本文選題：大股東減持 + 減持時(shí)機(jī)　； 參考：《江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國實(shí)施的股權(quán)分置改革制度改變了上市公司大股東的獲利方式。他們的獲利途徑從之前單純的依賴公司開始逐漸轉(zhuǎn)向證券市場,獲利的多少也逐漸變成了由證券市場和上市公司共同決定。但是我國證券市場目前還正在發(fā)展階段,相關(guān)法律法規(guī)還不完善,市場內(nèi)的信息也有著不對稱的特性。這使得大股東在提前知曉公司經(jīng)營不善的情況下,多數(shù)會(huì)選擇大量拋售股票以獲取更多收益,而不是主動(dòng)發(fā)現(xiàn)并解決公司問題。大股東的這種行為不僅損害了公司的聲譽(yù),給公司的經(jīng)營發(fā)展帶來負(fù)面影響,同時(shí)也讓國內(nèi)的眾多中小股東對證券市場失去信心,不利于市場有秩序的發(fā)展。本文在委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論和公司治理理論的基礎(chǔ)上,選擇樂視網(wǎng)為具體案例,分析樂視網(wǎng)大股東減少手中持有股份行為的動(dòng)機(jī)和時(shí)機(jī),以及減持行為的效果,得出結(jié)論和啟示。全文一共有六個(gè)部分。第一部分是引言。主要介紹了本文的研究背景和意義,歸納了國內(nèi)外學(xué)者對于大股東減持行為的動(dòng)因和市場反應(yīng)的研究現(xiàn)狀,并介紹了本文的研究思路和研究方法。第二部分是大股東減持行為的理論概述。該部分介紹了大股東減持的定義和相關(guān)法律規(guī)定,同時(shí)也闡述了上市公司大股東減持行為的時(shí)機(jī)、動(dòng)機(jī)和對股東財(cái)富的影響的理論基礎(chǔ)。第三部分是樂視網(wǎng)大股東減持的案例介紹。該部分先介紹了樂視網(wǎng)減持前的經(jīng)營狀況、財(cái)務(wù)狀況和外部環(huán)境,然后介紹了樂視網(wǎng)大股東減持的過程,包括其信息披露、具體減持方案以及其他與減持有關(guān)的事項(xiàng)。第四部分為樂視網(wǎng)大股東減持行為的動(dòng)機(jī)和時(shí)機(jī)分析。該部分結(jié)合之前國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的研究理論,對樂視網(wǎng)大股東減持行為的動(dòng)機(jī)和時(shí)機(jī)進(jìn)行了分析。第五部分為樂視網(wǎng)大股東減持行為的效果分析。這部分主要從減持行為帶來的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果,減持行為對公司財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)的影響以及減持行為對公司股東的影響三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行分析。第六部分為研究結(jié)論和啟示。根據(jù)前五部分的歸納分析得出結(jié)論,并提出具有參考價(jià)值的建議。本文從樂視網(wǎng)大股東減持的行為出發(fā),分析樂視網(wǎng)大股東減持的動(dòng)機(jī)、時(shí)機(jī)和減持帶來的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果。通過分析發(fā)現(xiàn)樂視網(wǎng)大股東減持行為的動(dòng)機(jī)表面上是緩解公司資金短缺,實(shí)際的動(dòng)機(jī)是在信息不對稱情況下大股東想要獲取超額收益。除此之外,減持期間還伴隨著員工股權(quán)激勵(lì)、配股等一系列股權(quán)增發(fā)行為,可見樂視網(wǎng)大股東大量減持股份的原因并不完全是公告中披露的那樣。在分析了樂視網(wǎng)大股東減持行為之后,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)上市公司如果想要穩(wěn)定健康地發(fā)展,一定要有一個(gè)良好且有效的公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)。只有公司內(nèi)部各管理層相互約束,公司才能夠長遠(yuǎn)地發(fā)展下去。除此之外,相關(guān)單位應(yīng)該加強(qiáng)對大股東減持行為的預(yù)披露相關(guān)規(guī)章的建設(shè),完善其中的不足之處。同時(shí)也應(yīng)該完善保護(hù)中小股東利益的法律法規(guī)。
[Abstract]:The reform of split share structure in China has changed the profit-making mode of major shareholders of listed companies. Their profit path from the former simple dependence on the company began to gradually shift to the securities market, the number of profits has gradually changed from the stock market and listed companies to decide. However, the securities market of our country is still in the developing stage, the relevant laws and regulations are not perfect, the information in the market also has the asymmetry characteristic. This allows the majority of shareholders to sell stocks in advance to earn more if they are aware of the company's mismanagement, rather than to actively identify and solve the company's problems. This behavior of large shareholders not only damages the reputation of the company and has a negative impact on the development of the company, but also makes a large number of minority shareholders lose confidence in the securities market, which is not conducive to the orderly development of the market. On the basis of principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and corporate governance theory, this paper chooses Letv net as a specific case to analyze the motivation and timing of Letv net major shareholders to reduce their shareholding behavior, as well as the effect of reduction behavior. Draw conclusions and enlightenments. There are six parts in this paper. The first part is the introduction. This paper mainly introduces the research background and significance of this paper, summarizes the domestic and foreign scholars' research on the motivation and market reaction of the behavior of large shareholder reduction, and introduces the research ideas and research methods of this paper. The second part is the theoretical overview of the behavior of major shareholder reduction. This part introduces the definition and relevant legal provisions of the reduction of large shareholders, and also expounds the timing, motivation and the theoretical basis of the influence on the wealth of shareholders of listed companies. The third part is the Letv net big shareholder reduces the case introduction. This part first introduces the operating situation, financial situation and external environment before Letv net reduction, then introduces the process of Letv net major shareholder reduction, including its information disclosure, specific reduction scheme and other items related to reduction. The fourth part is the motive and opportunity analysis of Letv net major shareholder's reduction behavior. In this part, the motivation and timing of Letv net major shareholder reduction are analyzed based on the previous theories of scholars at home and abroad. The fifth part is the effect analysis of Letv net major shareholder reduction behavior. This part mainly analyzes the economic consequences of the reduction behavior, the impact of the reduction behavior on the financial indicators of the company and the impact of the reduction behavior on the shareholders of the company. The sixth part is the research conclusion and enlightenment. The conclusion is drawn according to the analysis of the first five parts, and some valuable suggestions are put forward. This paper analyzes the motivation, timing and economic consequences of the reduction of Letv net major shareholders from the perspective of the behavior of the major shareholders of Letv net. Through analysis, it is found that the motivation of the reduction of Letv net shareholders is ostensibly to alleviate the capital shortage of the company, and the actual motivation is that the large shareholders want to obtain excess returns under the condition of asymmetric information. In addition, during the period of stock reduction accompanied by employee equity incentives, rights issues and other a series of additional equity behavior, it is clear that the large number of Letv shareholders to reduce the shares of the reasons is not exactly as disclosed in the announcement. After analyzing the behavior of large shareholder reduction in Letv net, this paper finds that if the listed company wants to develop steadily and healthily, it must have a good and effective internal governance structure. The company can develop in the long-term only if the internal management of the company restricts each other. In addition, relevant units should strengthen the construction of pre-disclosure regulations on the behavior of major shareholders reduction, and improve the deficiencies. At the same time, we should perfect the laws and regulations to protect the interests of minority shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F49;F275

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本文編號(hào)：1990733