企業(yè)低碳生產(chǎn)路徑選擇引導(dǎo)模型及應(yīng)用研究
發(fā)布時間：2019-02-19 19:23
【摘要】：在我國,政府為引導(dǎo)企業(yè)低碳制造,建立和營造了技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的機(jī)制與環(huán)境,在提供資金、監(jiān)管責(zé)任、稅收制度和產(chǎn)業(yè)政策等方面發(fā)揮作用,政府為了引導(dǎo)企業(yè)向低碳生產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)型制定了一系列相關(guān)的政策法規(guī)。但是,進(jìn)行低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新短期內(nèi)的高成本、低收益讓企業(yè)望而卻步,而地方政府在保增長目標(biāo)下,監(jiān)管上存在放松。政府通過懲罰手段,企業(yè)在政府的強(qiáng)令下只有被動的消極應(yīng)對;政府通過項目激勵手段,企業(yè)有時僅僅為了獲得政府優(yōu)惠政策和財政補(bǔ)貼,無法激發(fā)其低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新熱情。此外,不同企業(yè)由于所屬行業(yè)特征、產(chǎn)品制造過程制造工藝、領(lǐng)導(dǎo)意識、市場對低碳產(chǎn)品需求、低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新成本等的不同,其低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的熱情也不同。企業(yè)是低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的主體,在激勵企業(yè)進(jìn)行技術(shù)創(chuàng)新時,獎賞和懲罰是經(jīng)常被使用的手段。政府在對企業(yè)進(jìn)行獎懲時通常以企業(yè)碳排放量作為主要標(biāo)準(zhǔn),這種獎懲依據(jù)是否合理?對引導(dǎo)企業(yè)低碳生產(chǎn)的同時,是否會對企業(yè)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生不良的影響?政府如何根據(jù)社會低碳需求與企業(yè)實情制定合理有效的策略引導(dǎo)不同行業(yè)領(lǐng)域的企業(yè)實行低碳生產(chǎn)一直是困擾政府的關(guān)鍵問題。文章首先通過分析影響企業(yè)低碳意愿的內(nèi)外部因素及相關(guān)性,明確政府如何通過監(jiān)控和監(jiān)管企業(yè)內(nèi)外部環(huán)境影響企業(yè)低碳生產(chǎn)意愿,并利用四項分析法對我國工業(yè)企業(yè)分類,深入剖析政府規(guī)制對企業(yè)低碳生產(chǎn)意愿和對企業(yè)健康發(fā)展的影響,得到政府不應(yīng)以企業(yè)碳排放量作為獎懲指標(biāo)的唯一指標(biāo),還應(yīng)該根據(jù)企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平和企業(yè)低碳技術(shù)成熟度為評判依據(jù)的結(jié)論。通過分析影響企業(yè)行為決策的主要參數(shù)因素,明確企業(yè)參數(shù)對政府制定企業(yè)低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新梯階培育機(jī)理的影響。為此,建立政企雙方兩階段動態(tài)演化博弈模型:第一階段,通過建立演化博弈模型分析決定政企雙方在博弈過程中最優(yōu)決策選擇的關(guān)鍵參數(shù)。第二階段,針對企業(yè)在演化博弈過程中以往數(shù)據(jù)做出企業(yè)行為決策的關(guān)鍵參數(shù)預(yù)估值并據(jù)此篩選低碳創(chuàng)新能力較強(qiáng)的企業(yè)進(jìn)行財政低碳補(bǔ)貼。然后,針對低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行分析,根據(jù)政企雙方在不同時期、不同階段的博弈狀態(tài)和博弈形成機(jī)理,建立了動態(tài)賦時博弈模型,分析了政府的決策做出對企業(yè)低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新系統(tǒng)性能指標(biāo)的時間量特性影響。政企在低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新行為決策博弈中,某一時段的目標(biāo)函數(shù)取決于當(dāng)前雙方的博弈狀態(tài)和前一時段演進(jìn)過程中博弈結(jié)果。分別建立了動態(tài)博弈下的企業(yè)目標(biāo)決策模型和動態(tài)博弈下政府目標(biāo)決策模型,以利潤最大化來組織生產(chǎn)的企業(yè),政府的低碳規(guī)制會直接影響企業(yè)低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新決策行為,政府的低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)與環(huán)境保護(hù)責(zé)任目標(biāo)要求企業(yè)單位排放量的銷售額是穩(wěn)定增加的,或者單位銷售額的排放量的穩(wěn)定下降,這就要求不斷地進(jìn)行低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新�；诖�,以企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平和低碳技術(shù)成熟度的階段指標(biāo)為依據(jù)判斷企業(yè)低碳生產(chǎn)的積極性,并根據(jù)判斷結(jié)果給出政府政策規(guī)制導(dǎo)向建議。最后,提出雙重集成引導(dǎo)低碳規(guī)制的路徑選擇方法,以安徽省部分調(diào)研企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)為例進(jìn)行了仿真應(yīng)用驗證,驗證結(jié)果表明所設(shè)計的低碳規(guī)制路徑的合理性,為低碳環(huán)境下政府制定合適的引導(dǎo)企業(yè)低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新政策規(guī)制提供了科學(xué)的參考依據(jù)。根據(jù)準(zhǔn)備投入的低碳監(jiān)管資金、變動的低碳指標(biāo)和企業(yè)實際發(fā)展情況制定基于演化博弈過程參數(shù)預(yù)估值的低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新梯階培育機(jī)理能夠為低碳環(huán)境下政府更合理的引導(dǎo)企業(yè)低碳技術(shù)創(chuàng)新提供了依據(jù),為政府引導(dǎo)企業(yè)尋找一條適合的綠色健康發(fā)展的道路提供幫助,為政府合理有效的選擇、調(diào)控并引導(dǎo)企業(yè)執(zhí)行低碳生產(chǎn)提供了依據(jù),加速企業(yè)低碳生產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)化路徑的進(jìn)程,對我國低碳生產(chǎn)、走可持續(xù)發(fā)展道路有一定參考意義。
[Abstract]:In our country, the government has played a role in guiding the low-carbon manufacturing of enterprises, setting up and creating the mechanism and environment of technological innovation, and providing financial, regulatory responsibility, tax system and industrial policy. The government has developed a series of related policies and regulations in order to guide enterprises to transition to low-carbon production. However, low-carbon technology innovation is a short-term high-cost, low-income enterprise is prohibitive, and the local government has relaxed in the regulation of the growth target. The government, through the means of punishment, has only a passive negative response under the government's strong order; the government, through the means of project incentives, is sometimes unable to stimulate the enthusiasm of its low-carbon technology innovation in order to obtain government preferential policies and financial subsidies. In addition, due to the characteristics of the industry, the manufacturing process of the product manufacturing process, the leadership consciousness, the market's demand for low-carbon products, the low-carbon technology innovation cost and so on, the enthusiasm of the low-carbon technology innovation is different. The enterprise is the main body of the low-carbon technology innovation, and the reward and punishment are often used in the process of stimulating the enterprise to carry on the technological innovation. When the government rewards and rewards the enterprise, the carbon emission of the enterprise is usually used as the main standard, and the reward and punishment basis is reasonable? Will the low-carbon production of the leading enterprise have a bad influence on the development of the enterprise? It is a key problem that how the government can lead different industries to carry out low-carbon production on the basis of the society's low-carbon demand and the fact that the enterprise has a reasonable and effective strategy to guide the enterprises in different industries. Firstly, through the analysis of the internal and external factors and the correlation of the low-carbon will of the enterprise, it is clear how the government