本文選題：寬帶普遍服務(wù)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制 + 交叉補(bǔ)貼效率��； 參考：《北京郵電大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：隨著通信業(yè),尤其是寬帶產(chǎn)業(yè)的迅速發(fā)展,全世界都感受到了“數(shù)字鴻溝”向“寬帶鴻溝”的變化,以及這種變化對(duì)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生的影響。通過(guò)研究發(fā)現(xiàn),不論是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家還是發(fā)展中國(guó)家,不論其經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力如何,他們都不約而同的將“大力發(fā)展寬帶普遍服務(wù)”提升到國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略高度,其重視程度不言而喻。對(duì)于中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō),寬帶發(fā)展是也是大的趨勢(shì)。但是中國(guó)有著和其他國(guó)家不一樣的基本國(guó)情,諸如中國(guó)普遍服務(wù)機(jī)制與寬帶發(fā)展的情況無(wú)法完全相互適應(yīng)配合,加之地域復(fù)雜,人口眾多,電信法律法規(guī)體制不完善,普遍服務(wù)保障機(jī)制不健全等,使得中國(guó)的寬帶發(fā)展面臨種種困擾。 通過(guò)實(shí)證分析和文獻(xiàn)研究,本文認(rèn)為針對(duì)中國(guó)剛剛起步的寬帶普遍服務(wù)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制的研究來(lái)看,其理論方面存在三個(gè)急需彌補(bǔ)的理論空白：第一個(gè)理論空白,包含兩個(gè)層次：第一個(gè)層次,寬帶普遍服務(wù)的發(fā)展中已經(jīng)逐漸涉及到移動(dòng)寬帶的普及問(wèn)題,因此需要針對(duì)寬帶及其組合類型和特點(diǎn)來(lái)研究寬帶產(chǎn)業(yè)；第二個(gè)層次,寬帶產(chǎn)業(yè)的特點(diǎn)會(huì)影響補(bǔ)償機(jī)制的發(fā)展,就國(guó)內(nèi)目前的科研情況和現(xiàn)實(shí)需求來(lái)看,針對(duì)中國(guó)特有的交叉補(bǔ)貼寬帶普遍服務(wù)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制的研究較為欠缺,需要通過(guò)成本投入與產(chǎn)出(寬帶投入“產(chǎn)出”社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益)之間關(guān)系的研究,從定量角度確定中國(guó)寬帶交叉補(bǔ)貼的效率高低及其與寬帶發(fā)展的匹配性問(wèn)題。第二個(gè)理論空白,沒(méi)有較為合理和完善的成本核算的原則、理論方法以及相對(duì)應(yīng)的實(shí)證研究。第三個(gè)理論空白,目前很多應(yīng)用博弈論研究普遍服務(wù)的文獻(xiàn),大多是以靜態(tài)視角或者理論推導(dǎo)的方式,還沒(méi)有人從動(dòng)態(tài)角度,通過(guò)演化博弈及復(fù)制系統(tǒng)對(duì)寬帶產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展中的納什均衡問(wèn)題進(jìn)行分析和研究,更不用說(shuō)進(jìn)一步研究寬帶普遍服務(wù)了 對(duì)于這三個(gè)理論空白的選擇,本文也考慮到了邏輯上的連貫性和遞進(jìn)關(guān)系,概括如下：首先寬帶產(chǎn)業(yè)的特點(diǎn)會(huì)對(duì)普遍服務(wù)的補(bǔ)償機(jī)制產(chǎn)生影響,如果中國(guó)現(xiàn)有“交叉補(bǔ)貼+分片包干”的補(bǔ)償機(jī)制無(wú)法與寬帶發(fā)展相配合,那么這種影響就會(huì)最為直觀的體現(xiàn)在寬帶投入與產(chǎn)出(社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益)的低效率性上,也就是說(shuō)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制無(wú)法滿足寬帶發(fā)展的需要。得到效率評(píng)價(jià)之后,按照本文的理論分析,政府補(bǔ)貼應(yīng)該介入并作為輔助補(bǔ)償模式,對(duì)中國(guó)現(xiàn)有補(bǔ)償模式進(jìn)行完善和增補(bǔ),同時(shí)本文認(rèn)為補(bǔ)貼應(yīng)該按照成本法進(jìn)行發(fā)放,因此,接下來(lái)的問(wèn)題就是運(yùn)營(yíng)商的成本應(yīng)該如何估算,這也是本文認(rèn)定的第二個(gè)理論空白。在效率和成本的研究之后,我們需要考慮的是政府補(bǔ)貼介入后,會(huì)對(duì)寬帶普遍服務(wù)的市場(chǎng)產(chǎn)生何種影響,對(duì)運(yùn)營(yíng)商的合作與否產(chǎn)生何種影響,市場(chǎng)是否穩(wěn)定。這就需要我們從實(shí)證、動(dòng)態(tài)的角度結(jié)合假設(shè),定性定量分析政府補(bǔ)貼的地位及重要性,這剛好與文章前端部分的理論分析互相呼應(yīng),進(jìn)一步加強(qiáng)了文章的整體性。 綜上,本論文設(shè)計(jì)了幾個(gè)逐步遞進(jìn)的研究?jī)?nèi)容,力爭(zhēng)在上述三個(gè)理論空白上予以突破。最終得到了以下結(jié)論： 1.在應(yīng)用相關(guān)數(shù)學(xué)工具分析寬帶產(chǎn)業(yè)特點(diǎn)的基礎(chǔ)上,以數(shù)據(jù)包絡(luò)分析法的CCR模型為基礎(chǔ),構(gòu)建了投入(運(yùn)營(yíng)商村通寬帶發(fā)展及成本投入)與產(chǎn)出(社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益)之間的效率評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)體系,從實(shí)證角度結(jié)合理論計(jì)算,分析和證明了現(xiàn)階段中國(guó)寬帶交叉補(bǔ)貼下的村通寬帶發(fā)展及成本投入與社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益產(chǎn)出之間的低效率性,通過(guò)我們的計(jì)算,三大運(yùn)營(yíng)商平均投入產(chǎn)出效率為56.97%,高效率(相對(duì)效率超過(guò)70%)省份數(shù)占村通任務(wù)總數(shù)的比例為41.07%,整體效率偏低。