本文選題：價格歧視　切入點：拉姆齊定價　出處：《浙江財經大學》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：電信行業(yè)是一個傳統(tǒng)而新興的行業(yè)，它伴隨著技術進步而不斷發(fā)展變化。壟斷的市場格局已經無法滿足現階段的社會需求，各國電信行業(yè)在20世紀80年代開始逐步進行改革，我國電信行業(yè)也加入到了這股浪潮中。中國電信行業(yè)改革的關鍵環(huán)節(jié)就是逐步放開對電信價格的政府管制。政府管制放松使得電信運營商的價格自主權擴大，為了獲得市場占有率和企業(yè)利潤不斷展開價格競爭。但是，在放松政府管制的同時也面臨著問題，電信運營商通過價格歧視獲取利潤。本文將通過對電信下游零售市場三級價格歧視和上游批發(fā)市場接入價格歧視的分析，探討其經濟效應。 在電信下游終端市場，，以移動通信業(yè)務為例，電信運營商采用了不同的方案實現價格歧視。中國移動一直以來都在移動通信業(yè)務領域占有主導地位，本文根據中國移動公司2000-2011年數據得到移動通信用戶的平均需求價格彈性為-0.6136，表示移動通信的價格每下降10%，用戶的使用量將增加6.136%。然后以此為依據假設了高、中、低收入人群的需求價格彈性分別為-0.5136、-0.6136、-0.7136的移動通信用戶，根據運營商三級價格歧視的套餐設置得到相關價格和消費量數據，利用拉姆齊定價公式得到各個需求價格彈性下的拉姆齊價格，發(fā)現其普遍低于實際價格。但這種價格偏離存在現實原因，拉姆齊定價無法在電信終端市場實現。并且，電信下游零售市場的這種價格歧視與市場競爭程度存在正相關。 在電信上游批發(fā)市場，擁有基礎網絡的主導運營商向非主導運營商出售電信批發(fā)業(yè)務，非主導運營商通過向其支付接入價格連接基礎網絡，從而進入電信市場。在電信市場中，主導運營商成為一個縱向一體化企業(yè)，它能夠將上游批發(fā)市場的市場勢力通過歧視性接入價格延伸至下游零售市場，影響下游市場競爭。因此，接入價格歧視對下游市場競爭的影響成為電信中間市場的研究重點。論文通過模型建立，對政府統(tǒng)一定價、主導運營商以利潤最大化為目標的自由定價和政府以社會福利最大化為目標的管制定價三種電信接入價格定價模式對電信終端市場的影響進行分析，比較不同定價的競爭效應。得出存在歧視性的管制機構以社會福利最大化的管制定價最能促進下游終端市場的競爭，電信上游批發(fā)市場需要以歧視性接入價格進行適當的政府管制。 根據對電信上下游市場的價格歧視分析，論文給出相關的反壟斷和政府管制建議。根據兩個市場的不同特點，在電信下游零售市場以實行反壟斷政策為主，政府應當放松管制，促進市場的自由競爭。而在電信上游批發(fā)市場，主導運營商的寡頭壟斷格局很難打破，市場競爭性較弱，需要政府管制來完善市場。
[Abstract]:The telecommunication industry is a traditional and emerging industry, which has been developing and changing with the progress of technology. The monopoly market structure has been unable to meet the current social needs. In 1980s, the telecommunications industry of various countries began to reform gradually. China's telecommunications industry has also joined the wave. The key link in the reform of China's telecommunications industry is to gradually liberalize government controls on telecommunications prices. The deregulation of government regulation has expanded the price autonomy of telecom operators. In order to gain market share and enterprise profits, price competition continues to develop. However, while the government is loosening its regulations, it is also facing problems. Telecom operators make profits through price discrimination. This paper will discuss its economic effect by analyzing the three-level price discrimination in the downstream retail market and the access price discrimination in the upstream wholesale market. In the downstream terminal market of telecommunications, taking mobile communication service as an example, telecom operators have adopted different schemes to achieve price discrimination. China Mobile has always played a leading role in the field of mobile communication services. According to the data of China Mobile Company from 2000 to 2011, the average demand price elasticity of mobile communication users is -0.6136, which means that for every 10 decline in the price of mobile communication, the usage of users will increase 6.136. The demand price elasticity of low-income people is -0.5136U -0.6136U -0.7136, respectively. According to the set of three-level price discrimination set by operators, the relevant price and consumption data are obtained. Ramsay pricing formula is used to obtain Ramsay price under various demand price elasticity, and it is found that Ramsey price is generally lower than the actual price. However, there are realistic reasons for this price deviation. Ramsey pricing cannot be realized in the telecommunications terminal market. The price discrimination in the downstream retail market is positively related to the degree of market competition. In the upstream wholesale market of telecommunications, leading operators with basic networks sell wholesale services to non-dominant operators, which connect to the basic network by paying them access prices. Thus entering the telecommunications market. In the telecommunications market, the leading operator becomes a vertically integrated enterprise that can extend the market power of the upstream wholesale market to the downstream retail market through discriminatory access prices. Therefore, the impact of access price discrimination on downstream market competition has become the focus of research in telecommunications intermediate market. The influence of three telecom access pricing modes on telecom terminal market is analyzed, which is free pricing aiming at profit maximization and government regulation pricing aiming at social welfare maximization. Comparing the competitive effect of different pricing. It is concluded that the regulation pricing with the maximization of social welfare can promote the competition in the downstream end market. Upstream wholesale telecommunications markets need to be subject to appropriate government regulation at discriminatory access prices. Based on the analysis of price discrimination in the upstream and downstream markets of telecommunications, the paper gives some suggestions on antitrust and government regulation. According to the different characteristics of the two markets, antitrust policies are adopted in the downstream retail market. The government should deregulate and promote the free competition of the market, but in the wholesale market of telecom upstream, the oligopoly pattern of leading operators is difficult to break, the market competition is weak, and government regulation is needed to perfect the market.
【學位授予單位】：浙江財經大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F626

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本文編號：1581726