 代理沖突 DD模型

【摘要】：隨著證券市場的蓬勃發(fā)展,上市公司盈余質(zhì)量的問題受到了國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的廣泛關(guān)注。公司治理作為一個重要方面,對盈余質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生了很大的影響。目前已有文獻主要是研究公司治理的若干方面對盈余質(zhì)量的影響,難以就公司治理的綜合水平高低能否影響盈余質(zhì)量得到確切的結(jié)論。為此,本文將采用合適的方法來研究公司治理的綜合水平對盈余質(zhì)量的影響。另外,不合理的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)能夠引發(fā)較大的代理沖突,本文認為不同的代理沖突程度能夠?qū)е鹿局卫韺τ噘|(zhì)量產(chǎn)生不同的影響。因此,本文將代理沖突、公司治理與盈余質(zhì)量結(jié)合在一起,研究三者之間的相關(guān)性。 本文采用規(guī)范與實證相結(jié)合的研究方法,將全文分為五章。首先,本文通過對已有文獻進行綜述,歸納了研究現(xiàn)狀,引出了研究主題；其次,本文采用規(guī)范研究方法對委托代理、公司治理及盈余質(zhì)量三者的理論內(nèi)涵進行了深入的研究,同時對三者的相關(guān)性進行了理論分析；然后,根據(jù)理論分析提出了三條研究假設(shè),并進行實證研究設(shè)計,利用上市公司2008-2010年的經(jīng)驗數(shù)據(jù),運用修正的DD(2002)模型作為盈余質(zhì)量的計量模型,從以下兩個方面檢驗了三者之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系：一方面,檢驗公司治理水平與盈余質(zhì)量的相關(guān)關(guān)系；另一方面,檢驗在不同的代理沖突程度下,公司治理水平的高低對盈余質(zhì)量有何不同的影響。 本文的實證研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：第一,公司治理水平能夠影響盈余質(zhì)量,公司治理水平越好,則盈余質(zhì)量越高。第二,代理沖突程度的不同影響著公司治理水平與盈余質(zhì)量的相關(guān)關(guān)系,當(dāng)代理沖突程度較高時,提高公司治理水平能顯著改善盈余質(zhì)量；當(dāng)代理沖突程度較低時,提高公司治理水平不能顯著改善盈余質(zhì)量。 最后,本文在實證研究結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了減少代理沖突、完善公司治理機制及提高盈余質(zhì)量的一些粗淺建議,并指出了本文研究的不足之處及今后的研究方向。
[Abstract]:With the vigorous development of the securities market, the problem of earnings quality of listed companies has been widely concerned by scholars at home and abroad. Corporate governance as an important aspect. It has a great influence on earnings quality. At present, there are some literatures mainly studying the influence of several aspects of corporate governance on earnings quality. It is difficult to get a definite conclusion whether the comprehensive level of corporate governance can affect earnings quality. Therefore, this paper will adopt appropriate methods to study the impact of comprehensive level of corporate governance on earnings quality. Unreasonable corporate governance structure can lead to larger agency conflicts. This paper argues that different degree of agency conflicts can lead to different effects of corporate governance on earnings quality. The relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality is studied. This paper combines normative and empirical research methods, the full text is divided into five chapters. Firstly, this paper summarizes the existing literature, summarizes the current research situation, leads to the research topic; Secondly, this article uses the normative research method to carry on the thorough research to the principal-agent, the corporate governance and the earnings quality theory connotation, at the same time has carried on the theoretical analysis to the three correlation; Then, according to the theoretical analysis, three research hypotheses are put forward, and empirical research design is carried out, using the empirical data of listed companies from 2008 to 2010. Using the modified DDG 2002) model as the measurement model of earnings quality, this paper examines the correlation between the three from the following two aspects: on the one hand, the correlation between corporate governance level and earnings quality; On the other hand, under different agency conflicts, the level of corporate governance has different influence on earnings quality. The empirical results show that: first, the level of corporate governance can affect the quality of earnings, the better the level of corporate governance, the higher the quality of earnings. The degree of agency conflict affects the correlation between the level of corporate governance and earnings quality. When the degree of agency conflict is high, improving the level of corporate governance can significantly improve the quality of earnings; When the degree of agency conflict is low, improving the level of corporate governance can not significantly improve earnings quality. Finally, on the basis of empirical research conclusions, this paper puts forward some superficial suggestions to reduce agency conflicts, improve corporate governance mechanism and improve earnings quality. And pointed out the deficiency of this paper and the future research direction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F271;F832.51

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 李常青,管連云;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與盈余管理關(guān)系的實證研究[J];商業(yè)研究;2004年19期

2 趙勇德;張志花;;基于委托代理關(guān)系的真實活動盈余管理[J];財會通訊;2010年36期

3 余灼萍;;公司治理與盈余管理關(guān)系研究綜述[J];財會通訊;2011年06期

4 滕騰;;上市公司治理特征對盈余管理影響的實證研究[J];財會通訊;2011年15期

5 蔡寧,梁麗珍;公司治理與財務(wù)舞弊關(guān)系的經(jīng)驗分析[J];財經(jīng)理論與實踐;2003年06期

6 蔡吉甫;;會計盈余管理與公司治理[J];當(dāng)代財經(jīng);2007年06期

7 張佑輝;李延喜;高銳;;QFII與我國上市公司股價波動率關(guān)系研究[J];大連理工大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2008年02期

8 李維安,牛建波;中國上市公司經(jīng)理層治理評價與實證研究[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2004年09期

9 張祥建;徐晉;;股權(quán)再融資與大股東控制的“隧道效應(yīng)”——對上市公司股權(quán)再融資偏好的再解釋[J];管理世界;2005年11期

10 佟巖;程小可;;關(guān)聯(lián)交易利益流向與中國上市公司盈余質(zhì)量[J];管理世界;2007年11期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 席鑫;并購對公司價值的溢出效應(yīng)[D];吉林大學(xué);2010年

，

本文編號：1376882