【摘要】：近幾年來(lái),我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的繁榮,就業(yè)問題的緩解以及在創(chuàng)新、擴(kuò)大出口等方面的進(jìn)步都離不開我國(guó)中小企業(yè)的大力支持,而且中小企業(yè)正以較快的發(fā)展速度不斷擴(kuò)大數(shù)量。然而中小企業(yè)在投資過程中的非效率投資問題卻成了中小企業(yè)發(fā)展的絆腳石。引起中小企的非效率投資因素主要有兩方面;一是外部融資問題,二是企業(yè)內(nèi)部代理問題導(dǎo)致的利益沖突問題。因此,中小企業(yè)投資效率問題應(yīng)得到重視并解決,這樣企業(yè)的價(jià)值才會(huì)提升,我國(guó)的金融體系才會(huì)完善。本文首先對(duì)中小企業(yè)在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中的作用和發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析,進(jìn)而分析了與非效率投資的相關(guān)的信息不對(duì)稱理論、委托代理理論、和自由現(xiàn)金流理論,并結(jié)合我國(guó)中小企業(yè)板上市公司的特點(diǎn)分析以上三個(gè)理論如何引起非效率投資問題,在理論基礎(chǔ)之上系統(tǒng)的分析我國(guó)中小企業(yè)板上市公司的融資情況和投資情況,并總結(jié)出影響中小企業(yè)非效率投資的因素。最后進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,首先分析總體負(fù)債、債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)以及債務(wù)來(lái)源結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)企業(yè)非效率投資的影響,其次從股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡、管理層持股三方面來(lái)研究股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)非效率投資的影響。本文選取2012-2014年中小企業(yè)板上市公司作為研究對(duì)象,運(yùn)用spss22.0軟件進(jìn)行模型的實(shí)證分析。我國(guó)中小企業(yè)板上市公司的融資情況和投資情況以及模型的實(shí)證分析結(jié)果得出我國(guó)中小企業(yè)普遍存在融資約束和投資不足的非效率投資行為,進(jìn)而分析了影響企業(yè)非效率投資的因素。從融資情況來(lái)看,中小企業(yè)主要以外部融資為主,并且債務(wù)融資略高于股權(quán)融資,本文首先從總體債務(wù),債務(wù)期限及債務(wù)來(lái)源(銀行借款、商業(yè)信用)三方面分析了債務(wù)融資對(duì)非效率投資的影響,實(shí)證結(jié)果表明債務(wù)不但沒有引起投資不足,而且還緩解了投資不足,與銀行借款相比,商業(yè)信用更能有效的抑制投資不足,短期借款比長(zhǎng)期借款更能有效的緩解投資不足。從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)角度得出第一大股東持股比例普遍較高從而導(dǎo)致投資不足,管理層持股可以有效的緩解投資不足,在中小企業(yè)中股權(quán)制衡作用不明顯,不能有效地抑制企業(yè)的非效率投資。本文根據(jù)以上結(jié)論提出相應(yīng)的政策建議,解決中小企業(yè)融資難的問題;完善商業(yè)信用負(fù)債市場(chǎng);銀行擴(kuò)大對(duì)中小企業(yè)長(zhǎng)期貸款比例;合理分配股權(quán),發(fā)揮股權(quán)制衡作用。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the prosperity of China's economy, the alleviation of employment problems and the progress in innovation and export expansion can not be separated from the support of small and medium-sized enterprises in our country, and the number of small and medium-sized enterprises is expanding at a relatively fast speed. However, the problem of inefficient investment in the process of investment has become a stumbling block for the development of SMEs. There are two main factors causing the inefficient investment of SMEs: one is the external financing problem, the other is the conflict of interest caused by the internal agency problem. Therefore, the investment efficiency of small and medium-sized enterprises should be paid attention to and solved so that the value of enterprises will be improved and the financial system of our country will be improved. This paper first analyzes the role and current situation of SMEs in economic development, and then analyzes the information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory and free cash flow theory related to inefficient investment. Combined with the characteristics of Chinese SME board listed companies, this paper analyzes how the above three theories cause inefficient investment problems, and systematically analyzes the financing situation and investment situation of Chinese SME board listed companies on the basis of theory. And summed up the factors that affect the non-efficient investment of small and medium-sized enterprises. Finally, the paper analyzes the influence of total debt, debt maturity structure and debt source structure on the non-efficient investment of enterprises, and secondly, from the equity concentration, equity balance. The influence of ownership structure on non-efficient investment is studied in three aspects. In this paper, we choose the SME board listed companies as the research object in 2012-2014, and use spss22.0 software to carry on the empirical analysis of the model. The results of empirical analysis on the financing situation and investment situation of Chinese SME board listed companies as well as the empirical analysis of the model show that there are generally inefficient investment behaviors of financing constraints and underinvestment in SMEs in China. Then it analyzes the factors that affect the inefficiency investment of enterprises. From the point of view of financing situation, SMEs mainly focus on external financing, and debt financing is slightly higher than equity financing. This paper analyzes the impact of debt financing on inefficient investment from three aspects. The empirical results show that debt not only does not cause underinvestment, but also alleviates the underinvestment, compared with bank borrowing. Business credit is more effective in curbing underinvestment, and short-term borrowing is more effective than long-term borrowing to alleviate underinvestment. From the point of view of equity structure, it can be concluded that the proportion of the largest shareholders is generally high, which leads to insufficient investment. Management ownership can effectively alleviate the lack of investment, and the role of equity balance is not obvious in small and medium-sized enterprises. It can not effectively restrain the inefficient investment of enterprises. According to the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations to solve the financing difficulties of SMEs; improve the commercial credit debt market; banks to expand the proportion of long-term loans to SMEs; reasonable allocation of equity, play a role of equity checks and balances.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F276.3

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