本文選題：價(jià)格歧視　切入點(diǎn)：拉姆齊定價(jià)　出處：《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：電信行業(yè)是一個(gè)傳統(tǒng)而新興的行業(yè)，它伴隨著技術(shù)進(jìn)步而不斷發(fā)展變化。壟斷的市場(chǎng)格局已經(jīng)無法滿足現(xiàn)階段的社會(huì)需求，各國(guó)電信行業(yè)在20世紀(jì)80年代開始逐步進(jìn)行改革，我國(guó)電信行業(yè)也加入到了這股浪潮中。中國(guó)電信行業(yè)改革的關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)就是逐步放開對(duì)電信價(jià)格的政府管制。政府管制放松使得電信運(yùn)營(yíng)商的價(jià)格自主權(quán)擴(kuò)大，為了獲得市場(chǎng)占有率和企業(yè)利潤(rùn)不斷展開價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。但是，在放松政府管制的同時(shí)也面臨著問題，電信運(yùn)營(yíng)商通過價(jià)格歧視獲取利潤(rùn)。本文將通過對(duì)電信下游零售市場(chǎng)三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視和上游批發(fā)市場(chǎng)接入價(jià)格歧視的分析，探討其經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)。 在電信下游終端市場(chǎng)，，以移動(dòng)通信業(yè)務(wù)為例，電信運(yùn)營(yíng)商采用了不同的方案實(shí)現(xiàn)價(jià)格歧視。中國(guó)移動(dòng)一直以來都在移動(dòng)通信業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域占有主導(dǎo)地位，本文根據(jù)中國(guó)移動(dòng)公司2000-2011年數(shù)據(jù)得到移動(dòng)通信用戶的平均需求價(jià)格彈性為-0.6136，表示移動(dòng)通信的價(jià)格每下降10%，用戶的使用量將增加6.136%。然后以此為依據(jù)假設(shè)了高、中、低收入人群的需求價(jià)格彈性分別為-0.5136、-0.6136、-0.7136的移動(dòng)通信用戶，根據(jù)運(yùn)營(yíng)商三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視的套餐設(shè)置得到相關(guān)價(jià)格和消費(fèi)量數(shù)據(jù)，利用拉姆齊定價(jià)公式得到各個(gè)需求價(jià)格彈性下的拉姆齊價(jià)格，發(fā)現(xiàn)其普遍低于實(shí)際價(jià)格。但這種價(jià)格偏離存在現(xiàn)實(shí)原因，拉姆齊定價(jià)無法在電信終端市場(chǎng)實(shí)現(xiàn)。并且，電信下游零售市場(chǎng)的這種價(jià)格歧視與市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度存在正相關(guān)。 在電信上游批發(fā)市場(chǎng)，擁有基礎(chǔ)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的主導(dǎo)運(yùn)營(yíng)商向非主導(dǎo)運(yùn)營(yíng)商出售電信批發(fā)業(yè)務(wù)，非主導(dǎo)運(yùn)營(yíng)商通過向其支付接入價(jià)格連接基礎(chǔ)網(wǎng)絡(luò)，從而進(jìn)入電信市場(chǎng)。在電信市場(chǎng)中，主導(dǎo)運(yùn)營(yíng)商成為一個(gè)縱向一體化企業(yè)，它能夠?qū)⑸嫌闻l(fā)市場(chǎng)的市場(chǎng)勢(shì)力通過歧視性接入價(jià)格延伸至下游零售市場(chǎng)，影響下游市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。因此，接入價(jià)格歧視對(duì)下游市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的影響成為電信中間市場(chǎng)的研究重點(diǎn)。論文通過模型建立，對(duì)政府統(tǒng)一定價(jià)、主導(dǎo)運(yùn)營(yíng)商以利潤(rùn)最大化為目標(biāo)的自由定價(jià)和政府以社會(huì)福利最大化為目標(biāo)的管制定價(jià)三種電信接入價(jià)格定價(jià)模式對(duì)電信終端市場(chǎng)的影響進(jìn)行分析，比較不同定價(jià)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng)。得出存在歧視性的管制機(jī)構(gòu)以社會(huì)福利最大化的管制定價(jià)最能促進(jìn)下游終端市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，電信上游批發(fā)市場(chǎng)需要以歧視性接入價(jià)格進(jìn)行適當(dāng)?shù)恼苤啤?根據(jù)對(duì)電信上下游市場(chǎng)的價(jià)格歧視分析，論文給出相關(guān)的反壟斷和政府管制建議。根據(jù)兩個(gè)市場(chǎng)的不同特點(diǎn)，在電信下游零售市場(chǎng)以實(shí)行反壟斷政策為主，政府應(yīng)當(dāng)放松管制，促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)的自由競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。而在電信上游批發(fā)市場(chǎng)，主導(dǎo)運(yùn)營(yíng)商的寡頭壟斷格局很難打破，市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性較弱，需要政府管制來完善市場(chǎng)。
[Abstract]:The telecommunication industry is a traditional and emerging industry, which has been developing and changing with the progress of technology. The monopoly market structure has been unable to meet the current social needs. In 1980s, the telecommunications industry of various countries began to reform gradually. China's telecommunications industry has also joined the wave. The key link in the reform of China's telecommunications industry is to gradually liberalize government controls on telecommunications prices. The deregulation of government regulation has expanded the price autonomy of telecom operators. In order to gain market share and