董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效的影響
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-13 16:19
【摘要】：“促進(jìn)人類社會(huì)可持續(xù)發(fā)展”成為了21世紀(jì)企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)自身價(jià)值的重要目標(biāo),各行各業(yè)的企業(yè)積極投入到公益性事業(yè),承擔(dān)了越來(lái)越多的社會(huì)責(zé)任,用實(shí)際行動(dòng)踐行企業(yè)諾言。在聯(lián)合國(guó)《全球契約》、跨國(guó)企業(yè)公民條文等社會(huì)責(zé)任運(yùn)動(dòng)的號(hào)召下,在2011年國(guó)際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)ISO26000社會(huì)責(zé)任指南和2012年國(guó)際認(rèn)證聯(lián)盟IQNet SR 10《社會(huì)責(zé)任管理體系》認(rèn)證標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的指引下,各經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)域聯(lián)盟將會(huì)不斷根據(jù)本國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)比較優(yōu)勢(shì)制定企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任行為準(zhǔn)則和市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入條件,即“社會(huì)責(zé)任壁壘”,以此來(lái)規(guī)范本土民族企業(yè)和海外跨國(guó)集團(tuán)的社會(huì)責(zé)任行為,增加本國(guó)企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)實(shí)力,并以此來(lái)削弱外國(guó)企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。因此,當(dāng)踐行社會(huì)責(zé)任已經(jīng)成為國(guó)際市場(chǎng)的通行證時(shí),中國(guó)本土企業(yè)要想到海外發(fā)展,同海外企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),就需要提前研究分析國(guó)外市場(chǎng)中的企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任準(zhǔn)則條例,打破相關(guān)國(guó)家的政策門檻,將當(dāng)?shù)氐钠髽I(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效考核融入到企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略發(fā)展評(píng)估體系中,在企業(yè)內(nèi)部實(shí)施有效的企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任管理,才能最大程度的降低市場(chǎng)壁壘,提高本土企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。那么,企業(yè)如何才會(huì)主動(dòng)且有效地承擔(dān)社會(huì)責(zé)任呢?董事會(huì)作為企業(yè)發(fā)展的核心,任何重大戰(zhàn)略的抉擇都是由董事會(huì)決定,企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略性的承擔(dān)社會(huì)責(zé)任這一重要部署同樣也離不開(kāi)董事會(huì),所以說(shuō)董事會(huì)是推動(dòng)企業(yè)承擔(dān)社會(huì)責(zé)任的內(nèi)源性力量。但是,并不是所有的董事會(huì)都制定社會(huì)責(zé)任的戰(zhàn)略性目標(biāo),現(xiàn)階段的部分董事會(huì)受過(guò)去國(guó)有企業(yè)的影響,對(duì)企業(yè)承擔(dān)社會(huì)責(zé)任與企業(yè)辦社會(huì)的認(rèn)知并不十分清晰。通過(guò)對(duì)中國(guó)A股上市公司的社會(huì)責(zé)任報(bào)告的分析發(fā)現(xiàn),往往社會(huì)責(zé)任表現(xiàn)不佳的公司,其董事會(huì)治理結(jié)構(gòu)也相應(yīng)會(huì)有一定的局限性。因此,董事會(huì)采取什么樣的結(jié)構(gòu)配置才能最大限度的提高企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效?為什么不同的董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)特征會(huì)顯著影響企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效?這是本文研究的核心。本文選取了2009-2015年的中國(guó)A股數(shù)據(jù),探討了董事會(huì)規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事占比、董事學(xué)歷程度、女性董事比例、董事會(huì)成員平均年齡,董事長(zhǎng)是否兼任CEO這六個(gè)方面的董事會(huì)特征與企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明:董事會(huì)規(guī)模與企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效呈U型關(guān)系,即當(dāng)董事會(huì)規(guī)模小于10人時(shí),董事會(huì)規(guī)模與企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效負(fù)相關(guān);董事會(huì)規(guī)模大于10人,則正向影響企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效。董事會(huì)平均年齡越高,企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效越好。高學(xué)歷董事占比越高,企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效越好。女性董事占比與企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效負(fù)相關(guān)。出現(xiàn)這種情況可能是因?yàn)橹袊?guó)女性董事較為稀缺,受中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)文化的影響,女性話語(yǔ)權(quán)較小,因此在企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任的表現(xiàn)中,女性的獨(dú)特視角及決策能力未能顯現(xiàn)出來(lái)。獨(dú)立董事占比與企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效并無(wú)顯著相關(guān)性,但獨(dú)立董事占比過(guò)半的董事會(huì)與企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效顯著正相關(guān)。原因可能是(1)獨(dú)立董事的比例過(guò)低,在董事會(huì)中缺乏話語(yǔ)權(quán),導(dǎo)致獨(dú)立董事的監(jiān)督功能失效,不能對(duì)董事長(zhǎng)的權(quán)利進(jìn)行約束;(2)獨(dú)立董事的聘用與選拔制度缺乏獨(dú)立性,使得獨(dú)立董事與大股東有一定的關(guān)聯(lián)性,這種關(guān)聯(lián)性使得小股東的利益得不到保障,如果獨(dú)立董事不能根據(jù)實(shí)際情況獨(dú)立的作出決策,將會(huì)大大降低獨(dú)立董事的獨(dú)立性;(3)獨(dú)立董事的兼任多家企業(yè)董事的現(xiàn)象頗為普遍,由于個(gè)人精力的限制,身兼多家公司的獨(dú)立董事因精力限制,難以有效完成同時(shí)對(duì)多家公司行使董事的監(jiān)督權(quán),造成其他利益相關(guān)者的利益受到侵犯。董事長(zhǎng)是否兼任CEO與企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任績(jī)效并無(wú)顯著相關(guān)性,這說(shuō)明董事長(zhǎng)和總經(jīng)理是否由同一人兼任對(duì)公司社會(huì)責(zé)任的履行并沒(méi)有一致結(jié)論,即兩職兼任或分離需要根據(jù)企業(yè)自身來(lái)進(jìn)行設(shè)置。基于以上結(jié)論,本文認(rèn)為:(1)在法定范圍內(nèi)增加董事會(huì)成員,爭(zhēng)取接近規(guī)定上限;(2)建立完善的獨(dú)立董事制度(包括增加獨(dú)立董事人數(shù),完善獨(dú)立董事選任制度,確保獨(dú)立董事的獨(dú)立性不受其他影響,限制獨(dú)立董事的身兼多家企業(yè)董事的現(xiàn)象);(3)設(shè)定與公司自身業(yè)務(wù)相契合的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)結(jié)構(gòu)(兩職分離或兩職合一);(4)聘任更多高學(xué)歷的董事,充實(shí)公司的智囊團(tuán);(5)選任更多的女性董事,爭(zhēng)取在公司董事會(huì)組成中達(dá)到男女平衡的狀態(tài);(6)選取年齡段合適的董事會(huì)成員,保證董事會(huì)成員在年齡上的聚焦和連續(xù)性,為企業(yè)履行社會(huì)責(zé)任提供良好的氛圍。
