【摘要】：股權(quán)分置改革后我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)形成了國(guó)有股、法人股和社會(huì)公眾股三種流通的股權(quán)形式。在這三種不同的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下,高管持股仍然可能對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性產(chǎn)生以下兩種影響;一是激發(fā)高管的積極性,降低委托代理成本,為企業(yè)創(chuàng)造更多的價(jià)值;二是在委托代理理論中的“管理者自利行為”仍然存在,可能產(chǎn)生高管為了達(dá)到公司業(yè)績(jī)目標(biāo)而操縱財(cái)務(wù)信息,降低會(huì)計(jì)信息的穩(wěn)健性。本文采用我國(guó)A股市場(chǎng)2010年至2015年這6年的數(shù)據(jù),對(duì)高管持股、終極產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)、終極產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)與高管持股關(guān)系以及終極產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下,高管持股與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系進(jìn)行全面分析。結(jié)合我國(guó)的國(guó)情進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析發(fā)現(xiàn):國(guó)有企業(yè),高管持股與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性負(fù)相關(guān)且效應(yīng)顯著;法人股控股企業(yè),高管持股與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性負(fù)相關(guān)但不顯著;社會(huì)公眾股控股企業(yè),高管持股與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性正相關(guān)且效應(yīng)顯著。原因主要有以下幾個(gè)方面:(1)由于國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的所有權(quán)缺位導(dǎo)致容易出現(xiàn)政府干預(yù)和內(nèi)部人控制問(wèn)題,并且國(guó)有企業(yè)存在層層委托代理關(guān)系,代理鏈條過(guò)長(zhǎng)使國(guó)家很難監(jiān)管國(guó)有資產(chǎn),高管持股會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性降低。(2)我國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)還是處于不太成熟度的階段,市場(chǎng)本身的不健全,法人股控股股東會(huì)進(jìn)行短期投資行為以進(jìn)行套利。法人股股東并沒(méi)有對(duì)公司高管產(chǎn)生多大的監(jiān)督作用,所以高管持股降低了會(huì)計(jì)信息的穩(wěn)健性。但是可能是由于我國(guó)近年來(lái)的市場(chǎng)改革體現(xiàn)法律體系建設(shè),使得監(jiān)管環(huán)境有所改善。以至于在法人股控股公司,高管持股與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系并不顯著。(3)社會(huì)公眾控股的上市公司,上市公司的業(yè)績(jī)會(huì)直接關(guān)系著社會(huì)公眾的切身利益。社會(huì)公眾股控股公司,控股股東有很強(qiáng)的意愿監(jiān)督公司高管的行為,高管為了私利進(jìn)行內(nèi)部操控的可行性較小。并且社會(huì)公眾股控制公司,高管持股比例很高,高管能夠很好的享受企業(yè)長(zhǎng)期剩余收益的果實(shí),高管會(huì)切實(shí)關(guān)注企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展。高管與股東形成一致的利益目標(biāo),社會(huì)公眾股控股公司,高管持股與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性正相關(guān)且效應(yīng)顯著。不同的終極產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下,為了更好的處理高管持股與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系,有以下四點(diǎn)建議:(1)不斷發(fā)展我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng),健全國(guó)有控股監(jiān)管機(jī)制;(2)強(qiáng)化市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管,健全法人股控股監(jiān)管機(jī)制;(3)進(jìn)一步開(kāi)放市場(chǎng),促進(jìn)社會(huì)公眾股控股企業(yè)的發(fā)展;(4)每個(gè)企業(yè)應(yīng)當(dāng)積極提高高管素質(zhì),完善企業(yè)的內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)。
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure, the capital market of our country has formed three kinds of circulating equity forms: state-owned stock, legal person stock and social public stock. Under these three different property rights, executive ownership may still have the following two effects on accounting conservatism: one is to stimulate the enthusiasm of executives, reduce the cost of principal-agent, and create more value for enterprises; Second, the "self-interest behavior of managers" still exists in the principal-agent theory, which may lead to executives manipulating financial information in order to achieve the corporate performance goal and reduce the conservatism of accounting information. This paper uses the data of six years from 2010 to 2015 in China's A-share market to analyze the ownership of senior executives, the relationship between the nature of the ultimate property right and the ownership of senior executives, as well as the nature of the ultimate property right. The relationship between executive ownership and accounting conservatism is comprehensively analyzed. Combined with the situation of China, empirical analysis found that: state-owned enterprises, executive ownership and accounting conservatism negative correlation and significant effect; legal holding enterprises, executive ownership and accounting conservatism negative correlation, but not significant; social public share holding enterprises. Executive ownership and accounting conservatism are positively correlated and have significant effects. The main reasons are as follows: (1) due to the lack of ownership of state-owned assets, the problems of government intervention and insider control are easy to appear, and there are many principal-agent relationships in state-owned enterprises. The long chain of agency makes it difficult for the state to supervise the state-owned assets, and the ownership of senior managers will lead to the decrease of accounting conservatism. (2) the capital market of our country is still in the stage of immaturity, and the market itself is not perfect. Corporate shareholders will carry out short-term investment to carry out arbitrage. Corporate shareholders do not have much oversight over corporate executives, so executive ownership reduces the conservatism of accounting information. But it is possible that the market reform in recent years reflects the construction of legal system, which improves the regulatory environment. Even in corporate holding companies, the negative correlation between executive ownership and accounting conservatism is not significant. (3) listed companies controlled by the public, the performance of listed companies will directly affect the immediate interests of the public. Public stock holding companies, controlling shareholders have a strong willingness to supervise the behavior of the company's executives, executives for private interests to carry out internal manipulation is less feasible. And the public shares control companies, the proportion of executive ownership is very high, executives can enjoy the fruits of long-term residual income, executives will really pay attention to the long-term development of enterprises. Executives and shareholders form a consistent interest goal, social public stock holding companies, executive ownership and accounting conservatism is positively related and significant effect. Under different ultimate property rights, in order to better deal with the relationship between executive ownership and accounting conservatism, there are four suggestions: (1) to continuously develop China's capital market and perfect the supervision mechanism of state-owned holding; (2) to strengthen market supervision; Third, to further open the market to promote the development of public stock holding enterprises; (4) every enterprise should actively improve the quality of senior executives, improve the internal governance structure of enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F272.91;F832.51

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