通過(guò)對(duì)結(jié)論的分析,本文認(rèn)為政府補(bǔ)貼的介入對(duì)于中國(guó)寬帶普遍服務(wù)市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展而言,是一種見(jiàn)效快,效果好的輔助補(bǔ)償模式,它不僅促進(jìn)了寬帶的發(fā)展,而且直接帶動(dòng)了農(nóng)村地區(qū)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益的增加,是對(duì)整個(gè)投入產(chǎn)出的雙向強(qiáng)化。 2.提出了通過(guò)統(tǒng)計(jì)指標(biāo)估算成本的新思路和新方法：“滾動(dòng)式混合成本補(bǔ)貼測(cè)算法”�；谶@種新思路和方法,進(jìn)一步從統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)的視角研究并得到了“就中國(guó)而言,運(yùn)營(yíng)商在村通寬帶工程普遍服務(wù)中投入的成本與其寬帶任務(wù)量及普及率的乘積存在顯著性相關(guān)”這一重要結(jié)論,并通過(guò)指數(shù)回歸、線性回歸等方法量化了這種關(guān)系。這種新思路和新方法以及對(duì)應(yīng)的成本預(yù)估結(jié)論,對(duì)日后預(yù)估運(yùn)營(yíng)商村通寬帶普遍服務(wù)成本有著重要的指導(dǎo)作用,同時(shí)還能夠幫助政府制定補(bǔ)貼預(yù)算,對(duì)補(bǔ)貼額度進(jìn)行預(yù)估。 3.以村通寬帶普遍服務(wù)任務(wù)分配表中存在的特殊情況(同一省市地區(qū)存在兩家運(yùn)營(yíng)商或者三家運(yùn)營(yíng)商共同承擔(dān)村通寬帶普遍服務(wù)義務(wù),雖然沒(méi)有相關(guān)資料顯示是否存在合作或者行政村基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施共建共享等情況,但并不排除未來(lái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商之間進(jìn)行合作的可能性)和相關(guān)統(tǒng)計(jì)變量為基礎(chǔ),通過(guò)構(gòu)建“政府(決策包括補(bǔ)貼或者不補(bǔ)貼兩種)、運(yùn)營(yíng)商(決策包括與其他運(yùn)營(yíng)商合作或者不合作兩種,同時(shí)本文認(rèn)為,對(duì)于普遍服務(wù)這一高成本低收益市場(chǎng)而言,不合作就意味著不承擔(dān)義務(wù)不進(jìn)入其他運(yùn)營(yíng)商的普遍服務(wù)市場(chǎng),即運(yùn)營(yíng)商只會(huì)負(fù)責(zé)工信部給予自己的普遍服務(wù)任務(wù),不會(huì)出現(xiàn)一般市場(chǎng)“不合作就競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”的情況。)”之間的寬帶普遍服務(wù)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制演化博弈動(dòng)態(tài)復(fù)制系統(tǒng)(2×2×2雙策略成本博弈),得到了“政府給予補(bǔ)貼是該系統(tǒng)在重復(fù)博弈過(guò)程中達(dá)到漸進(jìn)穩(wěn)定納什均衡的必要條件之一,且穩(wěn)定均衡中運(yùn)營(yíng)商之間不存在合作關(guān)系”這個(gè)重要結(jié)論,一方面從理論層面強(qiáng)調(diào)了政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)于中國(guó)村通寬帶普遍服務(wù)發(fā)展的重要性,另一方面也彌補(bǔ)了“用動(dòng)態(tài)發(fā)展的視角和方法結(jié)合實(shí)證,研究寬帶普遍服務(wù)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制”的理論空白。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the communications industry, especially the broadband industry, the world has experienced the changes in the "digital divide" to the "broadband gap" and the impact of this change on the development of the country's economy. Through research, it is found that both developed and developing countries, regardless of their economic strength, will be identical. For China, the development of broadband is also a big trend. But China has a big trend in broadband development. But China has the basic national conditions that are different from other countries, such as the situation of the general service mechanism and the development of broadband in China, which can not be fully adapted to each other. The development of broadband in China is beset with many problems, such as complex territory, large population, imperfect telecommunications laws and regulations, and imperfect service guarantee mechanism.