can monitor and regulate the internal and external environment impact enterprise's low-carbon production will, and use the four analysis methods to classify the industrial enterprises in China. In-depth analysis of the influence of the government regulation on the enterprise's low-carbon production will and the development of the enterprise's health, the government should not only measure the carbon emission of the enterprise as the only index of the reward and punishment index, but also should be based on the enterprise's economic development level and the low-carbon technology maturity of the enterprise. Through the analysis of the main parameters affecting the enterprise's behavior decision-making, the effect of the enterprise's parameters on the formation mechanism of the low-carbon technology innovation in the government is clarified. To this end, a game model of two-stage dynamic evolution of the government-enterprise is set up: the first stage, through the establishment of the evolutionary game model, the key parameters of the optimal decision-making choice between the government and the enterprise in the game process are determined. In the second stage, the key parameter estimate of the enterprise's behavior decision is made for the past data of the enterprise in the course of the evolutionary game, and the low-carbon innovation ability of the enterprise is selected to carry out the financial low-carbon subsidy. Then, based on the analysis of the complex system of the low-carbon technology innovation, the game model is established based on the game state and the game forming mechanism between the government and the enterprise in different periods, different stages, The influence of the government's decision making on the performance index of the low-carbon technology innovation system in the enterprise is analyzed. In the decision-making game of the low-carbon technology innovation behavior, the objective function of a time segment depends on the game state of the current two parties and the game result in the evolution of the previous period. The decision-making model of the enterprise target under the dynamic game and the decision-making model of the government target under the dynamic game are respectively established, and the enterprise with the maximum profit is used to organize the production. The low-carbon regulation of the government can directly influence the decision-making behavior of the low-carbon technology innovation of the enterprise. The government's low-carbon economy and environmental protection responsibility target requires a steady increase in the amount of sales of an enterprise, or a steady decline in emissions from unit sales, which requires continuous low-carbon technology innovation. On the basis of this, the initiative of the low-carbon production of the enterprise is judged based on the stage index of the economic development level of the enterprise and the maturity of the low-carbon technology, and the guidance of the government policy rules is given according to the judgment result. In the end, the method for selecting the path of low-carbon regulation by double integration is put forward, and the simulation and application verification is carried out in the data of some research enterprise in Anhui province, and the result shows that the designed low-carbon regulation path is reasonable, It provides a scientific reference for the government to set the appropriate guidance for the low-carbon technology innovation in the low-carbon environment. the low-carbon technological innovation step-step cultivation mechanism based on the evolutionary game process parameter estimation value is developed according to the prepared low-carbon regulatory capital, the low-carbon index of the change and the actual development situation of the enterprise, which can provide the basis for the more reasonable guidance of the low-carbon technology innovation of the government in the low-carbon environment, In order to guide the government to find a suitable road for green health development, to help the government to select, control and guide the enterprises to carry out low-carbon production reasonably and effectively, to speed up the process of the low-carbon production and transformation path of the enterprise, and to make the low-carbon production in China, The road of sustainable development has some reference significance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工程大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272
[Abstract]:In our country, the government has played a role in guiding the low-carbon manufacturing of enterprises, setting up and creating the mechanism and environment of technological innovation, and providing financial, regulatory responsibility, tax system and industrial policy. The government has developed a series of related policies and regulations in order to guide enterprises to transition to low-carbon production. However, low-carbon technology innovation is a short-term high-cost, low-income enterprise is prohibitive, and the local government has relaxed in the regulation of the growth target. The government, through the means of punishment, has only a passive negative response under the government's strong order; the government, through the means of project incentives, is sometimes unable to stimulate the enthusiasm of its low-carbon technology innovation in order to obtain government preferential policies and financial subsidies. In addition, due to the characteristics of the industry, the manufacturing process of the product manufacturing process, the leadership consciousness, the market's demand for low-carbon