【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵作為一種長期的激勵制度,可以有效的改善企業(yè)所面臨的所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)相分離之后出現(xiàn)的代理問題。從2006年股權(quán)分置改革以來,由于法律制度環(huán)境的改善,我國實行股權(quán)激勵的公司逐年增加,但并不是所有懫用了股權(quán)激勵的企業(yè)都能取得良好的效果�；诖�,本文以上海家化為例對股權(quán)激勵的實施效果及影響因素進行分析研究具有重大意義。首先,本文采用規(guī)范研究法,對國內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵的實施效果、影響因素的相關(guān)文獻以及股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)理論進行總結(jié)。然后采用案例研究法,以文獻綜述及理論基礎(chǔ)為依據(jù),對上海家化實施效果及影響因素進行分析研究。本文主要從企業(yè)業(yè)績方面的直接效果和其他方面的間接效果來分析本文的股權(quán)激勵實施效果,直接效果即將實施前和實施后的企業(yè)業(yè)績進行縱向?qū)Ρ确治?間接效果即從人力資本的改善和科研創(chuàng)新狀況的提高來分析;影響因素從公司的內(nèi)外部環(huán)境以及股權(quán)激勵方案設(shè)計兩方面進行研究。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),上海家化股權(quán)激勵取得了較為積極的激勵效果,但是也存在失效之處。積極效果為表現(xiàn)為產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的轉(zhuǎn)變、行業(yè)的激烈競爭及股權(quán)激勵方案較為合理的設(shè)計使得公司盈利能力和償債能力得到了增強,并改善了員工的專業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)和受教育程度,提高了新項目以及專利的開發(fā)數(shù)量。失效之處表現(xiàn)為董事會結(jié)構(gòu)逐漸趨向不穩(wěn)定性給營運能力和發(fā)展能力帶來了不利影響,實施股權(quán)激勵期間,公司營運能力并沒有得到改善,同時發(fā)展能力雖然整體呈增長趨勢,但是不太穩(wěn)定;另一方面,2015年業(yè)績考核條件設(shè)置過高,使得2015年第一期激勵方案解鎖失敗,這也將對員工的積極性帶來影響。因此企業(yè)應(yīng)該重點加強內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)并提高股權(quán)激勵方案的科學(xué)性,確保股權(quán)激勵取得更好的實施效果。希望通過本文的研究,可以為上海家化及其他實施股權(quán)激勵的企業(yè)提供借鑒。
[Abstract]:As a long-term incentive system, equity incentive can effectively improve the agency problem after the separation of ownership and management rights. Since the reform of split share structure in 2006, due to the improvement of the legal system environment, the number of companies implementing equity incentive has increased year by year, but not all enterprises with equity incentive can achieve good results. Based on this, this paper takes Shanghai Jiahua as an example to analyze the effect of equity incentive and its influencing factors. First of all, this paper uses the normative research method to summarize the implementation effect of equity incentive, the related literature of influencing factors and the relevant theory of equity incentive at home and abroad. Based on the literature review and theoretical basis, this paper analyzes the effect and influencing factors of Shanghai Jiahua. This paper mainly analyzes the effect of equity incentive from the direct effect of enterprise performance and indirect effect of other aspects. The direct effect will be compared and analyzed vertically before and after implementation. The indirect effect is analyzed from the improvement of human capital and the improvement of scientific research innovation, and the influencing factors are studied from two aspects: the internal and external environment of the company and the design of equity incentive scheme. The study found that Shanghai Jiahua equity incentive has achieved a more positive incentive effect, but there are also failures. The positive effect is the change of the property right, the fierce competition in the industry and the reasonable design of the equity incentive scheme make the profitability and solvency of the company enhanced, and improve the professional structure and education level of the employees. Increased number of new projects and patents developed. The failure shows that the structure of the board of directors tends to be unstable and has a negative impact on the operating capacity and development ability. During the implementation of equity incentive, the operating ability of the company has not been improved, while the overall development capacity has shown a trend of growth. On the other hand, the 2015 performance appraisal conditions were set too high, resulting in the failure of the first phase of the 2015 incentive package unlocking, which will also have an impact on the motivation of employees. Therefore, enterprises should focus on strengthening the internal governance structure and improving the scientific nature of the equity incentive scheme to ensure better implementation effect of equity incentive. Through the research of this paper, we hope to provide reference for Shanghai Jiahua and other enterprises implementing equity incentive.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92

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