Through the empirical analysis and literature research, this paper believes that there are three theoretical gaps in the theory of broadband universal service compensation mechanism in China: the first theory blank, including two levels: the first level, the development of broadband universal service has been gradually involved in mobile broadband It is necessary to study the wide band industry for the wide band and its combination types and characteristics; second levels, the characteristics of the broadband industry will affect the development of the compensation mechanism. In view of the current scientific research and practical needs of the country, the research on the universal service compensation mechanism of China's special cross subsidies is short. Through the study of the relationship between cost input and output (broadband input "output" social and economic benefits), the efficiency of China's broadband cross subsidy and its matching with the development of broadband are determined from a quantitative point of view. Second theoretical gaps are blank, and there is no more reasonable and perfect cost accounting principle, theoretical method and corresponding response. There are third theoretical gaps. There are many literature on universal service using game theory at present. Most of them are in the way of static or theoretical derivation. No one has analyzed and studied the Nash equilibrium problem in the development of broadband industry by evolutionary game and replication system from a dynamic point of view, not to mention further research. A wide range of broadband services
As for the selection of the three theoretical gaps, this paper also takes into account the logical consistency and progressive relationship. It is summarized as follows: first, the characteristics of the broadband industry will affect the compensation mechanism of universal services. If the existing compensation mechanism of "cross subsidy + pieceproof" in China does not cooperate with the development of broadband, the effect will be It is most intuitively reflected in the low efficiency of broadband input and output (social and economic benefit), that is, the compensation mechanism can not meet the needs of broadband development. After the efficiency evaluation, according to the theoretical analysis of this paper, the government subsidies should be involved and as a supplementary compensation model to improve and supplement the existing compensation mode in China, At the same time, this paper believes that subsidies should be distributed according to the cost method, so the next question is how to estimate the cost of the operators. This is the second theoretical gap identified in this article. After the study of efficiency and cost, what we need to consider is what the government subsidies will bring to the market of broadband universal service. It is necessary for us to analyze the status and importance of government subsidies qualitatively and quantitatively, which coincides with the theoretical analysis of the front part of the article and strengthens the integrity of the article.
In summary, this paper designs several progressively progressive research contents and strives to break through the above three theoretical blanks.
1. based on the analysis of the characteristics of the broadband industry with relevant mathematical tools, based on the CCR model of data envelopment analysis (DEA), the efficiency evaluation index system of input (the broadband development and cost input) and output (social and economic benefits) is constructed. It is analyzed and proved in the present stage from the point of view and the theoretical calculation. Through our calculation, the average input-output efficiency of the three major operators is 56.97% and the high efficiency (relative efficiency is more than 70%) is 41.07% and the overall efficiency is low. Analysis, this article holds that the intervention of government subsidies is a kind of fast and effective auxiliary compensation model for the development of China's broadband universal service market. It not only promotes the development of broadband, but also directly promotes the increase of social and economic benefits in rural areas, and is a two-way strengthening of the whole input and output.
2. a new idea and a new method of estimating cost through statistical indicators are proposed: "the rolling hybrid cost subsidy calculation method". Based on this new idea and method, this new idea and method is further studied and obtained from the statistical point of view. "In terms of China, the cost of the operator in the universal service of the village communication broadband project and its broadband task volume and popularization are obtained." This new idea and method, as well as the corresponding cost prediction conclusions, have an important guiding role in predicting the universal service cost of the broadband operator in the future, and can also help the government to make up a supplement. Budget and estimate the amount of the subsidy.
3. the special situation in the distribution table of the universal service mission in the village of village Tong (the two operators or three operators in the same provinces and regions jointly undertake the universal service obligations of the village Tong, although there is no relevant information about the existence of cooperation or the common construction and sharing of the administrative village infrastructure, but it does not exclude future operators. " The possibility of cooperation between them and the related statistical variables is based on the construction of the "government" (two kinds of decisions, including subsidies or non subsidies), and the operators (decision-making includes two kinds of cooperation or non cooperation with other operators, and this article holds that for the high cost and low yield market of universal service, no cooperation means that it is not undertaken. " The obligation does not enter the universal service market of other operators, that is, the operators will only be responsible for the general service task given by the Ministry of industry and credit, and will not appear in the general market "the situation of non cooperation and competition". "The evolution game dynamic replication system of the broadband universal service compensation mechanism (2 x 2 x 2 dual strategy cost game), and the government has got the" government " Subsidies are one of the necessary conditions for the system to achieve progressive stable Nash equilibrium in the process of repeated games, and the important conclusion is that there is no cooperation between operators in a stable equilibrium. On the one hand, the importance of government subsidies to the development of broadband universal service in China's village is emphasized on the one hand, and on the other hand it is made up. In the light of the dynamic development perspective and method combined with empirical research, the theoretical blank of the broadband universal service compensation mechanism is studied.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京郵電大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F626

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