[Abstract]:"Promoting the Sustainable Development of Human Society" has become an important goal for enterprises to realize their own value in the 21st century. Enterprises from all walks of life actively devote themselves to public welfare undertakings, undertake more and more social responsibilities, and practice their promises with practical actions. Under the guidance of the 2011 International Standard ISO26000 Social Responsibility Guidelines and the 2012 International Certification Union IQNet SR 10 < Social Responsibility Management System > Certification Standards, the economic regional alliances will continue to formulate corporate social responsibility codes of conduct and market access conditions, namely "social responsibility barriers", in accordance with their own economic comparative advantages. Therefore, when the practice of social responsibility has become the passport of the international market, Chinese local enterprises need to study ahead if they want to develop overseas and compete with overseas enterprises. To study and analyze the rules and regulations of CSR in foreign markets, break the policy threshold of relevant countries, integrate the local CSR performance appraisal into the enterprise strategic development appraisal system, and implement effective CSR management in enterprises, can reduce the market barriers to the greatest extent and improve the competition of local enterprises. As the core of the development of enterprises, the board of directors decides any major strategic decisions. The important deployment of strategic corporate social responsibility can not be separated from the board of directors. So the board of directors is to promote corporate social responsibility. However, not all boards of directors have formulated strategic objectives of social responsibility. Some boards of directors at this stage are affected by state-owned enterprises in the past, and their understanding of corporate social responsibility and corporate social management is not very clear. Therefore, what kind of structure can the board adopt to maximize corporate social responsibility performance? Why different board structure characteristics will significantly affect corporate social responsibility performance? This is the core of this paper. Based on the A-share data of China from 2009 to 2015, this paper explores the relationship between board characteristics and corporate social responsibility performance in six aspects: board size, the proportion of independent directors, directors'educational background, the proportion of female directors, the average age of board members, and whether the chairman is concurrent CEO. When the board size is less than 10 people, the board size and corporate social responsibility performance are negatively correlated; if the board size is larger than 10 people, corporate social responsibility performance is positively affected. OK. The proportion of female directors is negatively correlated with CSR performance. This may be due to the scarcity of female directors in China. Influenced by Chinese traditional culture, female voice is relatively small. Therefore, in the performance of CSR, women's unique perspective and decision-making ability can not be shown. The proportion of independent directors and enterprises. There is no significant correlation between the performance of social responsibility, but the board of directors with more than half of the independent directors has a significant positive correlation with the performance of corporate social responsibility. The lack of independence in the system of employment and selection makes independent directors and major shareholders have certain relevance, which makes the interests of minority shareholders not guaranteed. If independent directors can not make independent decisions according to the actual situation, it will greatly reduce the independence of independent directors. (3) Independent directors concurrently serve as directors of many enterprises now. As is quite common, due to the limitation of personal energy, independent directors of many companies are difficult to effectively complete the supervision of directors of many companies at the same time, resulting in infringement of the interests of other stakeholders. Based on the above conclusions, this paper holds that: (1) increase the number of board members within the statutory scope, strive to close to the prescribed ceiling; (2) establish a sound independent director system (including increasing the number of independent directors) Increase the number of independent directors, improve the appointment system of independent directors, ensure that the independence of independent directors is not affected by other factors, restrict the phenomenon of independent directors and multiple enterprise directors; (3) set up a leadership structure consistent with the company's own business (separation of two positions or integration of two positions); (4) hire more highly educated directors, enrich the company's think tank. (5) Select more female directors, strive to achieve gender balance in the composition of the board of directors; (6) Select the appropriate age group of board members, to ensure the focus and continuity of board members in the age, to provide a good atmosphere for enterprises to fulfill their social responsibilities.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F270
本文編號(hào)：2181525