products, the low-carbon technology innovation cost and so on, the enthusiasm of the low-carbon technology innovation is different. The enterprise is the main body of the low-carbon technology innovation, and the reward and punishment are often used in the process of stimulating the enterprise to carry on the technological innovation. When the government rewards and rewards the enterprise, the carbon emission of the enterprise is usually used as the main standard, and the reward and punishment basis is reasonable? Will the low-carbon production of the leading enterprise have a bad influence on the development of the enterprise? It is a key problem that how the government can lead different industries to carry out low-carbon production on the basis of the society's low-carbon demand and the fact that the enterprise has a reasonable and effective strategy to guide the enterprises in different industries. Firstly, through the analysis of the internal and external factors and the correlation of the low-carbon will of the enterprise, it is clear how the government can monitor and regulate the internal and external environment impact enterprise's low-carbon production will, and use the four analysis methods to classify the industrial enterprises in China. In-depth analysis of the influence of the government regulation on the enterprise's low-carbon production will and the development of the enterprise's health, the government should not only measure the carbon emission of the enterprise as the only index of the reward and punishment index, but also should be based on the enterprise's economic development level and the low-carbon technology maturity of the enterprise. Through the analysis of the main parameters affecting the enterprise's behavior decision-making, the effect of the enterprise's parameters on the formation mechanism of the low-carbon technology innovation in the government is clarified. To this end, a game model of two-stage dynamic evolution of the government-enterprise is set up: the first stage, through the establishment of the evolutionary game model, the key parameters of the optimal decision-making choice between the government and the enterprise in the game process are determined. In the second stage, the key parameter estimate of the enterprise's behavior decision is made for the past data of the enterprise in the course of the evolutionary game, and the low-carbon innovation ability of the enterprise is selected to carry out the financial low-carbon subsidy. Then, based on the analysis of the complex system of the low-carbon technology innovation, the game model is established based on the game state and the game forming mechanism between the government and the enterprise in different periods, different stages, The influence of the government's decision making on the performance index of the low-carbon technology innovation system in the enterprise is analyzed. In the decision-making game of the low-carbon technology innovation behavior, the objective function of a time segment depends on the game state of the current two parties and the game result in the evolution of the previous period. The decision-making model of the enterprise target under the dynamic game and the decision-making model of the government target under the dynamic game are respectively established, and the enterprise with the maximum profit is used to organize the production. The low-carbon regulation of the government can directly influence the decision-making behavior of the low-carbon technology innovation of the enterprise. The government's low-carbon economy and environmental protection responsibility target requires a steady increase in the amount of sales of an enterprise, or a steady decline in emissions from unit sales, which requires continuous low-carbon technology innovation. On the basis of this, the initiative of the low-carbon production of the enterprise is judged based on the stage index of the economic development level of the enterprise and the maturity of the low-carbon technology, and the guidance of the government policy rules is given according to the judgment result. In the end, the method for selecting the path of low-carbon regulation by double integration is put forward, and the simulation and application verification is carried out in the data of some research enterprise in Anhui province, and the result shows that the designed low-carbon regulation path is reasonable, It provides a scientific reference for the government to set the appropriate guidance for the low-carbon technology innovation in the low-carbon environment. the low-carbon technological innovation step-step cultivation mechanism based on the evolutionary game process parameter estimation value is developed according to the prepared low-carbon regulatory capital, the low-carbon index of the change and the actual development situation of the enterprise, which can provide the basis for the more reasonable guidance of the low-carbon technology innovation of the government in the low-carbon environment, In order to guide the government to find a suitable road for green health development, to help the government to select, control and guide the enterprises to carry out low-carbon production reasonably and effectively, to speed up the process of the low-carbon production and transformation path of the enterprise, and to make the low-carbon production in China, The road of sustainable development has some reference significance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工程大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 趙黎明;陳U喼，
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