基于資金約束零售商的雙渠道制造商貿(mào)易信貸與提前訂貨折扣契約選擇策略研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-07-02 12:51
本文選題:需求不確定 + 雙渠道 ; 參考:《系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐》2017年05期
【摘要】:在市場需求不確定情形下,研究了當(dāng)零售商存在資金約束,而雙渠道制造商采用三種不同契約策略時(shí),供應(yīng)鏈各主體運(yùn)作策略和收益.結(jié)果指出:當(dāng)零售商資金不足而制造商為其提供貿(mào)易信貸契約時(shí),零售商訂貨資金不足的困境得到有效解決,零售商和雙渠道制造商的利潤均高于無任何契約時(shí)各主體利潤;當(dāng)零售商資金不足而制造商在其網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道提供提前訂貨折扣契約時(shí),制造商的利潤始終高于無任何契約時(shí)其所得的利潤,而零售商的利潤始終不高于無任何契約時(shí)其所得的利潤;最后,當(dāng)制造商聯(lián)合采用兩種不同契約時(shí),制造商收益始終高于零售商無資金約束時(shí)其所得利潤,即供應(yīng)鏈中零售商資金約束困境對制造商來說并非始終是有害的,制造商可以通過在雙渠道聯(lián)合采用兩種不同契約的方法獲得更多的收益.
[Abstract]:In the case of uncertain market demand, when the retailer has financial constraints and the dual-channel manufacturer adopts three different contract strategies, the operation strategy and revenue of the supply chain are studied. The results show that when the retailer is short of funds and the manufacturer provides the trade credit contract, the dilemma of the retailer's insufficient order funds is effectively solved, and the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer of the double channel is higher than that of the main body without any contract. When retailers are underfunded and manufacturers offer discount contracts for early orders through their network channels, the manufacturer's profits are always higher than they would have been in the absence of any contracts, The retailer's profit is never higher than that of the retailer without any contract. Finally, when the manufacturer adopts two different contracts, the manufacturer's profit is always higher than the retailer's profit if the retailer has no financial constraints. That is, the retailer's financial constraint is not always harmful to the manufacturer in the supply chain, and the manufacturer can make more profit by using two different contracts in two channels.
【作者單位】: 河南師范大學(xué)商學(xué)院;華南理工大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家自然科學(xué)基金(71131003,71402171) 河南省高等學(xué)校哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)應(yīng)用研究重大項(xiàng)目(2017-YYZD-10)~~
【分類號】:F274
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