[Abstract]:"Promoting the Sustainable Development of Human Society" has become an important goal for enterprises to realize their own value in the 21st century. Enterprises from all walks of life actively devote themselves to public welfare undertakings, undertake more and more social responsibilities, and practice their promises with practical actions. Under the guidance of the 2011 International Standard ISO26000 Social Responsibility Guidelines and the 2012 International Certification Union IQNet SR 10 < Social Responsibility Management System > Certification Standards, the economic regional alliances will continue to formulate corporate social responsibility codes of conduct and market access conditions, namely "social responsibility barriers", in accordance with their own economic comparative advantages. Therefore, when the practice of social responsibility has become the passport of the international market, Chinese local enterprises need to study ahead if they want to develop overseas and compete with overseas enterprises. To study and analyze the rules and regulations of CSR in foreign markets, break the policy threshold of relevant countries, integrate the local CSR performance appraisal into the enterprise strategic development appraisal system, and implement effective CSR management in enterprises, can reduce the market barriers to the greatest extent and improve the competition of local enterprises. As the core of the development of enterprises, the board of directors decides any major strategic decisions. The important deployment of strategic corporate social responsibility can not be separated from the board of directors. So the board of directors is to promote corporate social responsibility. However, not all boards of directors have formulated strategic objectives of social responsibility. Some boards of directors at this stage are affected by state-owned enterprises in the past, and their understanding of corporate social responsibility and corporate social management is not very clear. Therefore, what kind of structure can the board adopt to maximize corporate social responsibility performance? Why different board structure characteristics will significantly affect corporate social responsibility performance? This is the core of this paper. Based on the A-share data of China from 2009 to 2015, this paper explores the relationship between board characteristics and corporate social responsibility performance in six aspects: board size, the proportion of independent directors, directors'educational background, the proportion of female directors, the average age of board members, and whether the chairman is concurrent CEO. When the board size is less than 10 people, the board size and corporate social responsibility performance are negatively correlated; if the board size is larger than 10 people, corporate social responsibility performance is positively affected. OK. The proportion of female directors is negatively correlated with CSR performance. This may be due to the scarcity of female directors in China. Influenced by Chinese traditional culture, female voice is relatively small. Therefore, in the performance of CSR, women's unique perspective and decision-making ability can not be shown. The proportion of independent directors and enterprises. There is no significant correlation between the performance of social responsibility, but the board of directors with more than half of the independent directors has a significant positive correlation with the performance of corporate social responsibility. The lack of independence in the system of employment and selection makes independent directors and major shareholders have certain relevance, which makes the interests of minority shareholders not guaranteed. If independent directors can not make independent decisions according to the actual situation, it will greatly reduce the independence of independent directors. (3) Independent directors concurrently serve as directors of many enterprises now. As is quite common, due to the limitation of personal energy, independent directors of many companies are difficult to effectively complete the supervision of directors of many companies at the same time, resulting in infringement of the interests of other stakeholders. Based on the above conclusions, this paper holds that: (1) increase the number of board members within the statutory scope, strive to close to the prescribed ceiling; (2) establish a sound independent director system (including increasing the number of independent directors) Increase the number of independent directors, improve the appointment system of independent directors, ensure that the independence of independent directors is not affected by other factors, restrict the phenomenon of independent directors and multiple enterprise directors; (3) set up a leadership structure consistent with the company's own business (separation of two positions or integration of two positions); (4) hire more highly educated directors, enrich the company's think tank. (5) Select more female directors, strive to achieve gender balance in the composition of the board of directors; (6) Select the appropriate age group of board members, to ensure the focus and continuity of board members in the age, to provide a good atmosphere for enterprises to fulfill their social responsibilities.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F270
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