enterprise profits, price competition continues to develop. However, while the government is loosening its regulations, it is also facing problems. Telecom operators make profits through price discrimination. This paper will discuss its economic effect by analyzing the three-level price discrimination in the downstream retail market and the access price discrimination in the upstream wholesale market. In the downstream terminal market of telecommunications, taking mobile communication service as an example, telecom operators have adopted different schemes to achieve price discrimination. China Mobile has always played a leading role in the field of mobile communication services. According to the data of China Mobile Company from 2000 to 2011, the average demand price elasticity of mobile communication users is -0.6136, which means that for every 10 decline in the price of mobile communication, the usage of users will increase 6.136. The demand price elasticity of low-income people is -0.5136U -0.6136U -0.7136, respectively. According to the set of three-level price discrimination set by operators, the relevant price and consumption data are obtained. Ramsay pricing formula is used to obtain Ramsay price under various demand price elasticity, and it is found that Ramsey price is generally lower than the actual price. However, there are realistic reasons for this price deviation. Ramsey pricing cannot be realized in the telecommunications terminal market. The price discrimination in the downstream retail market is positively related to the degree of market competition. In the upstream wholesale market of telecommunications, leading operators with basic networks sell wholesale services to non-dominant operators, which connect to the basic network by paying them access prices. Thus entering the telecommunications market. In the telecommunications market, the leading operator becomes a vertically integrated enterprise that can extend the market power of the upstream wholesale market to the downstream retail market through discriminatory access prices. Therefore, the impact of access price discrimination on downstream market competition has become the focus of research in telecommunications intermediate market. The influence of three telecom access pricing modes on telecom terminal market is analyzed, which is free pricing aiming at profit maximization and government regulation pricing aiming at social welfare maximization. Comparing the competitive effect of different pricing. It is concluded that the regulation pricing with the maximization of social welfare can promote the competition in the downstream end market. Upstream wholesale telecommunications markets need to be subject to appropriate government regulation at discriminatory access prices. Based on the analysis of price discrimination in the upstream and downstream markets of telecommunications, the paper gives some suggestions on antitrust and government regulation. According to the different characteristics of the two markets, antitrust policies are adopted in the downstream retail market. The government should deregulate and promote the free competition of the market, but in the wholesale market of telecom upstream, the oligopoly pattern of leading operators is difficult to break, the market competition is weak, and government regulation is needed to perfect the market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F626

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